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Abstract
The thesis investigates how political actors remade key aspects of Europe’s
economic landscape after World Wars I and II. The first and the second case deal
with the borders of the Polish state; the third case investigates German
reparations after World War I; the fourth case looks at the internal processes of
the American administration in dealing with Germany’s reconstruction after
World War II.
The thesis argues that actors remade Europe’s economy by using cognitive
artefacts, such as cartographic maps, statistical tables or accounting procedures.
Because cognitive artefacts are explicit where written and spoken statements are
vague, they complement and expand the textual and verbal record. One of the
consequences is that we gain a different perspective of the performance of
political actors, which leads to a re-evaluation of diplomacy after World War I. It
has received a largely negative appraisal so far. That seems rather
disproportionate if due consideration is given to cognitive artefacts.
Moreover, the analysis of cognitive artefacts shows that the results actors
achieved, were not solely outcomes of rationality or policy discourse. Actors used
maps, statistical tables etc to develop jointly ad hoc ways of reasoning that were
synthetic, open-ended and considerably nuanced. Therefore, the thesis proposes
cognitive artefacts as an analytical framework for political agency. By producing,
circulating, rejecting and modifying them in an iterative process, actors identify
and structure their individual and their joint agency. As actors go through this
process, their cooperation as well their noncooperation take shape. In using
cognitive artefacts, actors are at the same time aligning and legitimising their
agency. That involves persuasion, coercion and deceit, but not necessarily shared
views.
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1 Introduction
Contents
1.1 Diplomacy and the remaking of economies, 1917 - 1947 14
1.2 Political agency and institutionalist political economy 17
1.3 Cognitive artefacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
This study revisits four instances of high-level diplomacy between 1917 and 1947
that determined basic features of the economic landscape after World Wars I and
II. The first and the second case investigate the borders of the Polish state after
the two wars; the third case deals with Germany’s reparations after 1918; the
fourth case looks at the American administration’s internal processes of dealing
with Germany’s reconstruction after World War II, see fig. 1.1, p. 13.
Why revisit these extensively covered moments in history? What is it that
scholarship so far has not told us? We know a great deal about the diplomatic
actors that were involved and the conditions under which they acted. We know
their relative power, their political goals and strategic interests, even their
personalities and the lunches they took. Equally, we know the diplomatic
outcomes they produced. The Polish border was fixed in a concrete place
eventually. The process, however, by which diplomatic results were achieved has
remained rather obscure. Did diplomats calculate the location of the border? If
so, what was the formula? Or was the border the consequence of applying
political ideas and principles? Again, what were those ideas? I will show that
outcomes were neither determined by political ideas nor by calculations. Such
elements were part of the process, e.g., the idea of separating ethnicities by
borders or the calculation of war damages to get at Germany’s reparation
12
1 Introduction
Figure 1.1: Structure of thesis
13
1 Introduction
obligation. I argue, however, that actors arrived at concrete results through
cognitive artefacts like maps or statistical tables.
This introduction is structured as follows. In the first section I give an overview
of the historical cases and the actors that were involved. The second section
discusses the notions of political agency that are put forward by the two broad
strands in the institutionalist political economy literature. I argue that they
cannot explain concrete diplomatic outcomes because their accounts of political
agency are inadequate. In the third section I motivate why this study is looking
to maps, statistical tables and the like to get insight into political agency. I
introduce the notion of cognitive artefacts and, to stake out the conceptual
domain in which they are located, discuss several theoretical elements from the
sociology of scientific knowledge. These elements will serve to differentiate and
refine the notion of cognitive artefacts in the case studies.
1.1 Diplomacy and the remaking of economies, 1917 -
1947
State borders in Europe changed frequently between 1914 and 1945, testifying to
underlying political, social and economic conflicts. Arguably, the Polish
experience was the most extreme with respect to borders. Norman Davies (2005)
titled his history of Poland God’s Playground.1 Poland had disappeared as an
independent state at the end of the 18th century, when she was partitioned by
Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Russia. Poland was reborn in the years after the
Great War. Her borders were determined after the armistice between the Allies
and Germany on 11 November 1918.2 The western border was settled in a
diplomatic process that began in early 1917 and ended with the Versailles Treaty
in June 1919. The eastern border was determined by the Polish Army in the
Polish-Soviet War that ended with the Treaty of Riga on 18 March 1921. The
1Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland (New York, NY: Columbia University
Press, 2005).
2Nominally, the United States were an Associated Power, not one of the Allies. I include the
United States into the Allies though.
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focus of the first case is the diplomacy leading to Poland’s border with Germany.
This process had four key actors. The American President Woodrow Wilson,
Britain’s Prime Minister Lloyd George, French President Georges Clemenceau
and Roman Dmowski, Polish exile politician and Head of the Polish Delegation at
the Paris Peace Conference. They were supported by other high-ranking
politicians, advisers, diplomats and technical experts.
In 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union occupied and partitioned Poland again,
but she re-emerged over the course of World War II. Her borders shifted
westwards though, roughly losing a third of her territory to the Soviet Union and
gaining a third from Germany. This is the subject of the second case. Winston
Churchill, British Prime Minister and one of the main actors, compared the
territorial shift to a soldier performing the drill left-close. The main actors were
the heads of state of the Grand Alliance, the coalition fighting Nazi Germany.
These were, in addition to Churchill, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt
and Joseph Stalin, General secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet
Union. Advisers and experts were part of the diplomatic process as well.
The years between 1914 and 1945 witnessed deep economic disruptions. Both
wars destroyed human capital and physical assets and challenged existing patterns
of economic integration. In the First World War, according to Jari Eloranta and
Mark Harrison (2010), some countries lost up to 7.2% of their human capital
(France) and 54.7% of their national wealth (Germany); in the Second World War
the Soviet Union lost approximately 19% of her human capital and 25% of her
national wealth.3 After the wars, these damages raised compensation and
international economic recovery as diplomatic issues. In both instances the focus
was on Germany. She had started and lost both wars and therefore bore
disproportionate responsibility for the damage in the eyes of the winners.
Moreover, Germany was at the centre of intra-European division of labour.
The third case focuses on the diplomacy during 1920/21 over Germany’s
reparation payments. In 1918, immediately after the war, the US had set German
3Jari Eloranta and Mark Harrison, ‘War and disintegration, 1914-1950’, chap. 6 in The Cam-
bridge Economic History of Europe, 1870 to the Present, ed. Stephen Broadberry and Kevin
H. O’Rourke, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 149-50.
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reparations as the main item of the diplomatic agenda. The US had financed the
Allies during the war and insisted that loans were repaid in full, $9.5bn in total.
The bulk had gone to Britain, $4.9bn, and France, $4bn.4 Britain was herself a
net creditor, but her main debtors were hard-pressed for money. Russia’s debt to
Britain were $2.7bn, France’s $2.1bn and Italy’s $2.0bn.5 Defaulting on their
American loans was neither an option for Britain nor France and resistance to
domestic taxation mounted quickly, leading to reparation demands. The main
actors were Britain’s Lloyd George and French Prime Minister, later President,
Alexandre Millerand, both supported by financial experts. Formally, there was no
American representative because Congress never ratified the Treaty of Versailles.
Moreover, reparation politics had a strong public dimension because the popular
press in France and Britain paid close attention.
The fourth case investigates the internal diplomacy of the US administration in
1945/46. The question was which role Germany’s economy should play in
Europe’s recovery, hence what kind of occupation policy the US should pursue.
The main actors were the Washington administration and high-ranking officials in
the American military administration in Germany, such as Lucius D. Clay,
Deputy Military Governor, William H. Draper, Director of the Economics
Division, and Bernard Bernstein, Director of the Finance Division. They were
supported by various units. International coordination over reparations was only
a minor issue after World War II, not least because each of the Allies controlled a
zone of occupation. There, according to John Gimbel (1990), they could ‘exploit
and plunder as they liked’.6 According to Adam Tooze (2006), it is ‘one of the
4Stephen Broadberry and Peter Howlett, ‘The United Kingdom during World War I: business
as usual?’, chap. 7 in The Economics of World War I, ed. Stephen Broadberry and Mark
Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 206–232, pp. 221-1; Pierre-Cyrille
Hautcoeur, Was the Great War a watershed? The economics of World War I in France, ed.
Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 169–
205, p. 191.
5Broadberry and Howlett, ‘The United Kingdom during World War I’, pp. 221-2.
6John Gimbel, Science, Technology and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Ger-
many (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990).
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most persistent myths’ that the quarrels after 1918 had taught the Allies not to
extract reparations.7
1.2 Political agency and institutionalist political economy
To understand diplomatic processes it is helpful to have a notion of political
agency. Which frameworks are there to conceptualise what political actors do?
How do actors achieve concrete results? There are two broad strands in the
institutionalist political economy literature: rationalist and historical
institutionalism. The former provides an account of political agency that is based
on individual rationality. The latter conceives political agency as outcome of a
social process that provides agents with options for action. I argue that neither
framework allows us to explain how Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and all
the others achieved the results they did.
Rationalist institutionalists, such as Douglass C. North (1997), maintain that
humans have created and used institutions to structure interaction ‘in a world of
uncertainty’.8 That is, institutions are an extension of rationality which in turn
presupposes individual choice and agency.9 In such a framework North, John
Joseph Wallis and Barry Weingast (2009) are examining the relationship between
the social order of states and their economic development. They distinguish
between ‘natural states’ and ‘open access orders’ and argue that only the latter
7Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (Lon-
don: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 673. A detailed discussion of reparations for the western zones is
Werner Plumpe, ‘Die Reparationsleistungen Westdeutschlands nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg’,
in Die Wirtschaft im geteilten und vereinten Deutschland, ed. Karl Eckart and Jo¨rg Roesler
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999), 31–46, for the eastern zone in Jochen Laufer, ‘Politik und
Bilanz der sowjetischen Demontagen in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1950’, in Sowjetische Demontagen
in Deutschland 1944-1949: Hintergru¨nde, Ziele und Wirkungen, ed. Rainer Karlsch, Jochen
Laufer and Friederike Sattler (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002), 31–77.
8Douglass C. North, ‘Prologue’, in The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics (London:
Academic Press, 1997), p. 6.
9This rationalist conception of institutions can also be found in Judith Goldstein and Robert O.
Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, Cornell
Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).
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are capable of sustained economic development.10 Natural states control violence
by allocating rents to members of the elite, a process based on personal
relationships. Open access orders, in comparison, control violence through an
impersonal process of economic and political competition. North et al explain
political agency in either social order through the rationality of agents. The
authors argue that individuals ‘are trying to accomplish the best outcomes with
their limited resources and choices’.11 That is, individuals are rational and
intentional within the boundaries of what they know and believe. Knowledge and
beliefs in turn follow from experience and education.
For historical institutionalists, actors have political agency within a realm of
policy discourse. Peter A. Hall (1993) argues that this realm is usually rather
stable and consists of a ‘framework of ideas and standards’.12 These amount to a
‘policy paradigm’, modelled on Kuhn’s notion, that specifies the goals and means
of policy as well as the nature of the problem policy addresses.13 Hence a policy
paradigm presents agents with a certain set of options, such as Keynesian
macroeconomic policy in Britain in the first decades after 1945. The political
agency of an actor consists in choosing from a set of options that a policy
paradigm makes available.
We begin to see the limitations of the rationalist and the historical framework
under conditions of informational uncertainty or when there is no political room
for manoeuvre. How do we account for political agency when rational
considerations are inconclusive? What do political actors do if the policy
paradigm presents them with no options at all or offers only choices that are
infeasible or socially unacceptable?
North et al acknowledge that there are limitations to rationality where ‘changes
in the environment are novel, without precedent’ and therefore require a
10Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders:
A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), pp. 18-22.
11Ibid., p. 28.
12Peter A. Hall, ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic Poli-
cymaking in Britain’, Comparative Politics 25, no. 3 (April 1993): p. 279.
13Ibid.
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‘changing structure of human interaction’.14 To understand agency under these
circumstances, they argue, a ‘necessary preliminary is to understand how the
brain interprets signals received by the senses and how the mind structures the
result into coherent beliefs’.15 Similarly, Goldstein and Keohane argue that ideas
work like ‘road maps’ that ‘clarify causal principles and conceptions of causal
relationships’; as such, ideas are forerunners of institutions and ‘continue to guide
action’ once they are ‘institutionalised’.16
In dealing with limitations of rationality, the rationalist approach moves into the
domain of the neurosciences. North et al admit that it is unclear if the neuro-
economic ideas they postulate even exist or how they might be formed. More
problematic from the perspective of social sciences and history though is what the
rationalist approach disregards by postulating subconscious micro-economic ideas:
there is a broad range of things that political actors do under uncertainty. They
reason, tinker and coordinate. Robert Bates (2010) makes the same point and
argues that North et al miss out on ‘micro-reasoning’ and the role it plays for
‘active agents’.17
The historical approach recognises that political agency becomes increasingly
difficult when the discourse changes that underpins the policy paradigm or when
anomalies occur, such as stagflation.18 This reduces and obfuscates the options of
agents. Examples are Hall’s own account of stagflation and British economic
policy in the 1970s or the work of Mark Blyth (2002).19 Hall’s proposed solution
is that intellectual and political competition eventually bring about the shift to a
new policy paradigm. As a consequence the mode of policy-making changes and a
14North, Wallis and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders, p. 251.
15Ibid.
16Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy , pp. 5-8.
17Robert Bates, ‘A Review of Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast’s
Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human His-
tory ’, Journal of Economic Literature 48, no. 3 (2010): p. 755.
18Hall, ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State’, pp. 283-5.
19Mark Blyth, Great Transformations : Economic Ideas and Instutional Change in the Twentieth
Century (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Another example is James A.
Morrison, ‘Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the
First Era of Globalization’, International Organization 66, no. 3 (2012): 395–428.
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different set of options, larger and well defined, becomes available to
agents.20
In democratic spheres the notion of a paradigm shift works well to explain
political agency at a high level. Different policy paradigms such as Keynesian or
monetary macroeconomics make different sets of policy options available. Hence
they change the political agency of actors. The transition from one paradigm to
another and the link between a paradigm and actual policy-making are
underdetermined though. Hall envisions and exemplifies the paradigm change
through intellectual and political competition in democracies. It is not clear
though whether that applies to non-democratic spheres as well, such as
international diplomacy. And while Hall outlines two procedural adjustments to
policy-making within a paradigm, first- and second-order change, there is no
account of how a paradigm might become operational in the first place.21
Rationalist and historical institutionalism allow only incomplete explanations of
high-level diplomacy. The former postulates neuro-economic cognition and
thereby disregards the things that political actors actually do. The latter relies on
a democratic social process that does not fit with international diplomacy.
1.3 Cognitive artefacts
How can maps or statistical tables give us better accounts of high-level
diplomacy? In the previous section we have identified shortcomings in rationalist
and historical institutionalism, so we can specify the positive conceptual features
that we would like a framework of political agency to have. First, it should allow
for individual and collective micro-level reasoning of actors, without demanding
or presuming rationality. Second, it should allow for actors developing ad hoc
20Hall, ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State’, pp. 286-7.
21ibid., pp. 281-3. Recent re-evaluations of Hall’s notion with a different focus are: Pierre-Marc
Daigneault, ‘Reassessing the concept of policy paradigm: aligning ontology and methodology
in policy studies’, Journal of European Public Policy 21, no. 3 (2014): 453–469; Sebastiaan
Princen and Paul ’t Hart, ‘Putting policy paradigms in their place’, Journal of European Public
Policy 21, no. 3 (2014): 470–474; Frank R. Baumgartner, ‘Ideas, paradigms and confusions’,
Journal of European Public Policy 21, no. 3 (2014): 475–480.
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solutions, without reducing the solution to one of several options predetermined
by some discourse.
We learn a fair amount about the reasoning of actors by examining the things
they say and write. That is the traditional domain of diplomatic history, but it
has to mitigate several problems. Most obviously, actors do not necessarily mean
the things they say and write and the other way around. Moreover, there is the
challenge of accessing and handling those statements that actors make off the
record, the thoughts that remain unsaid and the emotions that have an effect as
well. Hence pinpointing how a diplomatic result came about is often impossible.
If we turn to maps, statistical tables and the like, we might be able to avoid a
great deal of these problems. To indicate why and how, I want to draw broadly
on the first case.
The Polish-German border was fixed in the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919.
Part of the Treaty was a map that showed the new border.22 That border was not
transferred onto a map once Wilson, Lloyd George and the others had an
agreement. The actors developed their agreement, and thereby the border, by
arguing over a sequence of preliminary maps. Moreover, the arguments that
actors made were not external to these preliminary maps. Actors built their
arguments into the maps. The same applies to statistical tables and other things
that are often inadequately itemised as ‘evidence’. Wilson, Dmowski etc argued
through maps and the like just as much as they argued through verbal and
written statements. Above, we have outlined the difficulties specific to
investigating the reasoning of actors through language. We have a good chance of
avoiding these difficulties by turning to maps and statistics because they are
non-linguistic.
The term cognitive artefacts has first been coined by Donald A. Norman (1991)
in the cognitive sciences and computer science.23 Norman applies the term
22In fact, there were a number of maps. Large scale maps showed the border in its entirety.
Small scale maps showed the border in specific locations like Danzig.
23Donald A. Norman, ‘Cognitive Artifacts’, chap. 2 in Designing Interaction : Psychology at
the Human-Computer Interface, ed. John M. Carroll, Cambridge series on human-computer
interaction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 17–38.
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broadly to ‘artificial device[s] designed to maintain, display, or operate upon
information in order to serve a representational function’, objects that are as
diverse as graphs, maps, diagrams, books and notebooks.24 Norman (1992)
proposes ‘design principles’ for cognitive artefacts.25 Since then, the term is
employed predominantly in a context that is concerned with designing systems,
interfaces and process management.26 Moreover, an anthropological study
(Enfield, 2005) argues that the human body should be considered a cognitive
artefact as well and in the history of science the term is applied to Faraday’s
laboratory environment (Tweney and Ayala, 2015).27 Nathaniel T. Wilcox (2008)
uses the concept in arguing against neuroeconomics and advocating a process of
social cognition.28 Philosopher Richard Heersmink (2013) proposes a ‘taxonomy’
of cognitive artefacts. He defines cognitive artefacts even more broadly than
Norman, as ‘human-made, physical objects that functionally contribute to
performing a cognitive task’.29 Heersmink (2015) discusses moral aspects of
cognitive artefacts, too.30
24Norman, ‘Cognitive Artifacts’, p. 17, 21, 30, 33.
25Donald A. Norman, ‘Design principles for cognitive artifacts’, Research in Engineering Design
4, no. 1 (1992): 43–50.
26For computer science, see: C. Garbis, ‘Exploring the Openness of Cognitive Artifacts in Co-
operative Process Management’, Cognition, Technology & Work 4, no. 1 (2002): 9–21; John M.
Carroll, Marcela Borge and Shin-I Shih, ‘Cognitive artifacts as a window on design’, Journal of
Visual Languages and Computing 24, no. 4 (2013): 248–261. For health care, see: Christopher
P. Nemeth et al., ‘Using cognitive artifacts to understand distributed cognition’, IEEE Trans-
actions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Part A: Systems and Humans. 34, no. 6 (2004):
726–735; Rebecca Randell et al., ‘Beyond handover: supporting awareness for continuous
coverage’, Cognition, Technology & Work 12, no. 4 (2010): 271–283. For institutions more
generally, see: Masahiko Aoki, ‘Institutions as cognitive media between strategic interactions
and individual beliefs’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 79, nos. 1-2 (2011):
20–34.
27N. J. Enfield, ‘The Body as a Cognitive Artifact in Kinship Representations’, Current Anthro-
pology 46, no. 1 (2005): 51–73; Ryan D. Tweney and Christoper D. Ayala, ‘Memory and the
construction of scientific meaning: Michael Faraday’s use of notebooks and records’, Memory
Studies 8, no. 4 (2015): 422–439.
28Nathaniel T. Wilcox, ‘Against Simplicity and Cognitive Individualism’, Economics and Philo-
sophy 24, no. 3 (2008): 523–532.
29Richard Heersmink, ‘A Taxonomy of Cognitive Artifacts: Function, Information, and Categor-
ies’, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4, no. 3 (2013): p. 465.
30Richard Heersmink, ‘Extended mind and cognitive enhancement: moral aspects of cognitive
artifacts’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, November 2015,
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I want to claim cognitive artefacts for history and the social sciences and develop
them into a framework for understanding political agency. To that end I adopt
the notion introduced by Norman, but I interpret it more narrowly. To me,
cognitive artefacts are objects like maps, statistical tables and graphs. Cognitive
artefacts relate to aspects that political actors are dealing with, such as states,
populations, territory, resources, national wealth etc. Cognitive artefacts in part
consist of written words or short text, such as the headers of a table or the legend
of a map. Longer written documents, however, do not usually qualify. Like
spoken words, written diplomatic documents are ambiguous to begin with. Their
ambiguity is heightened further when they are translated, e.g., from English into
French. In comparison, ambiguity and translation are much smaller problems for
cognitive artefacts. There are visual, numerical and hybrid artefacts. Numerical
artefacts are sets of numbers that are logically and spatially assembled, for
example in a statistical table, or linked up by a narrative. Numerical artefacts
relate quantitative dimensions to each other. Visual artefacts, in particular maps,
place aspects into a spatial relationship. Numerical-visual hybrids, such as data
maps, relate quantitative and geographic dimensions to each other.
More importantly though, I argue that cognitive artefacts have an internal
structure that allows political actors to reason, communicate and collaborate.
Cognitive artefacts are complex. They are usually made up of numerous elements
and have many features. In the case of a map these features correspond with the
visual and logical elements from which the map is composed, e.g., the location of
an army as green shading or the coast as a black line. The features of a numerical
artefact correspond with the values and units of its numbers and the links
between numbers, e.g., gold marks and the linkage between war damages and
reparations.
Different features of a cognitive artefact have a different status. A feature can
either be rigid, flexible or stabilised. Usually, in a map we would think of a river
as rigid and see the location of an army as flexible. An example for a stabilised
feature would be a political border. It is neither rigid nor flexible by itself, but
derives its stability from other features, e.g., from the course of a river or an
army. In a political process features are not evidently rigid, flexible or stabilised.
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Their status varies from actor to actor and depends on interests, power, ideas etc.
Moreover, their status can change. Rivers can be diverted, armies can become a
permanent occupation force, political borders can shift or disappear.
An actor establishes his scope of agency by categorising features into rigid and
flexible and by assessing how and to which degree they stabilise other features.
When an actor treats a feature as rigid, he decides to see it as an aspect that
cannot be changed on the ground. All rigid features taken together establish the
outer limits of his agency. In contrast, a feature treated as flexible is an aspect
that is seen as changeable. Flexible features represent the available options for
agency. In this way, the rigid features of an artefact circumscribe an actor’s
political room of manoeuvre and the flexible features structure it internally.
A negotiated diplomatic outcome, such as a political border or a reparation
obligation, is a stabilised feature. As long as actors have different scopes and
structures of agency, they disagree on the stabilised feature, too. For example,
Wilson, Lloyd George and the other actors saw the new Polish border in different
places. Moreover, they disagreed if and to which degree the border would be
stabilised by the Polish army, Allied military guarantees to Poland against
Germany, the ethnicity of the population, natural frontiers like rivers etc. That
is, actors in a diplomatic process begin with dissimilar cognitive artefacts. As
they are grinding out their joint scope of agency though, they develop joint
cognitive artefacts. Finally, when actors come to an agreement, the stabilised
feature takes up one specific and permanent place. When Wilson, Lloyd George,
Clemenceau and Dmowski agreed on the border, that line on the map no longer
shifted. When Lloyd George, Millerand and Allied financial experts agreed on
Germany’s reparation obligation, the value of that number in the numerical
artefact no longer fluctuated.
Actors are aligning their agency in developing a joint cognitive artefact. How that
happens exactly though is hard to say without detail knowledge. When actors
align their agency, are they aligning their interests as well? Are they developing
shared views? Rather than speculating about answers, I want to introduce three
theoretical elements from the sociology of scientific knowledge and apply them in
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a general manner. In the cases, these elements will help us to further develop the
notion of a cognitive artefact and return more systematically to these
questions.
The first theoretical element is ‘boundary objects’ by Susan Star and James
Griesemer (1989).31 The analytical interest of Star and Griesemer is to
understand how cooperation and heterogeneity can coexist.32 That fits with the
conditions under which actors come together in the processes we are interested in.
Wilson, Clemenceau etc had different interests and views, but they had to
cooperate on a concrete problem. Star and Griesemer maintain that ‘consensus is
not necessary for cooperation, nor for the successful conduct of work’.33 Their
boundary objects achieve cooperation through a multi-way translation of the
findings of different actors, located in different social spheres, carried out with
different interests, into an emergent whole. Boundary objects do not require a
consensus, but some overlap of spheres. Boundary objects work as means of
cooperation when they build on that overlap. Do cognitive artefacts share these
characteristics? Cognitive artefacts achieve cooperation between actors with
different interests from different spheres by building on some overlap, too. But
are cognitive artefacts multi-way translations? When Lloyd George and
Clemenceau finally agreed on a map in Paris in 1919, they were probably more
concerned with satisfying, rather than translating their interests.
Boundary objects, according to Star and Griesemer, are abstract notions or
concrete tools that can be used by different actors in their spheres to coordinate
and manage their activities across spheres. Boundary objects are able to do so
because they are ‘simultaneously concrete and abstract, specific and general,
conventionalised and customised’ and often ‘internally heterogeneous’.34 Star and
Griesemer call this the ‘boundary nature’ of an object.35 The case study of Star
and Griesemer is a natural history museum that grows in size and reputation.
31Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer, ‘Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary
Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39’,
Social Studies of Science 19, no. 3 (1989): 387–420.
32Ibid., p. 414.
33Ibid., p. 388.
34Ibid., p. 408.
35Ibid.
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The museum’s success is the outcome of cooperation across spheres without
consensus. Speaking generally, Star and Griesemer maintain that the key is that
‘findings which incorporate radically different meanings’ are made coherent. To
that end, the different actors take their findings and ‘translate, negotiate, debate,
triangulate and simplify [them] in order to work together’.36 The specific case of
growing the museum was not achieved by trained biologists alone, but by
enlisting a wealthy philanthropist, amateur collectors, trappers and the university
administration. Each of them had their own vision for the museum and
contributed to it in a way of making it theirs.37 These disparate contributions
became coherent at the museum, because the museum staff disposed of two types
of conceptual tools that allowed them to manage cooperation as well as diversity,
‘methods standardisation’ and ‘boundary objects’.38 The prime example of a
boundary object was California itself. For the scientists, California was their
‘laboratory in the field’, for the philanthropist, trappers and conservationists it
was their home, living environment and identity, for the university administration
it was its constituency. Thus, every actor had different interests, but California as
a boundary object focused these interests geographically.39
The actors that came together in Paris in 1919 had to create coherence between
different meanings and findings, too. For Wilson, the Polish border was a
physically distant, but morally close matter. For Clemenceau, it was a strategic
calculation how to strengthen Poland and weaken Germany. For Dmowski, the
border was a life-task and the existential Polish question. When they reasoned
about the border, they all found different things worth considering. In agreeing
on a border, they had to translate, negotiate, create coherence, reconcile their
visions etc as well. It is not clear though if managing diversity and cooperation
was enough. Fixing the border probably required persuasion, deceit and coercion,
too. Hence it is not clear whether cognitive artefacts qualify as boundary objects
and where the two concepts might differ.
36Star and Griesemer, ‘Boundary Objects’, pp. 388-9.
37Ibid., pp. 396-404.
38Ibid., pp. 392-3.
39Ibid., pp. 409-10.
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The second theoretical element is ‘false numbers’ by Martha Lampland (2010).40
In contrast to numbers as they are usually understood, false numbers are neither
stable nor are they meaningful outside a specific environment.41 Lampland
introduces them in explaining social processes that are themselves dynamic, but
lead to formalised and rationalised practises.42 In these processes, argues
Lampland, actors use false numbers as temporary or conditional tools in making
stable numerical representations possible. The protagonists in our cases found
themselves in comparable situations. So should we consider the possibility of false
numerical artefacts? Our actors were part of dynamic diplomatic processes in
which they were looking to create fixed representations. These representations
could be visual as well as numerical. Hence we might identify a visual equivalent
to a false number. In contrast to the setting Lampland lays out, however, Wilson,
Lloyd George etc did not have the objective of establishing formalised practises.
Border and reparation diplomacy are and were non-generic. Nonetheless, false
numbers, or more generally false representations, might be useful diplomatic
devices. We can imagine that actors use false representations because their
temporary or conditional character helps them to manage an open-ended,
indeterminate process.
Lampland distinguishes three types of false numbers. False numbers, provisional
numbers in a temporary sense and provisional numbers in a conditional sense.
False numbers are used in formalisation processes that are being installed over a
period of time and require actors to learn the handling of numbers, such as new
accounting methods.43 Provisional numbers in a temporary sense can be found in
formalisation processes that are iterative, e.g., economic forecasting in quarterly
reports that guide investment decisions.44 Provisional numbers in a conditional
sense occur in formalisation processes that are partially open.45 One example is
scientific modelling which has to be open for epistemic reasons. Another example
40Martha Lampland, ‘False numbers as formalizing practices’, Social Studies of Science 40, no.
3 (2010): 377–404.
41Ibid., p. 378.
42Ibid.
43Ibid., pp. 387-94.
44Ibid., pp. 384.
45Ibid., pp. 384-6.
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is the determination of property value for tax purposes in California in the 1950s.
There, provisional numbers were a ‘product of recurring political machinations
[where] tax assessors were in the habit of privileging supporters and currying
favor with shifting voting allegiance’.46 As these processes evolve, Lampland
argues, their formal structures evolve as well and provisional numbers ‘decay’ or
are updated.47 In Lampland’s framework provisional numbers are used by
investors to make decisions, scientists use them to creatively solve a problem and
politicians use them as incentive.48
The diplomatic processes in our cases share many of these characteristics. Above
all, negotiations were political and iterative, too. Moreover, the way in which
actors argued and reasoned certainly evolved. It is not evident though that these
negotiations had a formal structure or that that structure evolved. Maybe it was
rather the interests, views and political ideas of our actors that developed. The
same applies to the aspect of learning. Wilson, Lloyd George etc learned a lot
while negotiating, but maybe they did not learn formalisation and rationalisation.
Moreover, it is likely that a whole lot more other than learning was going on
between the actors. Persuasion, deceit, coercion etc. What role can false
representations play in that regard? Diplomatic actors were forecasting in a
broad sense, too. When negotiating, they anticipated how their own interest, the
balance of power etc would be affected by the Polish border.
The third and last theoretical element I want to introduce are ‘travelling facts’,
developed from 2004-9 in a multidisciplinary research project headed by Peter
Howlett and Mary S. Morgan.49 The project investigated the nature of evidence
and sought to understand under which conditions facts from one sphere
successfully move to another, i.e., when they ‘travel well’.50 The actors in our
cases had to deal with that question, too. Wilson, Lloyd George etc determined
46Lampland, ‘False numbers as formalizing practices’, pp. 384-5.
47Ibid., p. 384.
48Ibid., pp. 384-7.
49Peter Howlett and Mary S. Morgan, eds., How Well Do Facts Travel? : The Dissemination of
Reliable Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
50Mary S. Morgan, ‘Travelling Facts’, chap. 1 in How Well Do Facts Travel? : The Dissemina-
tion of Reliable Knowledge, ed. Peter Howlett and Mary S. Morgan (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011), p. 12.
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Poland’s borders after World War I at the Paris Peace Conference. While they
shared a spatial and social sphere, their intellectual and diplomatic spheres did
not naturally overlap. In that sense making cognitive artefacts travel well was
part of negotiating.
The Travelling Facts project identifies two criteria to decide whether facts travel
well. First, according to Morgan (2011), a fact has to preserve its ‘integrity’ in
the transition; second, it has to be ‘fruitful’, i.e., a fact has to be acted upon
repeatedly outside its native sphere.51 These categories, integrity and fruitfulness,
might be particularly useful in the fourth case. The case deals with internal US
diplomacy about the role of Germany’s economy in European recovery and has a
particular constellation of actors. On the one hand, there were actors like Lucius
D. Clay and Bernard Bernstein. As officials in the American military
administration in Germany, they shared a spatial and social sphere. At the same
time, they had opposing views of Germany’s economy and therefore belonged to
different political and intellectual spheres. On the other hand, there was the
Washington administration. It was geographically and socially removed from
Clay and Bernstein and politically divided. Through their cognitive artefacts
Clay and Bernstein tried to influence Washington’s stance on the occupation. So
how did Clay and Bernstein give their cognitive artefacts integrity and
fruitfulness for their travels from Germany to Washington? Let us revisit these
questions in more detail as we go through the cases.
Before starting into the historical case work, I want to discuss briefly a theoretical
element that I will not use: performativity. Despite performativity not doing
analytical work in the cases, I think it would be a mistake not to mention it at all.
The possibility of cognitive artefacts being performative has accompanied a great
deal of the thinking that has gone into this thesis, if not the writing. There is no
doubt that statistics, maps or accounting procedures can be performative.52 The
51Morgan, ‘Travelling Facts’, pp. 13-8, 18-25.
52For example: Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape
Markets, Inside Technology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006); Rob Sullivan, Geography
Speaks: Performative Aspects of Geography (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011); Mahmoud Ezzamel,
‘Order and accounting as a performative ritual: Evidence from ancient Egypt’, Accounting,
Organizations and Society 34, nos. 3-4 (April 2009): 348–380.
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theoretical elements introduced above, however, give us much better traction than
performativity to understand how political actors arrive, e.g., at a map that shows
new state borders. It will become evident in the cases that maps and statistics
hardly become real just by being drawn or calculated. A great deal of negotiating,
convincing, threatening and deceiving are necessary to make a cognitive artefact
real for just a handful of politicians and high-level diplomats. The process of
producing, circulating and modifying cognitive artefacts tells us something more
general than the performativity claim: it tells us what actors need to do to other
actors and to cognitive artefacts before the latter can be performative.
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2.1 Introduction
The process that gave Poland her post-World War I borders lasted from early
1917 to 18 March 1921. It began when Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary
started to lose the war. These three powers had divided Poland amongst them at
the end of the 18th century and occupied her since then. The process ended with
the Treaty of Riga, after the Polish Army pushed Bolshevik forces eastwards into
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modern day Ukraine. While Poland’s eastern border was determined by military
means, her western and southern borders came about through diplomacy,
plebiscites and smaller armed conflicts.
The most important diplomatic milestone was reached at the Paris Peace
Conference in 1919 by US President Woodrow Wilson, Britain’s Prime Minister
Lloyd George, French President Georges Clemenceau and Roman Dmowski, Head
of the Polish Delegation. The American, British and French heads of state were
often collectively referred to as the Big Three. The Big Three and Dmowski were
supported by other diplomats and technical experts. This chapter examines seven
cognitive artefacts that circulated between them, up to the signing of the
Versailles Treaty, table 2.1, p. 32: maps, statistics and data-maps. On 28 June
1919 the treaty fixed the border between Poland and Germany, placed Danzig
under international control and set out plebiscites for parts of East Prussia and
Silesia. By producing, circulating, modifying and rejecting cognitive artefacts the
actors figured out their joint scope of agency for fixing the Polish-German border.
They successfully aligned their diverging interests, determined a large portion of
the frontier and agreed on the procedure of plebiscites for the remaining
segments.
Table 2.1: Cognitive artefacts of Poland’s post-1918 borders
No. Date Actor1 Description
1 Oct. 1918 PL Map of historical Poland
2 Oct. 1918 US Map of ethnic Poland
3 Feb. 1919 PL Statistics of Polish population and economy
4 Feb. 1919 PL Ethnographic maps of Prussian Poland
5 Mar. 1919 CPA Statistics on ethnic separation by borders
6 Mar. 1919 CPA Border proposed between Poland and East Prussia
7 Jun. 1919 PPC Border decided between Poland and East Prussia
1 Denominates the political actor, fraction or entity from which the artefacts originated:
PL=Poland; US=United States; CPA=Interallied Commission on Polish Affairs of the
Paris Peace Conference; PPC=Paris Peace Conference.
No dominant policy paradigm emerged during the diplomatic process. Wilson
and the other actors could not choose between several options for the border. The
32
2 Poland’s borders after World War I
notion of a policy paradigm goes back to Peter A. Hall (1993).1 Hall suggests that
political actors usually operate within policy paradigms. They determine the
political scope of agency by offering a number of policy options from which actors
can choose. That was not the case for Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and
Dmowski. Nor did they develop a common rationality that allowed them to
calculate the border. They arrived at it through the iterative creation, circulation
and modification of maps, statistics and data maps. With these artefacts the
actors fleshed out their common scope of agency.
Embedded in those artefacts, however, were ideas and rationalist elements. A
relevant idea was to draw the political border in accordance with ethnicity. An
important rationalist element was to calculate minimum borders, based on the
number of people that were necessary for Poland to build a strong army. Over the
course of several iterations some of these ideational and rational elements were
rejected. Those that remained were amalgamated and ultimately submerged in a
singular political decision.
Poland’s rebirth brought about one of the many border changes after World War
I. A comparison of 1912 and 1923 shows the numerous transformations, see
fig. 2.1, p. 34. Most notable is an increasing fragmentation. New nation states
emerged, old boundaries shifted and empires were stunted. Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Baltic States surfaced, drawing on land that
was formerly under the rule of the Habsburg monarchy, Russia or Germany.
Romania roughly doubled in size, Serbia and Montenegro were subsumed into
Yugoslavia and Germany’s borders with Denmark and France retracted.
2.2 Literature review
2.2.1 Historical literature
The Paris Peace Conference, dubbed a temporary ‘world government’ by
Margaret MacMillan (2001), was a point of condensation for the competing
1Hall, ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State’.
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(a) 1912
(b) 1923
Figure 2.1: Political borders in Central Europe in 1912 and 1923. Austria-Hungary
was broken up, Germany and Russia lost some of their territory. Poland re-emerged
as an independent state. One of the notoriously contentious issues after World War
I was the Polish corridor to the Baltic Sea, Danzig and German East Prussia.
Sources: Library of Congress (hereafter LoC), Rand McNally and Company, G5700
1912 .R3: The Rand-McNally new library atlas map of Europe, Chicago, 1912, http:
//hdl . loc . gov / loc . gmd/g5700 . ct002032; George Washington Bacon and Weber
Costello Company, G5700 192- .B3: Bacon’s standard map of Europe, 1923, http:
//hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/g5700.ct001973.
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desires and countless ideas to restructure Europe.2 Interests diverged, but the
conference had to end with an agreement, creating a great deal of the situational
pressure under which actors identified their common scope of agency.
The making of Poland’s interwar borders and international postwar diplomacy
more generally have received a lot of attention, then and today. While the Peace
Conference was still in session, John Maynard Keynes was the first of many to
argue that politicians were taking poor decisions with very negative consequences
for Europe’s economy and its entire civilisation. Europe’s ‘structure and
civilisation are essentially one’, he argued, and the political decisions taken at the
conference may cause the continent to collapse.3 Keynes’ prediction of another
war and the broad brush strokes of the 20th century seem to corroborate his view.
World War II began when Germany attacked Poland and undid the border fixed
in Paris.
Joshua Hagen (2009) examines maps of the Polish corridor that the Polish and
German sides used during the interwar years, to gather public support for their
positions.4 He finds that both states used maps to portray their neighbours’
borders as a threat to themselves, as injustice to their ethnic groups and as a
disruption to harmonious economic flows. Charles Feinstein, Peter Temin and
Gianni Toniolo (1997) broadly follow Keynes and the German argumentation of
the interwar years. They maintain that the fragmentation and reorganisation of
polities after 1918 ‘was a cause of widespread resource misallocation, resulting in
lower output and higher prices’.5
Nikolaus Wolf, Max-Stephan Schulze and Hans-Christian Heinemeyer (2011) set a
counterpoint to this still dominant narrative. They maintain that a ‘pattern of
economic fragmentation’ existed since the late 19th century that was merely
2Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers : The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End
War (London: John Murray, 2001), p. 65.
3John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, ed. Elizabeth Johnson and
Donald Moggridge, vol. 2, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (Macmillan, 1978),
p. 2.
4Joshua Hagen, ‘Mapping the Polish Corridor: Ethnicity, Economics and Geopolitics’, Imago
Mundi: The International Journal for the History of Cartography 62, no. 1 (2009): 63–82.
5Charles H. Feinstein, Peter Temin and Gianni Toniolo, The European Economy between the
Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 31-2.
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followed by the new borders.6 They ‘imposed only modest additional trade costs’,
because markets were already more deeply integrated along lines of
ethnolinguistic and geographic division.7 This leads Wolf et al to conclude that
‘intentionally or not’, border diplomacy somehow accounted for the relative
integration of markets.8
The principles or, more pragmatically, the process by which diplomacy
established the new borders is still debated. There is substantive evidence though
that a mix of considerations came together in an eclectic manner. The view of
Helga Schultz (2002), that ‘an ethnic principle was established’ for Poland, seems
wrong.9 One set of accounts puts emphasis on the notion of national self-
determination. Alan Sharp (2008) remarks about the Eastern European
settlement that the ‘victors had no clear and agreed basis on which to proceed’
and entered into mutually exclusive commitments.10 On the one hand, they
promised to preserve the unity of Austria-Hungary, on the other they pledged
territory to Poland. Sharp remarks that the various parties disagreed on the
territories and populations that should be assigned to Poland and concludes that
the ‘task of reconciling the irreconcilable was beyond the conference’.11
Zara Steiner (2005) maintains that ‘no one [...] understood the full complexity’ of
peacemaking in the east.12 Local complications, geography, unreliable statistics,
inaccurate maps, the ethnic patchwork, strategic and economic factors were too
6Nikolaus Wolf, Max-Stephan Schulze and Hans-Christian Heinemeyer, ‘On the Economic Con-
sequences of the Peace: Trade and Borders After Versailles’, The Journal of Economic History
71, no. 4 (2011): p. 915.
7Ibid., pp. 940, 944.
8ibid., p. 944. Another recent study of still persistent effects on voting of Poland’s 18th century
partition between Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany is: Irena Grosfeld and Ekaterina
Zhuravskaya, ‘Persistent Effects of Empires: Evidence from the Partitions of Poland’ (Paris,
2013).
9Helga Schultz, ‘Self-Determination and Economic Interest: Border Drawing After the World
Wars’, in National Borders and Economic Disintegration in Modern East Central Europe, ed.
Uwe Mu¨ller and Helga Schultz, vol. 8, Frankfurter Studien zur Grenzregion (Berlin: Verlag A.
Spitz, 2002), p. 111.
10Alan Sharp, The Versailles Settlement : Peacemaking After the First World War, 1919-1923,
2nd ed., The Making of the 20th Century (London: Palgrave, 2008), pp. 139-40.
11Ibid., pp. 161-8.
12Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933, Oxford His-
tory of Modern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 82.
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convoluted for anyone to sort out, even without the consideration of national
interests and the incessant lobbying of the ‘new or expanding states’.13 Politicians
in Paris recognised a national principle, but they applied it irregularly, ignored it,
sacrificed it for strategic interests and ‘modified [it in] practice when new
boundaries were drawn’.14 Norman Graebner and Edward Bennett (2011) argue
as well that boundary decisions in Eastern Europe were ‘devoid of principle’ and
see the idea of self-determination as a ‘device for punishing the losers’.15
Margaret MacMillan (2001) calls the ‘rebirth of Poland’ one of the Peace
Conference’s ‘great stories’ that caused ‘endless difficulties’.16 The Poles disagreed
amongst each other whether they wanted a large country with many non-Poles, a
small one with few non-Poles or a compromise between the two; only the ‘need
for access to the Baltic’ was beyond doubt.17 Allied experts that worked on the
question agreed that the boundaries ‘should be drawn on ethnic lines as much as
possible’, but maintained that there were also other relevant
considerations.18
Other accounts pay greater attention to the strategic interests of actors. Kay
Lundgreen-Nielsen (1979, 1992) surveys the policies of Poland and the major
powers.19 Sharp (2001) analyses British policy.20 Piotr Wandycz (1992) evaluates
13Steiner, The Lights that Failed , pp. 82-3.
14Ibid., p. 84.
15Norman A. Graebner and Edward M. Bennett, The Versailles Treaty and its Legacy: The
Failure of the Wilsonian Vision (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 50-2.
16MacMillan, Peacemakers, p. 217.
17Ibid., pp. 217-21.
18Ibid., p. 226.
19Kay Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the
Policies of the Great Powers and the Poles. 1918-1919. (Odense: Odense University Press,
1979); Kay Lundgreen-Nielsen, ‘Aspects of American Policy towards Poland at the Paris
Peace Conference and the Role of Isaiah Bowman’, in The Reconstruction of Poland, 1914-23,
ed. Paul Latawski (Macmillan and School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University
of London, 1992), 95–116.
20Alan Sharp, ‘Holding up the Flag of Britain ... with Sustained Vigour and Brilliance or ‘Sowing
the seeds of European Disaster’? Lloyd George and Balfour at the Paris Peace Conference’,
chap. 3 in The Paris Peace Conference, 1919 : Peace without Victory?, ed. John Fisher and
Michael Dockrill, Studies in Military and Strategic History (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
2001), 35–50.
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Poland’s diplomatic strategy.21 Anna Cienciala (1992) reconstructs the battle
between American, British, French and Polish interests in the politicking over
Danzig and Poland’s access to the Baltic Sea.22
Wolf et al aptly sum up that making new boundaries was a ‘messy process’ in
which many factors had to be taken into account.23 Ideas like self-determination
mattered, but so did ethnicity, the punishment of Germany, strategic and
economic interests of the Allies and of Poland etc. An analysis of the cognitive
artefacts that were used in Paris confirms that the process was messy. There was
no principle, no metric, no design of Poland’s borders. There was, however, a
process that yielded a combination of factors. This combination was remarkably
considered, but not conclusively defined. The Polish-German border was made
from a colourful combination of considerations that satisfied Polish, American,
British and French concerns.
2.2.2 Literature on artefacts
Like most other aspects of the Peace Conference, the involvement of technical
experts and their production of artefacts is discussed, too. Accounts mainly focus
on American experts and materials. There are only indications, however, of the
role artefacts have played regarding political agency.
In Harold Nicolson’s (1933) classic account of the Peace Conference, maps feature
as powerful and persuasive objects, but also as a source of confusion. Handling
and creating maps was part of Nicolson’s routine. He was a member of the
British Delegation and of the conference’s Territorial Committee. He anecdotally
recounts the progress that he and his American colleagues made by pouring over
maps, the endless nuisance by politicians trying to gain an advantage by using
incorrect maps and the difficulties of leaders like Lloyd George to read maps
21Piotr Wandycz, ‘Dmowski’s Policy at the Paris Peace Conference: Success or Failure?’, in The
Reconstruction of Poland, 1914-23, ed. Paul Latawski (London: Macmillan, 1992), 117–32.
22Anna M. Cienciala, ‘The Battle of Danzig and the Polish Corridor at the Paris Peace Conference
of 1919’, in The Reconstruction of Poland, 1914-23, ed. Paul Latawski (Macmillan and School
of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, 1992), 71–94.
23Wolf, Schulze and Heinemeyer, ‘Economic Consequences of the Peace’, p. 922.
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correctly.24 Frank Marston (1944) discusses organisational and technical aspects
of the conference and remarks that a range of map-making activities prepared the
ground for political negotiations.25 Lawrence Gelfand (1963) dedicates a study to
the American team of technical experts, the so-called Inquiry, in which
geographers and maps played a central part. The group produced approximately
2,000 reports and 1,200 maps.26 Neil Smith (2003) follows the political career of
geographer Isaiah Bowman. Bowman was a leading figure in the American
Inquiry and tried to ‘corral the factual and graphic support’, according to Smith,
that made Wilson’s positions persuasive.27 Bowman spoke of the ‘map language’
as a ‘new instrument’ that was discovered in Paris; like Nicolson, Bowman
thought that ‘a perverted map was a life-belt to many a foundering
argument’.28
Jeremy Crampton (2006) discusses the mapping activities of the Inquiry by
example of the Yugoslavian frontiers. The Inquiry produced a spatial account of
race in its then popular statistical and governmental form. Hence it created
‘statistical cartography’ or ‘statistical mapping’.29 Crampton draws on the critical
cartography literature of the 1990s and 2000s to argue that the Inquiry applied
Foucault’s notion of governmentality to cartography.30 Crampton suggests that
the Inquiry contributed to establishing governmentality as an ‘alternative
political rule to sovereignty’, because maps are ‘active political instruments’ that
are ‘produced by and productive of truth’.31 Diplomatic history tells us that
visualisation of government knowledge, e.g., the ethnic composition of the
population, was an important part of the process. It tells us as well though, that
24Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (London: Constable, 1933), pp. 211, 222-3, 272-3.
25Frank Swain Marston, The Paris Conference of 1919 : Organization and Procedure (London:
Oxford University Press, 1944).
26Lawrence E. Gelfand, The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919 (Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1963), pp. x, 341-2.
27Neil Smith, American Empire : Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization, Cali-
fornia Studies in Critical Human Geography (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
2003), p. 147.
28Cited in: ibid.
29Jeremy W. Crampton, ‘The Cartographic Calculation of Space : Race Mapping and the Balkans
at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919’, Social & Cultural Geography 7, no. 5 (2006): p. 732.
30Ibid., pp. 732-5.
31Ibid.
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visualisation itself was a problematic issue, which produced controversies that
were not fully resolved. Wesley Reisser (2012) discusses a collection of American
maps that acquired some mystic fame during the conference, the so-called Black
Book. It was a US policy document that summarised research and presented a
whole range of border recommendations. Unsurprisingly, Reisser finds that
borders in the Black Book were ‘scuttled’ and did not match actual
outcomes.32
The literature suggests that maps were quite literally at the centre of diplomacy.
It also tells us that there was dedicated American and British personnel that
produced numerous artefacts that then circulated. Bowman’s term of the ‘map
language’ echoes the ability of boundary objects to create coherence by speaking
to actors from different social spheres. After all, the actors in Paris did not just
pursue different interests, they also spoke different languages. One of the most
vivid accounts of high-level diplomacy in Paris is that of Paul Mantoux (1955).33
As Clemenceau’s interpreter he was right in the middle of many arguments.
French was the official language, but a great deal of the technical expertise was of
American origin and therefore in English. In the heat of the moment arguments
were exchanged in English or another language that the discussants shared.
Similar to boundary objects, cognitive artefacts certainly played their part in
overcoming the language barriers between actors.
Diplomatic history, as well as Bowman and Nicolson, tells us that the cognitive
artefacts of the conference were not quite like boundary objects. Arguments
between actors, e.g., about the question where and how to apply the principle of
self-determination, meant disagreement on the location of the border. Hence
producing and circulating cognitive artefacts was not sufficient, they also had to
be argued over, modified and rejected. Furthermore, Bowman’s ‘map language’
was in danger of being corrupted. There were those who were not familiar with it
or who played foul with ‘perverted maps’. If cognitive artefacts created
32Wesley J. Reisser, The Black Book : Woodrow Wilson’s Secret Plan for Peace (Lanham: Lex-
ington Books, 2012), pp. 27, 98.
33Paul Mantoux, Les de´liberations du Conseil des quatre (24 Mars - 28 Juin 1919) : notes de
l’officier interpreˆte Paul Mantoux (Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1955).
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coherence, it is likely that this happened in an arduous, competitive and limited
manner that is absent in the original notion of boundary objects.
2.3 Wartime prelude: Poland’s re-emergence
2.3.1 Actors and interests
Four main actors who determined the Polish-German border. First, there was
Roman Dmowski, Polish exile politician in Paris, Founder and President of the
Polish National Committee (KNP) and Head of the Polish Delegation in Paris.
Second, Lloyd George, Britain’s prime minister. Third, President Woodrow
Wilson of the US. Fourth, France’s president George Clemenceau. They had
different interests and initially envisioned the border in different places. Between
early 1917 and mid-1919, however, they managed to align their interest to the
extent that they could jointly draw the frontier.
Poland, rather the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth Kingdom, had ceased to
exist as an independent state when she was partitioned by Prussia,
Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire in 1772, 1793 and 1795. The Great
War had seen one of the partitioning powers, Russia, collapse and the two others
being defeated. The increasing power vacuum had gradually opened a space that
allowed the Poles to work towards greater self-determination and finally towards
their own state.34
By the time the window of opportunity opened in early 1917, Roman Dmowski
had strategised about and lobbied for a Polish state for many years. To Dmowski,
the greatest threat had always been Prussia or Germany and her ambitions in the
east. In his 1909 publication La question polonaise, Dmowski had put this in
34Anita J. Praz˙mowska, Poland: A Modern History (I.B. Tauris, 2010), pp. 61-86. The bigger
picture of Poland’s resurrection is also given in: Paul Latawski, ed., The Reconstruction of
Poland, 1914-23, Studies in Russia and East Europe (Macmillan and School of Slavonic and
East European Studies, University of London, 1992).
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writing accessible to a broad audience.35 Before 1914 he counted on a strong and
increasingly liberal Russia to act as the great anti-German force, but events after
1914 invalidated this calculation. During the war German and Austrian forces
occupied Russian Polish territory and Russia collapsed into a civil war.
Germany’s Peace of Brest-Litovsk with the Ukraine on 9 February 1918 and
Russia on 3 March cemented German, Baltic, Russian and Ukrainian national
interests and territory at the expense of the Poles. Already by early 1917
Dmowski reasoned that, in the absence of other forces, Poland had to be remade
as a country that was strong enough to withstand Germany by herself. As such,
Poland would also make up the core of the forces that were to contain Germany
in the east.36
Poland could play that role, thought Dmowski, under three conditions that he
stated in March 1917 to Arthur Balfour, Britain’s foreign secretary:
1. The state must be sufficiently large and strong.
2. The state must be economically independent of Germany, especially with
regard to access to the sea, and possession of the Silesian coal mines.
3. It should be a sovereign state with its own foreign policy, so that it could
work for the organisation of the Central European nationals, and that these
could free themselves from German influence.37
In Dmowski’s view, the Polish state had to have a minimal absolute size, access
to trade routes and control over resources. These were prerequisites for economic
independence and self-determination.
Wilson partially led, partially dragged the US into the war in April 1917. He did
so with a morally flamboyant rhetoric that championed nothing short of a new
order. The underlying driver for this moral-political mission were American
economic interests.38 Nonetheless, the war was fought to end all wars. And the
35Roman Dmowski and Wac law Jan Gasztowtt, La question polonaise (Paris: Armand Colin,
1909); originally published in Polish in 1908 as Niemcy, Rosja a sprawa polska (Germany,
Russia and the Polish Cause).
36Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish Problem in Paris, pp. 32-5.
37Cited in: ibid., p. 33.
38Smith, American Empire, pp. 113-5.
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coming peace would no longer be based on secretive politics, economic
nationalism and imperialism. It would be morally principled and enshrine
political and economic openness for which the planned League of Nations,
founded in 1920, would provide the necessary international co-ordination.
Although the practical points of Wilson’s new order remained notoriously vague
all the way through 1919, its general outline almost naturally meant advocating
the recreation of a Polish state. In the 13th of his famous Fourteen Points, Wilson
proclaimed publicly on 8 January 1918:
An independent Polish state should be erected which should include
the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which
should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose
political and economic independence and territorial integrity should
be guaranteed by international covenant.39
Furthermore, recreated Poland would justly draw on territory of those who she
fell prey to in the first place, her imperialist neighbours Germany, Austria-
Hungary and Russia. Wilson’s ideas found their counterpart in a strong Polish
nationalist movement in the US. The public could identify with the cause, not
least because the Polish-American community was about four million strong.
Tadeusz Kos´ciuszko was a hero of Polish descent in the American Independence
War. Ignacy Jan Paderewski, a Polish pianist, was popular in the US and a
figurehead of the nationalist movement.40
The British attitude was supportive, but much more reserved than that of the
US. British aspirations for postwar Europe were less comprehensive and morally
charged, but economic and politic pragmatism created some common ground.
The British merchant fleet would benefit from open trade under the new order.
The public strongly desired an arrangement that promised to prevent the horrors
of war, something the League of Nations aspired to. The political elite did not
believe though, that the League and its ideals could actually deliver political
stability. Hence, recreating the Polish state was not a matter of principle. It was
39Woodrow Wilson and Yale Law School, President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, 1918,
accessed 4th October 2015, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th century/wilson14.asp.
40MacMillan, Peacemakers, pp. 221-3.
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a necessity, due to the collapse or defeat of the three partitioning powers, the
strength of the Polish national movement and some sympathy for the general
auspices under which the US favoured the Polish state. In his speech on war aims
on 5 January 1918 Lloyd George spoke of an ‘independent Poland comprising all
those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form part of it’.41 New borders
should be drawn without upsetting the European triangulation of power between
Germany, France and Britain and without creating more terre irredente like
Alsace-Lorraine, which were obvious reasons for past and future wars in the
British perspective.42 Perceptions of Polish figureheads cemented the
dispassionate approach. Jo´zef Pi lsudski, Head of the Polish Government in
Warsaw, had fought the war along with Austria-Hungary and against the British.
He was viewed with suspicion because of his socialist leanings. Roman Dmowski
and his organisation were too far on the political right. Dmowski had left an
impression of general crudeness and outsized anti-Semitism, when visiting Britain
during the war.43 Reluctance further increased by January 1919. When the
conference in Paris began, Britain already had Germany’s fleet and her colonies
and thereby most of what she wanted.
France’s Georges Clemenceau had, like the US, a far reaching vision of
overhauling Europe’s order, but it was driven by a very different motive. It
should break Germany’s aspirations to dominate. The war of 1870/71 had been a
national humiliation that was still felt and for which France sought revenge. The
Great War had brought her so close to defeat that the existential threat was still
fresh in early 1919. Moreover, France had suffered from much greater human and
material losses than Britain or the US and she sought to get compensated.44 The
German neighbour, in turn, had just lost the war but was still more populous and
economically stronger. This seemed to make the next episode of German
aggression only a question of time. Hence, French support for a League of
Nations hinged on the question whether it would be capable of reigning in
41Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish Problem in Paris, pp. 35-9.
42MacMillan, Peacemakers, pp. 221-3.
43Ibid.
44Bruno Cabanes, ‘1919: Aftermath’, chap. 7 in The Cambridge History of the First World War:
Global War, ed. Jay Winter, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 176.
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Germany, i.e., whether the League had an army.45 In the same vein, the rebirth of
a Polish state was an opportunity to clip Germany’s territory and her economic
capacities. Furthermore, since Russia was in decay, it was hoped that Poland
would take on the role of containing Germany in the east. Accordingly, Foreign
Secretary Ste´phen Pichon had publicly demanded ‘a big and strong, very strong’
Poland in fall 1917, months before Britain or the United States gave public
support to the Polish state.46 France’s strategic interest in the Polish cause was
complemented by a great emotional attachment. Polish nationals like Napoleon’s
lover Maria Walewska, Fre´de´ric Chopin or the Polish volunteers fighting Prussia
in 1870 featured positively in the French collective memory.47
The four main actors had very different reasons to support a Polish state. All
sides sought their own advantage, resulting in different approaches and
geographic outlines. ‘Independent Poland’ had many meanings that were initially
incompatible. Dmowski thought of the natural and human resources a strong
Poland needed. To Wilson Poland had to be as ethnically Polish as possible so
that it could be the showpiece of a morally clothed American liberalism. Lloyd
George wanted a border that minimised disruptions to the prewar order. France
tried to find that shape of Poland that would weaken Germany the most. In early
1917 it was not clear whether and where these different visions overlapped. Nor
was it clear that any segment of the border could be settled diplomatically. By
mid-1919, however, the actors had figured out the location of the Polish-German
border through their artefacts. And they had realised, too, that Poland’s eastern
border was beyond their diplomacy’s reach.
2.3.2 The Polish vision: A state from Polish territory
By early 1918 Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau had given their public
support to a Polish state. The US and Britain had broadly couched the issue in
the language of ethnic self-determination. This language was initially not
45MacMillan, Peacemakers, pp. 27-31.
46Cited in: ibid., p. 212.
47Ibid., pp. 95-6, 221-3.
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Dmowski’s, but he adopted it to ensure American and British support. From
February 1918 onwards border discussions at the KNP took tactical deliberations
of Allied positions into account and Dmowski began to employ Wilson and Lloyd
George’s terminology. When Wilson asked Dmowski to produce an in-depth
treatment of the ‘national composition’ and history of Polish territory, separately
for each province, Dmowski responded in October 1918 with a memo and a map,
the first cognitive artefact of this chapter.48
Dmowski’s map showed the borders of Russia, Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian
empire as solid red lines, see fig. 2.2, p. 47. Poland’s borders before the partition
were a solid green line. Territories that had been Polish at some point before 1772
were outlined with a green dashed line and marked with the year in which Poland
lost them: a strip of Pomerania on the Baltic Sea in 1296; a part of Moravia and
the Carpathian Mountains north of Budapest in 1026; territories on the Black
Sea, north of Odessa, in 1672, see fig. 2.3, p. 48. In Dmowski’s map, historical
Poland was an enormous country that stretched from the Baltic Sea almost to the
Black Sea, that started close to Berlin and Vienna in the north-west and south-
west and ended just before Moscow in the east.
Dmowski’s memo, titled The Territory of Poland, introduced the Polish question
as ‘above all a problem of territory’.49 It started out with the geopolitical
perspective that the Poles found themselves between aggressive Germany in the
west and Russia, the collapsing behemoth, in the east. Since the Poles were
without protection ‘Poland must herself become a solid State, completely
independent, capable of self-protection and of development along lines of her
own’. She also had to ‘become the great constructive democracy of Eastern
Europe, a barrier against German pressure eastward’.50 Dmowski told Poland’s
history as a battle against German armies, culture and statistics. Prussia’s
military conquest, argued Dmowski, was followed by political immigration and
48Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish Problem in Paris, pp. 35-9.
49The Polish Delegation reissued the memo in early 1919 at the peace conference as Poland’s
Territorial Problems. Archives diplomatiques de France (hereafter ADDF), Roman Dmowski
and Polish National Commitee, 294QO/074: Poland’s Territorial Problems, Paris, October
1918.
50ADDF, ibid., p. 3.
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Figure 2.2: CA 1, Roman Dmowski’s map of Poland from October 1918. It showed
the prewar frontiers of Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary (red) as well as histor-
ically Polish territory (green). Dmowski suggested the 1772 borders as starting point
for negotiations.
Source: Archives diplomatiques de France (hereafter ADDF), Roman Dmowski and
Polish National Commitee, 294QO/073 : Frontie`res de Russie, de Prusse, d’Autriche
& de Pologne, Paris, October 1918.
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(a) Detail
(b) Legend
Figure 2.3: Details of fig. 2.2, p. 47. Dmowski interpreted Wilsons’ support for a
Poland from ‘territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations’ in a historical
way. Fig. 2.3a shows territory that Poland lost in 1256 and in 1252. The solid green
line was the Polish border before the partitions of 1772. The thick red line was
the pre-1914 border between Germany and Russia. The amended legend shows that
Dmowski added Polish history to a pre-1914 political map, see fig.2.3b.
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Germanisation by force. The success of these measures, however, was ‘grossly
exaggerated’ by official statistics of the German state, which were a ‘great weapon
[of propaganda]’. Germany was the only country, according to Dmowski, that had
fully recognised the importance of the Polish question. After the partitions in the
18th century Germany had set to work ‘official statisticians, historians, economists
and publicists [to] degrade Poland in the eyes of the world and represent her as a
small nationality of little value to civilised mankind’.51
Dmowski characterised the statistics of the German state as a ‘great weapon’
against the Polish people. His words highlight that cognitive artefacts are not as
benign as boundary objects. Star and Griesemer conceive them as enabling actors
from different social spheres and with different objectives to cooperate without
encroaching upon each other.52 In contrast, the cognitive artefacts of the German
state were a tool of oppression for Dmowski and a means of ruling for the
German government. Boundary objects are internally heterogenous. They create
coherence by allowing different actors to interpret them differently. The map of
California enables scientists, administrators, environmentalists etc to collaborate
harmoniously by allowing them to see different things in the map.53 Cognitive
artefacts, in comparison, are infused with power. One of the intentions with
which actors create cognitive artefacts, it appears, is to establish their own
interpretation as dominant. What does that mean for the internal heterogeneity
of cognitive artefacts in contrast to boundary objects? Furthermore, what is the
role of cognitive artefacts in enforcing an interpretation? Are they transmitters
for the agency of an actor, do they alter his agency or do they even have agency
themselves? For now it is evident that power relations play an important role for
cognitive artefacts.
The main body of Dmowski’s memo gave accounts of all Polish provinces,
detailing history and the population’s ethnicity. Dmowski’s discussion followed a
typical structure. At first, he gave an overview of the different political powers
that had occupied the province in the past. Then he evaluated the cultural,
51ADDF, Dmowski and Polish National Commitee, Poland’s Territorial Problems, pp. 3-4.
52Star and Griesemer, ‘Boundary Objects’.
53Ibid., pp. 409-10.
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linguistic and national developments that resulted from it. This entailed
historical considerations, in the case of East Prussia going back to the 13th
century, and qualitative judgements, e.g., that Posnania was ‘the most cultured
part of the [Polish] national body’, on par with the ‘corresponding classes in the
most advanced Western countries’.54 Dmowski referenced official statistics on
Polish speakers, which he put into doubt at once. He argued that they were
irrelevant or that they understated the Polish element. The ‘official figures [...]
for almost purely German Dantzig’, according to Dmowski, failed to capture that
‘nearly one-half of the population’ was only ‘superficially Germanised’.55 And in
the territories east of the Kingdom of Poland a ‘powerful minority’ of Poles was
‘the only intellectual and economic force capable of ruling the country’.56
In his October 1918 memo Dmowski also modified the three necessary conditions
for the recreation of Poland, which he had laid out first in March 1917, see
table 2.2, p. 51. The revised first condition explicitly made the claim to a strong
state as measured by territory and population. The third condition of October
1918 seems to have evolved from the second of March 1917. Both dealt with the
notion of independence, but while the latter referred to Germany the former
spoke of neighbours in general. Similarly, Dmowski subsumed the claims to
Silesian coal and access to the sea under the broad demand for frontiers that
correspond to ‘geographical requirements’. The third condition of March 1917,
Polish sovereignty and an ‘own foreign policy’, was redundant to the general idea
of independence in October 1918. Dmowski dropped Poland’s role as a ‘centre of
organisation’ for the liberation of Central Europe. Lastly, Dmowski’s second
condition of October 1918 argued for ‘internal cohesion’, ensured by a sufficiently
homogenous population.
Dmowski’s memo of October 1918 and his revised conditions show a great deal of
alignment with the language and reasoning of Wilson and Lloyd George. At the
same time Dmowski’s map presented a vision of Poland that was more sizeable
than theirs. Dmowski submitted memo and map to Wilson, Lloyd George and
54ADDF, Dmowski and Polish National Commitee, Poland’s Territorial Problems, pp. 8-9.
55ADDF, ibid., pp. 10-1.
56ADDF, ibid., pp. 26-7.
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Table 2.2: Roman Dmowski’s conditions for recreating Poland, 1917 & 18
March 19171 October 19182
1. Sufficiently large and strong state. Extensive territory and a large
population.
2. Economically independent of Germany,
especially with regard to access to the
sea, and possession of the Silesian coal
mines.
Sufficiently homogenous
population to insure internal
cohesion.
3. A sovereign state, own foreign policy,
able to organise Central Europe to free
itself from German influence.
Frontiers that correspond to
geographical requirements,
ensuring independence from
neighbours.
1 Dmowski in a note to Balfour, March 1917; cited in: Kay Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish
Problem at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study of the Policies of the Great Powers and the
Poles. 1918-1919. (Odense: Odense University Press, 1979), p. 33.
2 ADDF, Roman Dmowski and Polish National Commitee, 294QO/074: Poland’s Territorial
Problems, Paris, October 1918, p. 3.
Clemenceau on 8 October 1918. When he presented the map at a meeting in
autumn 1918, the American impression was that Dmowski ‘claimed a large part
of the earth’.57 Dmowski complied with Wilson’s initial request and dealt with
official population statistics, although the data did not yield the kind of Poland
he imagined. Dmowski tried to overcome this dissonance by deconstructing
official numbers and substituting them with Polish history and culture. ‘Forced
Germanisation’ referred to politically motivated immigration and the pressure for
people to self-identify as German in the census. This increased the number of
Germans at the expense of Poles. The ‘superficial Germanisation of Danzig’ was
Dmowski’s appeal to a deeper identity, not captured by the German census,
which would resurface once the city was Polish again. He set the profundity of
medieval Polish history against the currently German population in East Prussia.
Dmowski argued that in the easter territories the superior social and economic
development of Poles outweighed their low numbers. Dmowski argued for his
vision by translating it into the terms used by the Big Three.
57MacMillan, Peacemakers, p. 223.
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Dmowski’s artefact was situated in a power constellation that included his direct
negotiating partners, Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, but also the states
that had just lost the war. Dmowski produced memo and map at Wilson’s
request and appealed to American, British and French support by employing
their language and a historical version of the ethnographic border reasoning.
Moreover, although absent from the negotiations, the partitioning states exerted
their influence by proxy of their statistics. This influence was evidently strong
enough for Dmowski to acknowledge the population data that Germany, Austria-
Hungary and Russia had produced since they partitioned Poland.
Considering the number and variety of features in Dmowski’s map, it would be
implausible to argue that cognitive artefacts are not internally heterogeneous.
The map fused Poland’s past with her future, showed natural and human
geography and provoked diverging responses. Where Dmowski circumscribed the
Polish heartland, Wilson saw a Polish claim to ‘a large part of the earth’.58 Both
boundary objects and cognitive artefacts are internally heterogeneous. The
internal heterogeneity of cognitive artefacts, however, is combined with a claim to
legitimacy. The internal heterogeneity of boundary objects, in contrast, makes no
such claim. The producer of a boundary object like the map of California does
not seek to control what the user sees in the map, whether it is a constituency or
a natural habitat.59 In Dmowski’s map as cognitive artefact, in contrast, the Big
Three were supposed to see legitimate borders. Dmowski built this claim into the
features of his cognitive artefact.
Polish history was Dmowski’s most important rigid feature. The solid green
outline in Dmowski’s map, fig. 2.2, p. 47, represented the geographic extent of the
Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth before the partitions. To Dmowski, this green
line was the main stabilising factor for borders after 1918. It outlined the minimal
extent and the starting point for negotiations. Polish history outside of the green
line, such as the Pomeranian strip that was lost in 1296, was also rigid. The
extent to which it stabilised Poland’s borders would only be determined during
negotiations though. Flexible features were the red lines, the political borders of
58MacMillan, Peacemakers, p. 223.
59Star and Griesemer, ‘Boundary Objects’, pp. 409-10.
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Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia. They were fully flexible within the green
outline of pre-1772 Poland and to an unknown degree outside of it. From
Dmowski’s memo it is evident that there were also other rigid and flexible features
that his map did not show. Possession of the Silesian coal deposits was rigid while
Prussian statistics and the German identity of the population were flexible.
2.3.3 The American vision: A state from Polish people
Isaiah Bowman, a geographer and political advisor at the Inquiry, the American
group of technical experts, produced a map of Wilson’s vision of Poland in
October 1918, see fig. 2.4, p. 54. Bowman’s map is the second cognitive artefact
of this chapter. Compared to Dmowski’s vision, Wilson’s Poland was much
smaller. She had a coast line on the Baltic Sea, but was slotted in between Russia
in the east, Livonia and Courland in the north, Romania and the Czechoslovak
Country in the south and Germany in the west. She controlled a wide north-
south corridor that included Danzig and the Vistula River. Lithuania and Polish
Livonia in the north-east were federated with Poland and enclosed German East
Prussia. Like Dmowski’s map, Bowman’s also showed the course of the prewar
border of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia as a red line.
Bowman overlaid large parts of the proposed Polish territory with pink or a pink
hatching, which indicated the presence of a Polish population. This was a visual
implementation of Wilson’s statements in his Fourteen Points about ethnic
separation and territories of ‘indisputably Polish populations’.60 Polish control
over Danzig, a corridor to the Baltic Sea and natural resource deposits in the
south-west specified the content of Wilson’s other statements on the future Polish
state, see fig. 2.5a, p. 55. Poland had ‘free and secure access to the sea’ and
would enjoy ‘economic independence’ through deposits of iron, copper, coal, zinc,
salt and petroleum.61 These natural resources were a basis for industrialisation
and means of economic survival and modernisation.
60Wilson and Yale Law School, President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points.
61Ibid.
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Figure 2.4: CA 2, Isaiah Bowman’s ethnic map of Poland from October 1918. The
map showed the location of Poles (pink) and other ethnicities, but also of natural
resources and major waterways.
Source: LoC, Isaiah Bowman and Woodrow Wilson, G6521.F2 1918 .P7: The pro-
posed frontiers of Poland, Washington, D.C., October 1918, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.
gmd/g6521f.ct003470.
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(a) Detail of Bowman’s map
(b) Legend of Bowman’s map
Figure 2.5: Details of fig. 2.4, p. 54. Bowman’s colour-coding for Poles, fig. 2.5b,
visually overstated their presence compared to Ruthenians, Lithuanians and Whiter-
uthenians. Bowman did not show other populations at all, e.g., Czechs or Germans,
but added the location of resources, e.g., ‘Petroleum’ south of Lwow. The combina-
tion of ethnicity with other factors exemplifies the Allied strategy to define Poland’s
borders.
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Unlike Dmowski, Bowman did not dispel and disregard the population statistics
of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia in favour of Polish history and culture.
These government statistics were the numerical sources for Bowman’s colour-
coding of ethnicities, see fig. 2.5b, p. 55. Bowman made a number of concessions
to Polish interests though. Where the share of Poles was greater than 50% the
pink was solid, areas with 25% to 50% of Poles had a dense cross-hatching, a
share between 10% and 15% was indicated with a tight diagonal hatch and less
than 10% with a loose vertical hatch. Ruthenians were marked in yellow,
Lithuanians in light green and Whiteruthenians in light blue.62 In the south-west
and west Bowman placed Poland’s political borders fairly close to her ethnic
borders. They diverged somewhat to the east and west of Danzig, to create
Poland’s corridor to the Baltic Sea. In the south-east, east and north-east,
however, Bowman drew political borders far away from ethnic borders. Here,
Bowman assigned vast areas to Poland where less than 50% of the population
were Polish. He thereby accepted Dmowski’s argument that in this area only a
Polish minority was fit to govern. Accordingly, Bowman enlarged Poland’s
territory approximately by a third. Bowman also accepted Dmowski’s historical
argument in the north-east, alluded to by the term ‘Polish Livonia’. In the south-
east Bowman included an area with petroleum fields around the ethnically Polish
island of Lwow into the Polish state..
The rigid and flexible features in Bowman’s map were different from Dmowski’s.
Polish ethnicity, even as a minority, was rigid and stabilised most of the south-
western border to Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania. Whiteruthenian
ethnicity was a rigid feature that stabilised the border in the north-east, due to
their presumed sympathy for the Poles. Polish culture was a rigid feature in the
south-east and stabilised the border in spite of a large non-Polish majority. The
location of resources, rivers and the Polish corridor to Danzig were rigid, too.
Fully flexible features were the prewar borders of Germany, Austria-Hungary and
Russia, but also the ethnicity of Ruthenians, Germans, Czechoslovaks and
Romanians.
62Today, Ruthenians would mostly be called Ukrainians, the closest equivalent to Whiterutheni-
ans are Belorussians.
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Bowman combined ethnic self-determination with other factors, making clear that
self-determination did not apply to all ethnicities equally. This ex ante hierarchy
was built into Bowman’s map through his colour-coding scheme, see fig. 2.5b,
p. 55. Bowman showed the geographic presence of Polish populations in four
gradations. In contrast, he treated the presence of Ruthenians, Whiteruthenians
and Lithuanians as binary. Consequently, only the pink hatching overlapped with
blue, yellow and green territories, i.e., non-Polish majority areas were shown to be
interspersed with Poles but not the other way around. Populations that were
German, Czech, Slovak or Romanian were not colour-coded at all. This
heightened the impression of Polish predominance on the southern and south-
western frontier and concealed the presence of German populations in the north-
west and around East Prussia. The way Bowman built population statistics into
his map favoured the presence of Poles over non-Poles.
Bowman’s map visualised and specified Wilson’s vision of Poland’s borders.
There were major differences between Wilson’s and Dmowski’s vision, but they
overlapped, too. By proxy of Bowman’s map, Wilson insisted on the role of
ethnicity as captured by the population statistics that Dmowski rejected. But
Wilson allowed some bias towards Poles over other ethnicities, gave partial
validity to Dmowski’s concern with Polish history and culture in the east and
generally shared Dmowski’s concern with Silesian coal and resources. Wilson
went beyond Dmowski’s territorial demands with regard to access to the Baltic
Sea. Poland’s corridor was wider in Bowman’s map than in Dmowski’s.
Bowman’s map both shifted and refined how Wilson and Dmowski could reason
jointly. It was a first step to clarify their common scope of agency and it
narrowed the geographic range in which the borders could fall.
The maps of Dmowski and Bowman give us an opportunity to develop in some
more detail the relationship between rigid, flexible and stabilised features. How
do actors reason with the features of a cognitive artefact? How do these features
circumscribe and structure their joint scope of agency? These questions help us
to flesh out the commonalities and differences between cognitive artefacts and
boundary objects in greater detail.
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Both maps included Danzig and part of the coastline into the Polish state. Polish
access to the sea was one of the less controversial issues between the four actors.
They all agreed on the necessity for trade via the Baltic Sea. Danzig was the only
place to provide the necessary infrastructure, with its port, the mouth of the
Vistula River and the railways that connected to Warsaw and other cities.
Dmowski and Wilson considered the Danzig port to be immobile. In addition,
and this is crucial to notice, they saw the port in the same geographical location.
Hence there was agreement on the rigidity as well as on the location of the
Danzig port. This twofold agreement gave them their joint scope of agency.
Because the port could not be moved and because it was where it was, borders
had to be drawn so that Poland had access to the sea. Danzig’s port was a rigid
feature both to Wilson and Dmowski and as such it stabilised the political border
they both envisioned.
The maps of Dmowski and Bowman show as well that the feature of a cognitive
artefact is not equally rigid or flexible in all places and varies in its stabilising
effect. For Dmowski, Polish history was so rigid within the borders of 1772 that it
would stabilise borders. Outside of the 1772 borders, however, history was more
flexible and had a less stabilising effect. For Bowman, Polish history was flexible
in the west and the south, where it did not stabilise the border. In the east,
however, Bowman did consider history to be rigid and to stabilise the border.
Bowman treated Polish ethnicity the other way around. Furthermore, it seems
that the less stabilising potential a feature has for an actor, the less visible it is in
his cognitive artefact. Dmowski showed no ethnicities or non-Polish history in his
map, Bowman played down non-Polish ethnicities and showed Polish history only
implicitly, by referring to Polish Livonia. Neither of them included, e.g., climatic
conditions or vegetation.
Dmowski’s and Bowman’s maps give further insight into the process in which
cognitive artefacts are embedded. Actors iteratively produce, circulate, modify
and reject them to grind out a common order of features. They establish the
stabilising effect of features by producing and modifying cognitive artefacts.
Non-stabilising features become invisible, stabilising features become visible and
are treated as flexible or rigid. The Danzig port was rigid and had a strong
58
2 Poland’s borders after World War I
stabilising effect on the border in both maps, but Polish culture and history were
much more rigid and stabilising to Dmowski than to Wilson. By going through
iterations of cognitive artefacts, actors establish a common hierarchy of features
and establish their effect. This gives actors their joint scope of agency.
Actors who produce and circulate cognitive artefacts seek to change the agency of
their counterparts and align it with their own. Boundary objects do not attempt
to do that. Star and Griesemer account for changes in the agency through
‘methods standardisation’, which they describe as ‘developing, teaching and
enforcing a clear set of methods to ‘discipline’ the information obtained’.63 An
example is a standardised format and a set of data that amateur collectors
provided, along with the specimen they submitted to the museum.64 Some of the
terms that Star and Griesemer put forward in relation to methods
standardisation can be applied to the alignment of agency via cognitive artefacts
as well, others fit rather poorly. Star and Griesemer’s themes of ‘discipline’ and
‘enforcement’ link up well with the power relations between actors and their
respective cognitive artefacts. In contrast, ‘teaching’ would underplay the
conflicts that Wilson, Dmowski and the others were sorting out. Furthermore,
‘methods’ suggests a degree of systematic rigour that reasoning and actions in
1919 did not have. Cognitive artefacts are not methodologically sound and they
do not primarily appeal to reason.
Agreement on the location of the Danzig port and its rigidity was an exception.
Location and status of most other features were controversial. Until they resolved
these questions, the joint agency of Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and
Dmowski remained suspended.
63Star and Griesemer, ‘Boundary Objects’, p. 404.
64Ibid., p. 406.
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2.4 At the Paris Peace Conference
2.4.1 The Polish Delegation and the weapon of statistics
The Paris Peace Conference began in the first days of the year 1919. On 29
January Dmowski verbally delivered an abridged version of the position he had
developed in autumn 1918.65 His audience was the Council of Ten. It consisted of
the heads of state and foreign secretaries of the five states that were thought to
be most important to the peace making process, In addition to the US, Britain
and France these were Italy and Japan. Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau
were part of the Council of Ten. Dmowski drew up his territorial demands in
broad lines, embedded in a broader pitch about Poland’s role in postwar Europe.
His verbal exposition was familiar to those who had previously dealt with the
Polish question, but it was less axiomatic and historical than his memo of
October 1918. Dmowski was more concerned with the acute threats that Poland
faced and her resulting need for ‘arms and ammunition’.66
Meetings before the conference and Bowman’s map had driven home to Dmowski
that the Allies would indeed draw on population statistics to determine Poland’s
border. Hence he framed the border question as a matter of inexistent Polish
statistics. Poland, for Dmowski, could not easily state what her territory and who
her people were. Unlike France or Great Britain, Poland had neither well-defined
frontiers nor her own statistics. Therefore, her borders could not be deduced from
statistics by including ‘only those territories where the Poles were in a large
majority’.67 Instead, the historical boundaries of 1772 should be the starting
point for negotiations and then modified by current conditions. On such grounds
Dmowski argued that he could not accept the border of 1772 in the west. Silesia,
e.g., had been lost already in the 14th century, but saw a strong ‘national revival’
65For an appraisal on the success of Dmowski’s strategy in Paris, see: Wandycz, ‘Dmowski’s
Policy at the Paris Peace Conference: Success or Failure?’
66Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish Problem in Paris, pp. 38, 168-9.
67British Foreign Office, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part II, Series I: From the First to the Second World
War. The Paris Peace Conference 1919, ed. Michael Lawrence Dockrill, vol. 2 (University
Publications of America, 1989), p. 46.
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as ‘90 per cent of the population [...] was strongly Polish’.68 Dmowski argued that
Polish territory was Germanised so thoroughly that it could be identified by the
presence of ‘anti-Polish laws’.69 Dmowski granted that ‘the bulk of the
population’ in the east was no longer Polish so that ‘a large portion [should]
remain under Russia’ and no claims could be laid to the Ukraine or Lithuania.70
Eastern Galicia, although ‘a disputed territory’, should go to Poland because the
native Ruthenians were not fit to form their own state, with only 16,000 of them
in ‘intellectual professions’ as opposed to 400,000 Poles.71 Dmowski verbally
iterated and emphasised what he had written in October 1918: official German
statistics were weapons in the war against Poland.
Dmowski went to great lengths in trying to dispel and delegitimise population
statistics. He realised that his vision of Poland became weaker, the more his
negotiating partners would draw on German government data. Dmowski’s efforts
emphasise on the one hand the competitive character that cognitive artefacts
have and boundary objects lack. On the other, they point to a set of questions
that revolve around the credibility and availability of cognitive artefacts. Star
and Griesemer introduce ‘repositories’ as a type of boundary object.72 These are
‘ordered ‘piles’ of objects’ from which actors can ‘borrow [...] for their own
purposes without having directly to negotiate differences in purpose’.73 We can
think of Dmowski’s efforts as an attempt to remove German statistics from the
repository on which the Big Three could draw.
Actors do not just compete through their cognitive artefacts, they also compete
over the artefacts that get produced and circulated in the first place. While Star
and Griesemer do not deal with this dimension, the results of the travelling facts
project, compiled by Peter Howlett and Mary Morgan (2011), provide a
framework that allows us to explore the issue.74 Howlett and Morgan argue that
facts travel well under two conditions. First, they have to preserve their
68British Foreign Office, The Paris Peace Conference 1919, vol. 2 , p. 46.
69Ibid., p. 47.
70Ibid.
71Ibid., p. 48.
72Star and Griesemer, ‘Boundary Objects’, p. 410.
73Ibid.
74Howlett and Morgan, How Well do Facts Travel?
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‘integrity’ while moving between spheres; second, they have to be ‘fruitful’ in the
sense that they find ‘new users’ and ‘new uses’.75 Dmowski feared that German
statistics, a tool for suppression to him, might have integrity to his negotiating
partners. Moreover, he worried that German statistics might prove fruitful in the
hands of the Big Three in negotiating the Polish border. Was he successful in
destroying the integrity of German statistics? If not, was there another way for
him to prevent German statistics from being fruitful?
Dmowski’s worries were justified. The Big Three did not let go of German
statistics. Their response to his statement to the Council of Ten lead Dmowski to
adjust his reasoning again and he set out to forge a statistical weapon for Poland
himself. By February Dmowski had fashioned a written argument in the mixed
style of Bowman’s map. In his memo The Economic Situation of Poland he
brought together aspects of Polish ethnicity, regional stability and resource driven
development.76 Dmowski discussed the progress that had taken place during the
150 years of Poland’s partition. If these parts were put together, he argued, they
would ‘create particularly favourable conditions for the economic development of
Poland’.77 He described the sizeable vision for Poland that he also presented in
his map, concluded that such a state had ‘the economic character of France
before the war’ and supported his argument with statistics, see fig. 2.6, p. 63.78
Poland’s territory, population number and annual production of rye (French:
seigle) and sugar would equal that of France, Polish production of coal and
potatoes would surpass French output.
When Dmowski failed to cancel German statistics, he tried to supplant them with
Polish statistics. Dmowski’s numbers on population and territory stand in the
tradition of the forefathers of statistics, such as Gottfried Achenwall, Anton
Friedrich Bu¨sching and August Friedrich Wilhelm Crome. In the late 18th and
early 19th century the size of territory and population had become staple
75Howlett and Morgan, How Well do Facts Travel? , p. 12.
76ADDF, Roman Dmowski and Polish Delegation at the Peace Conference, 294QO/074 :
Me´moire sur la situation e´conomique de la Pologne unifie´e et sur l’urgence de donner sat-
isfaction a` ses besoins e´conomiques, Paris, February 1919, pp. 3-4.
77ADDF, ibid., p. 6.
78ADDF, ibid., p. 7.
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Figure 2.6: CA 3, Polish statistics by Dmowski from February 1919. Dmowski
mimicked the Allied approach of combining ethnicity with other considerations. His
statistics of territory, population, rye and wheat production, sugar, oil and potatoes
showed, Dmowski argued, that his border proposition would make Poland a state as
strong as France, capable of defending herself. A quintal, the unit in which rye is
given, is roughly equivalent to a centner; from Arabic quintaˆr, weight of a hundred,
via medieval Latin quintale.
Source: ADDF, Roman Dmowski and Polish Delegation at the Peace Conference,
294QO/074 : Me´moire sur la situation e´conomique de la Pologne unifie´e et sur
l’urgence de donner satisfaction a` ses besoins e´conomiques, Paris, February 1919,
p. 8.
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measures for comparing the strength of states.79 The twist of Dmowski’s numbers
was that the Polish state, as Dmowski himself rightly pointed out, did not have
any statistics of his own. Like Bowman in his ethnicity map, Dmowski built on
German, Russian and Austro-Hungarian data in calculating Poland’s territory,
population and potato output. The data sources of Dmowski’s Polish statistics
were the very same that he unsuccessfully tried to deconstruct in his statement to
the Council of Ten in January 1919.80
Without foreclosing too much, Dmowski’s Polish statistics were a cognitive
artefact that the Big Three rejected. To them, Dmowski’s Polish statistics had
less integrity than the statistics of Poland’s former occupiers. This is not
surprising. Creating numbers that have integrity across different social spheres,
creating numbers that are valid, takes much more than compiling and comparing
data on territory and potato harvest. Theodore Porter (1995) shows that it
‘requires a massive exercise of social power’ for an actor to establish what to
count, how to count it and how to measure it.81 States achieve the publication of
valid numbers only after long struggles for power, a kind of power that Dmowski
did not have.
Dmowski’s Polish statistics failed in February 1919. That was the time when
Polish forces began to push eastwards, against the Russian army. The actors who
determined Poland’s eastern border were no longer Dmowski and the Big Three
and the means of agency were no longer diplomatic. Agency over the eastern
border moved to Jo´zef Pi lsudski, the notorious opponent of Roman Dmowski.
Pi lsudski was Head of the Polish Government in Warsaw in 1919. His view on
border arrangements had always been different than Dmowski’s. The Polish state,
thought Pi lsudski, should determine his borders directly with his neighbours,
79Sybilla Nikolow, ‘A.F.W. Crome’s Measurements of the ‘Strength of the State’: Statistical
Representations in Central Europe around 1800’, History of Political Economy 33, Sup. (2001):
23–56.
80The data for France was taken from French statistics. According to the prewar census of
1911, France had a territory of 536,464 square kilometres and a population of 39.6 million,
see Statistique Ge´nerale de la France, Re´sultats statistiques du recensement ge´ne´ral de la
population effectue´ le 5 mars 1911, vol. 1 (Imprimerie nationale, 1913), p. 47.
81Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 33-48.
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either through military means or diplomatically. To Pi lsudski, the main obstacle
to a Polish state was Russia. He was a soldier of aristocratic descent, grew up in
the Russian part of Poland and experienced the suppression of Polish culture.
Raised to keep his heritage alive, he became both a nationalist and a radical
socialist. Pi lsudski had fought the war on the side of Austria-Hungary. Hence
Poland had in effect two governments in early 1919, Pi lsudski in Warsaw and
Dmowski in Paris. While Dmowski negotiated in Paris, Pi lsudski governed in
Warsaw and mended together different administrations, currencies and railway
systems. Pi lsudski carried little weight in Paris, but when the diplomats dropped
the question of the eastern frontier it landed in his lap.82 The result of the
military movement that began in February 1919 was the Polish-Russian border
that was settled with the Treaty of Riga in March 1921. This concluded the
piecemeal process that defined Poland’s post-World War I borders. In the end
Poland had a territory of 387,826 square kilometres and a population of
26.9m.83
From February 1919 onwards the cognitive artefacts of the actors in Paris dealt
with a much smaller geographic area than before. Poland’s east disappeared from
their maps and they focused on the border with Germany. The diplomatic scope
of agency had become more narrow and more specific. After Dmowski’s Polish
statistics failed in Paris, the Polish Army began its offensive in the east. This
timing indicates that the production, circulation and rejection of cognitive
artefacts allows actors to identify the outer limits of their agency. In Paris they
learned that they would not fix the eastern border. Hence agency over the Polish-
Russian border fell to Pi lsudski, who disposed of different means than the
diplomats.
82MacMillan, Peacemakers, pp. 217-21; Lundgreen-Nielsen, The Polish Problem in Paris, pp.
48-57, 169.
83Eugene Romer, ‘The Population of Poland according to the Census of 1921’, Geographical
Review 13, no. 3 (1923): p. 399.
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2.4.2 The case of Kwidzyn: Moving railways or people?
Kwidzyn, Marienwerder in German, is both the name of a city and a district
about 100km south of Danzig. It became one of the focal points of border
diplomacy. As Polish military resources concentrated in the east, the resources of
the conference concentrated on the west. There, the most contentious issues were
Upper Silesia, Danzig and East Prussia. Upper Silesia had industry and coal that
could give Poland an industrial base. The population was predominantly Polish,
but not as numerous and nationalistic as elsewhere. Danzig had the port and a
strong German majority. East Prussia had vital transport links and a strong
German majority, too. Furthermore, there was a strategic threat that the Polish
corridor could be easily closed off by Germany, if East Prussia was not trimmed
back far enough. Kwidzyn sat in the south-western corner of East Prussia, on the
eastern bank of the Vistula. The river could be controlled from the city and it
was a transit point for the most direct railway line from Danzig to Warsaw, see
fig. 2.11, p. 77.
In early 1919 Dmowski and the Polish Delegation produced a map that spoke to
the issue of transport links to and from Danzig. In this map Dmowski went much
further than before in accepting ethnicity as a rigid feature. He showed the
ethnographic make-up of Prussian Poland, see fig. 2.7, p. 67. The numerical
sources were various Prussian government statistics. The darker the territory, the
greater was the share of Poles. As in Bowman’s map, the black-and-white scheme
visually downplayed the presence of non-Poles. There were five categories that
ranged from 0.5-10%, 10-25%, 25-40%, 40-50% and from 50-100%, see fig. 2.8,
p. 68. The map only showed Polish populations and the three highest categories
in very dark shadings. This created the impression of areas with a strong Polish
presence, even if the ethnic share was just at 25%.84
84On the map the Agence Polonaise Centrale (APC) is named as author. APC was founded
in September 1915 in Lausanne and coordinated the activities of those Polish news agencies
during the war that were on the side of the Entente. Chairman of the APC from 1916 was
Marian Seyda. He was a member of the Committee for Encyclopaedic Publications on Poland,
based in Lausanne and Fribourg, Switzerland, and of Dmowski’s Polish National Committee
KNP. At the Peace Conference Seyda was an expert of the Polish Delegation, see Halina
Florkowska-Francˇic´, Seyda, Marian, Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, 2012, http://www.hls-
dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D28490.php.
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Figure 2.7: CA 4, an ethnographic map of Polish Prussia by the Polish Delegation
from early 1919. The map was based on on the Prussian censuses of 1905 and 1900.
The darker the area, the greater the statistical share of Poles.
Source: ADDF, Roman Dmowski, Polish Delegation at the Peace Conference and
Agence Polonaise Centrale, 294QO/071 : Carte ethnographique de la Pologne Prusi-
enne, Paris, Lausanne, February 1919.
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(a) Polish ethnography around Kwidzyn, based on census
(b) Legend and colouring-scheme
Figure 2.8: Details of fig. 2.7, p. 67. The area south-east of Kwidzyn was a conten-
tious issue between the Allies. The direct railway line Danzig-Warsaw, considered an
important piece of infrastructure for Poland, ran over territory with a predominantly
German population. The black-and-white gradation, fig. 2.8b, visually favoured the
presence of Polish.
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Dmowski and the Polish Delegation produced a second version of this map, too.
It was constructed identically, but had a different data source. Instead of census
figures it visualised official primary school statistics from 1911. As a consequence,
those districts were darker through which the direct Danzig-Warsaw railway ran,
see fig. 2.9, p. 70. In the second version the districts of Kwidzyn, on the south-
western fringe of East Prussia, and the district Susz looked more ethnically
Polish.
Ethnographic maps are numerical-visual hybrids.. They show statistical data in a
spatial distribution. Discrete numbers are subsumed under ranges, which are
translated into a colour-coding scheme. Between October 1918 and early 1919
Dmowski changed the vision he presented to his counterparts from an historical
to an ethnographic version. Through the production, rejection and modification
of cognitive artefacts he aligned a great deal of his reasoning and his interests
with the Big Three. Ethnicity, as measured by German statistics, had become a
rigid feature to him as well.
Dmowski produced more artefacts than the Big Three. He also tried harder to
align his reasoning and his agency to his counterparts. From this asymmetry we
can hypothesise about the relationship between an actor’s power, his stakes in the
process and his output of cognitive artefacts. Between the four of them, Dmowski
was probably the weakest actor. He reasonably expected that Polish borders
would be less secure without the support of the Big Three. Dmowski’s stakes
were probably the highest, too. Insecure borders, as history has taught Poland,
are an existential matter for a state. Wilson’s state was on the other side of the
Atlantic Ocean. Lloyd George’s Britain was protected from continental threats by
the English Channel. Clemenceau’s France was stronger than Poland and had
just one open flank.
On 12 February 1919 the Big Three set up the Commission on Polish Affairs, to
coordinate on technical aspects of the border question. The Commission
consisted of an American, British, French, Italian and Japanese representative.
Japan and Italy completed the group of the five major powers at the conference.
Japan was given a formally prominent role as she had fought World War I against
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(a) Polish ethnography around Kwidzyn, based on census
(b) Polish ethnography around Kwidzyn, based on primary school statistics
Figure 2.9: Details and variation of fig. 2.7, p. 67. The Polish Delegation produced
two versions of its ethnographic map. One was based on the Prussian census, fig.2.9a,
the other was based on primary school statistics, fig. 2.9b. The latter showed a greater
presence of Poles in the districts Kwidzyn and Susz and was adduced in the Allied
debate by French politicians and experts.
Source: ADDF, Roman Dmowski, Polish Delegation at the Peace Conference and
Agence Polonaise Centrale, 294QO/071 : Pologne Prussienne : La nationalite´ des
enfants dans les e´coles primaires d’apre`s la statistique du gouvernement prussien de
1911, Paris, Lausanne, February 1919.
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Germany in the Far East and in the Pacific. The American member of the
Commission on Polish Affairs was Isaiah Bowman. The Commission’s terms
included the ‘question of boundaries of the Polish State’ and how to give it ‘some
prospect of continued life’.85
The Commission submitted its first proposal to Wilson, Lloyd George,
Clemenceau and the other members on the Council of Ten on 12 March 1919.
The proposal explicated and refined the synthetic mode of reasoning that had
emerged through the production, circulation and modification of cognitive
artefacts up to that point:
(a.) That primary consideration be given to the line of ethnic
separation in such a way as to secure the fairest possible settlement
between the two peoples concerned.
(b.) That rectifications of the frontier, in some places in favour of the
Poles and in others in favour of the Germans, be made where the
ethnic facts are outweighed by the other facts and principles involved.
(c.) That due weight be attached to lines of religious cleavage, as, for
example, in Mazuria, where a Protestant population exists which is
Polish in speech and race.
(d.) That slight adjustments be made in a line based on the above
determining considerations wherever such adjustments would make the
proposed line coincide with a well-recognised line of historical division,
as, for example, on the borders of the province of Poznania, which
coincide with the frontier of the Kingdom of Poland prior to 1772.
(e.) That natural economic relations and existing means of
communication be taken into consideration in order that the normal
industrial life of each community should be restored as quickly as
possible.
85London School of Economics Archives (hereafter LSEA), Commission on Polish Affairs of the
Paris Conference, Webster Papers : 3/10/18 : Report No. 1: Frontier between Poland and
Germany, 1919, p. 1; British Foreign Office, British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports
and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part II, Series I: From the First to the
Second World War. The Paris Peace Conference 1919, ed. Michael Lawrence Dockrill, vol. 3
(University Publications of America, 1989), p. 42.
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(f.) That account be taken of the exposed situation of Poland between
Russia on the one hand and Germany on the other, and that after all
the above factors have been duly taken into consideration, attention
be paid to the strengthening of the defensive frontiers of the new
Polish State. While such a strengthening in no case gives Poland any
advantage for offensive action, it diminishes to some extent the
dangers which threaten her, exposed as she is to attack on the east,
the west, and the north over unobstructed plains which offer at best
but insignificant natural defences.86
True to the idea that the Commission operated in a space of mediation and
reason, it laid out its principles prior to its recommendations, see table 2.3, p. 72.
‘Ethnic separation’ was given as primary objective. It was qualified by ‘expedient
rectifications’, which could be ‘religious cleavage’, the ‘historical division’ of the
land, ‘natural economic relations and existing means of communication’ and a
geostrategic concern for Poland’s security. The order of these six points was
intended to mirror a hierarchy of application.
Table 2.3: Border making principles of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919
No. 19191
1 Ethnic separation
2 Expedient rectifications where ethnic separation is outweighed by other
factors:
2.1 Religious affiliation, especially where it does not follow ethnicity
2.2 Historical borders
2.3 ‘Natural economic relations & means of communication’
2.4 Defensibility of the Polish state
1 Source: LSEA, Commission on Polish Affairs of the Paris Conference, Webster Papers :
3/10/18 : Report No. 1: Frontier between Poland and Germany, 1919, p. 2.
In the introduction I have argued that the term cognitive artefact does usually not
apply to written documents. There are written documents, however, that have
some of the features of cognitive artefacts. Examples are the ordered sequences of
verbally expressed ideas and principles, such as the border making principles of
86LSEA, Commission on Polish Affairs of the Paris Conference, Report No. 1 , p. 2.
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the Commission on Polish Affairs, table 2.3, p. 72, or Dmowski’s requirements of
the Polish state, table 2.2, p. 51. Beyond that, there is an important and close
relationship between verbal statements and cognitive artefacts: it is evident from
Dmowski’s map that Polish history was more important to him than ethnicity,
but his written and verbal statements provided background and detail that were
not explicitly present in the map. For example, meaning and purpose of the
number 1296 written into Pomerania, fig. 2.3, p. 48, were only accessible to a map
user who knew about history and its meaning to Dmowski.
My reason not to apply the term cognitive artefact to verbal expressions generally
is that the latter have a much greater degree of ambiguity. I do not think that
Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau knew what Dmowski’s writings and
statements meant for the exact location of the border. Language, in particular
the language of diplomacy, is flexible. It is rife with suggestion and intimation.
Cognitive artefacts, in contrast, cut through such vagueness. The decidedness of
the border on Dmowski’s map triggered Wilson’s to exclaim that the Poles
wanted ‘a large part of the earth’.87 Dmowski, Lloyd George and Clemenceau only
understood the bearing of Wilson’s ‘indisputably Polish populations’ on borders
once they saw Bowman’s map.88 Actors in diplomatic processes adopt clear
positions in their cognitive artefacts, but rarely in their verbal statements.
Concerning Poland’s prospect of continued life, a number of points are worth
noticing. First, the issue of Poland’s security, pinched between Russia and
Germany, was only a qualifying clause for the Commission. Second, economic
considerations were given in subordination to ethnic identity and only in a very
toned down manner. The Commission stated that ‘natural economic relations
and existing means of communication’ were taken into account to restore the
‘normal industrial life’ of self-contained communities. The Commission mentioned
neither trade nor natural, industrial or human resources, not to speak of
distributional conflicts, e.g., over the industry and coal of Upper Silesia. The
Commission was both purposely vague and coy in phrasing its principles. The
87MacMillan, Peacemakers, p. 223.
88Wilson and Yale Law School, President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points.
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words had to leave considerable ambiguity so that the different factions and
diverging interests, which had to be represented, could sign up to them.
The Commission supported its own proposal with a statistical table on the
number of Poles and Germans it would assign to Poland, see fig. 2.10a, p. 74.
Figures for the border proposition by Dmowski and the Polish Delegation were in
columns one and two, for the Commission’s proposition in columns three and
four. Columns five and six showed the difference. The Commission’s proposal
reduced the number of Germans in Poland by 805,000 and that of Poles only by
365,200. The Commission relayed its data sources and provided commentary on
its cognitive artefact in the footnotes, see fig. 2.10b, p. 74.
(a)
(b) Footnotes to table
Figure 2.10: CA 5, statistics from 12 March 1919 by the Commission on Polish
Affairs. The Commission argued, fig. 2.10a, that its own border proposition (column
‘Assigned Germans’) achieved a greater degree of ethnic separation than the borders
demanded by the Polish Delegation (column ‘Claimed Germans’). The Commission
constructed its statistics, fig. 2.10b, in selectively invalidating the Prussian census
and drawing on elements of it.
Source: LSEA, Commission on Polish Affairs of the Paris Conference, Webster Papers
: 3/10/18 : Report No. 1: Frontier between Poland and Germany, 1919, p. 9.
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With this cognitive artefact the Commission showed that its frontier provided for
a greater degree of ethnic separation. In creating its table the Commission
performed a number of operations. It translated its own and Dmowski’s borders
from a geographic into a quantitative relationship. Moreover, it transformed
existing German statistics into statistics of the Peace Conference. The
Commission deconstructed German statistics, then assembled fragments into new
interallied statistics and validated it. These steps happened simultaneously and
were directed at different parts of the cognitive artefact.
The strongest aspect of deconstruction was the breaking up of the German
government districts as valid territorial and statistical units. In the table,
Pomerania, Danzig, Marienwerder etc were divided into Polish and German parts,
i.e, they were divided and recast into new units. Their validity no longer
depended on the social power of the German state, but on the power of the Peace
Conference. The limits of these new units were not yet stable, Dmowski and the
Big Three were still wrangling. The footnotes to the artefact are further
indicators that the German state had partially lost power over its numbers.
Where plebiscites would be held, footnote †, that power would ultimately shift to
the local population. For the population of Oppeln it had fallen to those who
defined the borders of Czecho-Slovakia (§). The German soldiers and officials that
were included in the German census of 1905 (*), would be made to leave and
thereby render the old official statistics biased.
Comparison was another strategy that the Commission employed to make its
numbers valid. The Commission applied the criterium of ethnic separation and
compared numbers for its own borders with those of the Polish Delegation. The
footnotes played a role in validating the new object, too. Footnote † stated that
the figure 365,200 included the number of Poles that lived in plebiscite areas, i.e.,
that it was a maximum figure. Footnote * referred to the inclusion of
administrative and military personnel in the census, which meant that the
2,132,600 Germans assigned to Poland, column 4 in fig. 2.10a, p. 74, were a
maximum figure as well. The Commission’s frontier would thus achieve an even
greater degree of ethnic separation than the numbers stated.
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To give the numerical artefact validity, it was important that the challenge of the
German state and the concomitant deconstruction of its statistics was only
partial. Only certain elements of the old object were deconstructed and only to a
certain extent. The government districts were properly broken up. The numbers,
the Commission argued, counted too many Germans, but were not wrong enough
to be completely useless. The Commission kept the units of account intact,
individuals and their Polish or German identity, to make the argument of ethnic
separation work. One rigid feature of the Commission was a binary notion of
identity of numerable individuals. People could be counted and they were either
Polish or German. A second rigid feature was the location of the ordinary
population, while the Commission considered the location of German officials and
soldiers to be flexible. The Commission’s calculation assumed that the population
would be in the same place once the Polish-German border was drawn, as it had
been when the census was taken in 1905. These rigid and flexible features of the
Commission’s cognitive artefact stabilised its own border proposition and
destabilised Dmowski’s. Moreover, the Commission’s artefact further specified the
scope of agency of Dmowski and the Big Three. In addition to drawing borders
by appealing to ethnicity, the actors could schedule plebiscites and move German
soldiers and public servants.
The Commission laid out its recommendation of the Polish-German border on 12
March 1919 with a written exposition and a map. Kwidzyn became a hot topic in
the ensuing discussion of the Big Three. Fig. 2.11, p. 77, shows the area where
the Polish corridor to the Baltic Sea bordered on East Prussia. The solid red line
marked the proposed frontier, with East Prussia in the north-east and Poland in
the south-west. Danzig was in the north-eastern corner. Kwidzyn was labelled
with its German name Marienwerder, just west of a 90◦ bend in the frontier, on a
u-shaped railway connection between Elbing and Danzig. In the south-eastern
corner of the close-up is the city of M lawa. Here is how the Commission’s
reasoned for the frontier in this area:
(g.) West Prussia east of the Vistula
The Commission considers it necessary that the Dantzig-Dirschau-
Mlawa-Warsaw railway should be in Polish hands. This involves the
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Figure 2.11: CA 6, detail of the map by the Commission on Polish Affairs from 12
March 1919. East and south-east of Kwidzyn the commission recommended a border
(solid red line) that included the Danzig-M lawa-Warsaw railway (thin black line)
into Poland. The Commission argued that the railway line was vital to Poland. This
meant the inclusion of Germans into Poland, which lead to a controversy between
Lloyd George and the French Delegation.
Source: LSEA, Commission on Polish Affairs of the Paris Conference, Webster Papers
: 3/10/18 : Report No. 1: Frontier between Poland and Germany, 1919.
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annexation to Poland of a certain number of Germans in the northern
part of West Prussia east of the Vistula, although even in this region
there are considerable areas, notably in a portion of the Kreis [county]
of Stuhm (Sztum), where the Poles are in a majority. Incidentally it
will enable the Poles to control both banks of the Vistula, thus
avoiding the complication of dual control.
In view of the importance to Poland of the Dantzig-Dirschau-Mlawa
railway, it will further be necessary to exclude from the proposed
plebiscite in East Prussia a very small area inhabited by Protestant
Poles in the southern corner of Regierungsbezirk [district] Allenstein
(Olsztyn), which considerations of transport make it necessary to
assign definitely to Poland.89
The border between Poland and West Prussia exemplifies the Commission’s
synthetic reasoning, see table 2.3, p. 72. In the case of Kwidzyn, the Commission
locally disregarded ethnic separation in favour of the Danzig-M lawa railway that
continued towards Warsaw in the south-east. This was not the only connection
between the capital and Danzig, but it was the most direct. Giving it to Poland
meant to assign her a ‘certain number of Germans’, which was attenuated by a
number of positive side-effects. The annexation also included certain areas where
the Poles were in a majority. Avoiding dual control of the Vistula improved
Poland’s defensive capability and a number of Protestant Poles would also be
included into Poland.
The Commission’s written exposition tried to paper over a conflict that flared up
between Clemenceau and Lloyd George during the discussion. Instead of
quantifying the numbers of Germans and Poles that were affected by the border
in this area, the Commission’s wording was vague. The phrase ‘avoiding dual
control of the Vistula’ understated the strategic importance of Kwidzyn. In the
map the Commission avoided the issue of ethnicity altogether. It showed cities,
railways, waterways and political borders. For the aggregate level, the
Commission produced a numerical artefact that exclusively dealt with ethnic
89LSEA, Commission on Polish Affairs of the Paris Conference, Report No. 1 , p. 4. Italics in
original.
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separation and emphasised the great degree to which it would be achieved. In the
concrete instance, in fact on all the maps it produced, the Commission omitted
the location of Germans and Poles.
The rigid features of the Commission’s map were cities, railways and waterways.
Kwidzyn, the Danzig-M lawa line and the Vistula stabilised the political border
that the Commission proposed. While ethnicity was not a feature of the
Commission’s map, it was a rigid feature of its table. How can we explain the
phenomenon that ethnicity flickered in and out of the Commission’s reasoning,
depending on the type of cognitive artefact? Quantifying ethnicity on the
aggregate level, i.e., in the statistical table, had a stabilising effect on the
Commission’s border. Visualising ethnicity on the disaggregate level, i.e., in the
map, would have had the opposite effect. Different types of cognitive artefacts
enabled the Commission to create coherence on different levels and according to
different criteria. The rigid feature on the micro level was a railway line. The
rigid feature on the macro level was ethnicity.
While the Allies were proportionally represented on the Commission, production
of the Commission’s maps was in the hands of the geographical service of the
French Army. Quantifying ethnicity, but not visualising it, was an attempt to
strengthen Poland at the expense of Germany. Clemenceau tried to align Wilson
and Lloyd George to his position. Whether or not Wilson and Lloyd George
accepted the cognitive artefacts of the Commission would show whether or not
Clemenceau’s agency extended so far that Kwidzyn and the Danzig-M lawa
railway could be included into Poland.
2.4.3 The Supreme Council
Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau discussed the Commission’s border
recommendation on 19 March 1919. The three were members of the conference’s
Supreme Council, another name for the Council of Ten. Typically, they were
accompanied by their ministers of foreign affairs and a selection of national
experts that could speak to the question at hand. Jules Cambon, the French
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Chairman of the Commission, laid out its deliberations prior to the discussion.
He rehashed the general impossibility of strictly ethnographic borders anywhere
in Central or Eastern Europe, the need to consider economic and strategic factors
so that Poland had a ‘fair chance of surviving’ and Germany’s systematic
anti-Polish politics.90 The frontier in the north, Cambon remarked before dealing
with specific sections, had been drawn ‘in accordance with school statistics’.91
Danzig had a mostly German population but there were economic, strategic and
military reasons to accord it to Poland, just like the two railways to M lawa and
Thorn that gave the port ‘communication with the interior’.92
Cambon’s exposition reveals that the Commission drew on the second version of
Dmowski’s ethnographic map, the one based on school statistics. That version
showed a stronger Polish presence in the north and in Kwidzyn than the first
version, based on the Prussian census. Of the two versions that Dmowski
produced, the Commission’s interests were better met by the version that showed
a greater Polish presence in Kwidzyn. It stabilised a border that allowed the
inclusion of Kwidzyn and the Danzig-M lawa railway into Poland.
Lloyd George rejected Dmowski’s ethnographic map and the cognitive artefacts of
the Commission. He interrupted Cambon’s exposition and objected to the border
with East Prussia. To Lloyd George that border meant to ‘hand over millions of
[Germans] to a distasteful [Polish] allegiance merely because of a railway’.93 The
preferable solution was to ‘accord communication’ to Poland across German
territory.94 Wilson reminded Lloyd George of Germany’s political colonisation in
the region and Cambon argued that much of the German population would
emigrate quickly once Poland was constituted, as it was of ‘recent importation’.95
Lloyd George in response focused his critique and dissented exclusively to the
‘assignment to Poland of areas whose whole history was German’ and where there
was a German majority - the districts of Danzig and Kwidzyn.96
90British Foreign Office, The Paris Peace Conference 1919, vol. 3 , p. 40.
91Ibid.
92Ibid.
93Ibid., p. 41.
94Ibid.
95Ibid.
96Ibid.
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Cambon, speaking for Clemenceau, replied that historically ‘the real end of
Poland did not come in 1772’, but with the loss of Danzig in 1743; that showed
that ‘without that port Poland could not live’.97 Economically, Cambon argued,
secure railway communication between East and West Prussia was acceptable for
Germany as it was marginal to begin with; 90 percent of East Prussia’s exports,
mainly timber, travelled by sea. The two railways between Warsaw and Danzig,
on the other hand, were ‘absolutely essential to Poland’.98 The conference was
forced to choose between protecting ‘largely imported’ Germans or Poles and
Cambon stated that he ‘unquestionably preferred the latter alternative’.99
Lloyd George agreed on the need of a ‘principal artery for Polish commerce’, but
continued to protest against the Commission’s ‘most dangerous proposal’.100 In
his view the Vistula and the railway adjoining on the eastern bank were the
necessary transport arteries. The Danzig-M lawa railway, he maintained, ‘could be
removed’ much more easily than the ‘long-settled population’.101 Therefore, with
a long-term perspective, the Allies could not depart from the principle of ethnic
self-determination in this case. Drawing the border as the Commission suggested,
argued Lloyd George, meant to create a territory of ‘Germania Irredenta’, which
was the ‘seed of future war’ unless the allies were ready ‘to go to war to maintain
Polish rule’.102
Cambon and Ste´phen Pichon, France’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, reciprocated
with a modified version of the security and economy argument. The district
Kwidzyn, they stated, should not only be Polish because of the Danzig-M lawa
connection, but because whoever held the city dominated the Vistula, which was
the ‘main artery of commercial traffic’. Therefore, the two railway lines through
Kwidzyn ‘were indispensable to the economic life of Poland’.103
97British Foreign Office, The Paris Peace Conference 1919, vol. 3 , p. 42.
98Ibid.
99Ibid.
100Ibid.
101Ibid.
102Ibid., pp. 42-3.
103Ibid., p. 43.
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The controversy between Lloyd George and the French diplomats came down to a
disagreement over rigid and flexible features. Was the railway or the German
population more rigid and which had a greater stabilising effect on the border?
To Lloyd George the German population was more rigid than the railway, for the
French politicians it was the other way around. To Lloyd George the exclusion of
Germans stabilised the Polish state more than the inclusion of Kwidzyn and the
railway, for the French it was the opposite. In the instance, Wilson eventually
deflated the controversy by postponing a decision. The issue was returned to the
Commission on Polish Affairs, so that it reconsidered its border proposition for
Kwidzyn.104
How was the difference of opinion between Lloyd George and the French resolved?
Which side did Wilson choose? Did the Big Three ultimately find the railroad to
be more rigid or the people? The Commission reconsidered its border
proposition, but did not change its mind. Lloyd George insisted on his point of
view as well. In the end, the question whether railways or people were more rigid
remained unresolved. Instead, the peace conference fixed a provisional Polish-
German border in the Kwidzyn district. Fig. 2.12, p. 83, shows a detail of one of
the maps that accompanied the Treaty of Versailles. The red hachure of the
Kwidzyn district and other parts of East Prussia indicated areas in which the
peace conference scheduled plebiscites. On 11 July 1920 a majority of the local
population of Kwidzyn voted for the inclusion of the Kwidzyn district into
Germany.
The map that accompanied the Treaty of Versailles reveals another characteristic
of producing, circulating and modifying cognitive artefacts. The process enables
actors to specify their joint agency without necessarily resolving their differences
of opinion. The Big Three agreed on the exact location for most of the Polish-
German border. For sections such as in fig. 2.12, p. 83, however, they agreed on a
provisional border. Cognitive artefacts display traits that Martha
Lampland (2010) captures in her concept of ‘false numbers’.105 Lampland shows
that false numbers are ‘temporary or conditional devices’ that do not undermine,
104British Foreign Office, The Paris Peace Conference 1919, vol. 3 , pp. 43-4.
105Lampland, ‘False numbers as formalizing practices’.
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Figure 2.12: CA7, detail from one of the maps of the Versailles Treaty from 28
June 1919. The Paris Conference could not agree on a definite course of the border
east and south-east of Kwidzyn, but specified that a plebiscite would be held in the
area (red).
Source: ADDF, Paris Peace Conference and Se´rvice Ge´ographique de l’Arme´e,
294QO/72 : Frontie`res Occidentales de l’Allemagne, Paris, June 1919.
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but facilitate ‘fixity and stability in representation’.106 One of Lampland’s
examples is the use of false numbers in Stalinist Hungary to engrain the practise
of accounting in rural workers.107 For the Treaty of Versailles the Peace
Conference created a map in which the Polish-German border was in parts a false
line. The border was temporary and conditional where it touched on plebiscite
areas. Like Lampland’s false numbers, these false lines did not subvert, but
enabled the ‘fixity and stability’ of the border. First, they allowed Wilson, Lloyd
George and Clemenceau to fix the border in all those places where they had no
disagreements. Second, the false lines acted as placeholders until plebiscites
would determine the final border.
2.5 Analytical conclusions: Themes from the case
Between 1918 and June 1919 Dmowski, Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau
delimited, specified and used their scope of agency in determining Poland’s
borders. They did so by producing, circulating, rejecting and modifying cognitive
artefacts in an iterative process. Through this process the actors established a
shared way of reasoning about the location of the Polish border. This reasoning
was synthetic and did not follow one single principle. It consisted of ideational
elements like the self-determination of ethnicities. It also contained rationalist
elements like the distinct identification of individuals with one ethnicity and the
quantification of these individuals.
Dmowski, Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George developed a shared reasoning.
They did not, however, have or develop shared views of the Polish border
question. For example, there was no shared understanding that self-determination
was a moral imperative. Neither did Dmowski and the Big Three end up with a
formula or measure for the border. The shared reasoning of our actors was loose
enough for them to pursue their own objectives. At the same time it was specific
enough to yield a considerable range of concrete diplomatic results.
106Lampland, ‘False numbers as formalizing practices’, p. 377.
107Ibid., pp. 387-94.
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The case has shown that cognitive artefacts are not multi-way translations like
boundary objects. First, actors reject and change cognitive artefacts. Cognitive
artefacts do not mediate between the positions of actors, they sharpen their
positions and grind out potential overlap. Second, different types of cognitive
artefacts, even if they are produced by the same actor, provide different accounts
of the same issue. A map has different rigid and flexible features than a statistical
table. That is, cognitive artefacts change rather than translate an issue. These
are two important differences between cognitive artefacts and the boundary
objects of Star and Griesemer.
Cognitive artefacts are a way for actors to explore and develop their agency.
Individual actors identify the limits of their agency through the iterative process
in which their negotiation partners accept, reject or modify cognitive artefacts.
Actors collectively figure out the limits of their joint agency through these
iterations, too, and they develop the internal structure of agency. In the iterative
process actors close in on a shared order of features and become increasingly
sophisticated at differentiating their flexibility, rigidity and stability. One possible
outcome of this refinement is that actors produce artefacts with false features in
Lampland’s sense. These false features do not subvert, but enable stability of
representation and of the diplomatic process.
It is tempting to extend Bowman’s dictum of the ‘map language’ to an artefact
language.108 Cognitive artefacts are linked up to a network of reasoning,
communicating and arguing. Maps can visualise quantitative aspects, statistics
can quantify spatial aspects. Actors can hardly appreciate different cognitive
artefacts in isolation and without the verbal statements in which they are
embedded. The term of an artefact language is risky though. It might lead us to
discounting unduly their non-linguistic characteristics. We have argued that
verbal statements are not cognitive artefacts because the latter are much more
decided. Subsuming maps and statistics under an artefacts language bears the
risk of obliterating that distinction. Moreover, cognitive artefacts have elements
that are non-verbal and non-textual, e.g., the geographic space of a map or the
logical dimensions of a table.
108Cited in: Smith, American Empire, p. 147.
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3.1 Introduction
Poland shifted westward through the Second World War, roughly losing a third of
her territory in the east to the Soviet Union and gaining a third in the west from
Germany, see figs. 3.1a & 3.1b, p. 88. The main actors that determined Poland’s
borders were the political leaders of the US, the Soviet Union and Great Britain,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill. The three heads of
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state were joined in the so-called Grand Alliance that fought World War II
against Germany.1 Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill determined borders not after,
but during the war. Poland’s borders were settled by mid-1945.
The diplomacy surrounding Poland’s borders was driven by two factors. First,
the common aim to defeat Germany. Second, the actors’ diverging objectives for
postwar Europe. Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill relegated the Polish government
to a dummy that was only included where it served their interests. The diplomatic
process between the members of the Grand Alliance lasted from December 1943
to June 1945 and was underpinned by their military activities.
This chapter examines seven cognitive artefacts from 1943 to 1945 that the actors
used to determine Poland’s post-1945 border, see table 3.1, p. 87. With these
artefacts the actors developed their joint agency, based on shared war aims and
diverging postwar aims. The first two artefacts circulated within the US
administration, the remaining five circulated within the Grand Alliance. It will
be argued that the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain
coordinated successfully on Poland’s borders through the production, circulation
and modification of these artefacts.
Table 3.1: Artefacts of Poland’s post-1945 borders
No. Date Actor1 Description
1 12.1.1943 PL/US Ethnicity statistics east of Soviet-German line
2 22.1.1943 US Map of possible Polish-Soviet boundaries
3 1942/43 US/SU (St) Map of Polish-Soviet frontier
4 Sep. 1944 US (Rv) Map of proposed division of Germany
5 Sep. 1944 US (Mt) Map of proposed division of Germany
6 Sep. 1944 EAC Map of occupation zones in Germany
7 1945 US Data map of German-Polish frontier
1 Denominates the political actor, fraction or entity from which the artefact origin-
ated: PL=Poland; US=United States; St=Joseph Stalin, Soviet Union; Rv=Franklin
D. Roosevelt, US President; Mt=Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, US;
EAC=European Advisory Commission (interallied body of US, UK & SU).
1Winston Churchill coined the term ‘Grand Alliance’ and later popularised it through his per-
sonal account of the war; Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 1-6 (London:
Houghton Miﬄin, 1948).
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(a) Poland in 1937
(b) Poland after 1945
Figure 3.1: Poland’s borders before and after World War II.
Source: Richard C. Lukas, The Strange Allies : The United States and Poland, 1941-
45 (Knoxville, TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1978), pp. 6 & 133.
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3.2 Literature review
3.2.1 Historical literature
Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill shared the principal war aim to defeat Germany.
This was an existential matter for Britain and the Soviet Union; for the US,
Germany was a threat to the aspired liberal world order.2 Hence the three
countries joined in the Grand Alliance after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour on 7
December 1941.3 In the postwar world the US wanted to expand economically
into Western Europe.4 The Soviet Union sought to control Central and Eastern
Europe, to prevent future challenges in her west by Germany.5 Britain wanted a
European balance of power that restrained Germany and an economic
integration, mainly of Western Europe, under her leadership.6 The postwar
objectives of the US and Britain on one side and the Soviet Union on the other
were thereby directed at largely disjunct geographic areas, which intersected
somewhere in prewar Poland or Germany.
American, British and Soviet border politicking is predominantly seen to be
driven by geopolitical aspirations and utter disregard for Polish concerns. There
is little need to probe Stalin’s actions for pro-Polish intentions, considering the
Red Army’s move westwards during World War II and the inclusion of Poland
into the communist bloc. Regarding the attitudes of Roosevelt and Churchill, Jan
Karski (1985) argues that they were familiar with Stalin’s westward expansion
and tolerated it until mid-1945.7 Robert Szymczak (1999) maintains that the US
preserved good Soviet-American relations at virtually any cost, including the
2Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought,
2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 3-6.
3Michael Howard, ‘Grand Alliance’, in The Oxford Companion to World War II, ed. I. C. B.
Dear and M. R. D. Foot (Oxford University Press, 2001).
4Nicolas Lewkowicz, The German Question and the International Order, 1943-48, Global Con-
flict and Security since 1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 49-67.
5Ibid., pp. 68-78.
6Talbot Imlay, ‘Western Allied ideology, 1939 - 1945’, chap. 2 in The Cambridge History of the
Second World War, ed. Richard J. B. Bosworth and Joseph A. Maiolo, vol. 2 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2015), 43–67.
7Jan Karski, The Great Powers & Poland, 1919-1945: From Versailles to Yalta (Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, 1985), pp. 451, 619.
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Soviet massacre of Polish officers in Katyn in 1943.8 Mieczys law Biskupski (2002)
studies the role of Hollywood’s film industry in shaping public perception of
Poland; he concludes that the administration found a perfect ally in the movie
industry in disregarding ‘Poland as a reactionary obstacle to Soviet-American
cooperation’.9 P. M. H. Bell (1989) makes the same point for British policy
towards Poland and Katyn and emphasises the role public propaganda played.10
Anna M. Cienciala (2009) argues that ignoring Polish sovereignty was part of
Roosevelt’s policy towards the Soviets.11 To Anita J. Praz˙mowska (1995), Poland
is the ally that Britain betrayed.12
3.2.2 Literature on artefacts
The cognitive artefacts of border diplomacy during World War II have received
comparably less attention than those of the Paris Conference in 1919. The reason
is, I presume, that ongoing military activity tends to overshadow concurrent
political reasoning and coordination. The disproportionate attention that is given
to military maps supports this assumption.13
Harley A. Notter (1975) has published a number of US foreign policy documents
on Poland from the early 1940s.14 These documents contain two cognitive
artefacts, a statistical table and a map, that will be discussed, amongst others, in
8Robert Szymczak, ‘Uneasy Observers: The OSS Foreign Nationalities Branch and Perceptions
of Polish Nationalism in the United States during World War II’, Polish American Studies 56,
no. 1 (1999): 7–73.
9Mieczys law B. Biskupski, ‘Hollywood and Poland, 1939-1945: The American Cinema and Poles
during World War II’, The Polish Review 47, no. 2 (2002): p. 210.
10P. M. H. Bell, ‘Censorship, Propaganda and Public Opinion: The Case of the Katyn Graves,
1943’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 39 (1989): 63–83.
11Anna M. Cienciala, ‘The United States and Poland in World War II’, The Polish Review 54,
no. 2 (2009): 173–194.
12Anita J. Praz˙mowska, Britain and Poland, 1939-1943: The betrayed ally, Cambridge Russian,
Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
13A selection of publications is: Jasper Henry Stembridge, The Oxford War Atlas (London:
Oxford University Press, 1945); John Keegan, Collins Atlas of World War II (New York, NY:
Harper Perennial, 2006); Alexander Swanston and Malcolm Swanston, The Historical Atlas
of World War II (London: Cartographica, 207).
14Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945, General Foreign Policy Series
15 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975).
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this chapter. Notter treats these cognitive artefacts as outcomes of quasi-scientific
information gathering, providing the factual background on which Roosevelt
based his policies. This chapter will challenge Notter’s position. In light of the
results that the previous chapter has yielded, it seems unlikely that cognitive
artefacts provide facts on which to base agency.
Other scholars that have circled in on the question of cognitive artefacts include
Neil Gregor (2008).15 He builds on Churchill’s known fascination with physical
maps and tries to get at the mental maps of Britain’s political leader during the
war. Steven Casey (2008) conducts a similar analysis for Roosevelt.16 Alan G.
Henrikson (1980) argues in general terms that geographic intuition and
imagination are vital, but chronically underdeveloped skills in foreign policy
making.17 Werner Abelshauser (2004) has edited a primary source that would
lend itself to an analysis of Nazi Germany’s agency during the war: Go¨ring’s
Atlas was a collection of maps that visualised resource deposits and industrial
facilities across Europe.18 The atlas was put together in spring 1944, to give
Hitler’s ‘armament’s dictator’ an overview over the continent’s resource potential
for warfare. Abelshauser remarks that the atlas had a predominantly
representative function for Go¨ring. The task of armaments planning had already
passed to Albert Speer when the atlas was produced. The type of resource maps
it contained though, played an important part in military planning.19
15Neil Gregor, ‘The Maps on Churchill’s Mind’, chap. 11 in Mental Maps in the Era of Two World
Wars, ed. Steven Casey and Jonathan Wright (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 203–
215.
16Steven Casey, ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt’, chap. 12 in Mental Maps in the Era of Two World Wars,
ed. Steven Casey and Jonathan Wright (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 216–239.
17Alan K. Henrikson, ‘The Geographical ”Mental Maps” of American Foreign Policy Makers’,
International Political Science Review 1, no. 4 (1980): 495–530.
18Werner Abelshauser, ed., Go¨ring’s Atlas. Das Handwerkszeug des Ru¨stungsdiktators. Geheimes
Kartenmaterial aus dem Bu¨ro des Beauftragten fu¨r den Vierjahresplan Reichsmarschall Her-
mann Go¨ring (Braunschweig: Archiv Verlag, 2004).
19Ibid., introduction.
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3.3 US policy and borders
Regarding borders in Central Europe, Roosevelt had to take account of America’s
war and postwar aims. The latter were more comprehensive than economic
expansion into Western Europe. The US sought to embed economic liberalism in
a postwar international order that was safeguarded by a collective security
system, not empires. When Japan bombarded Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941,
the dominant belief of the American public became that there was no American
security without an active and ongoing military involvement. US foreign policy
had been heterogeneous in the preceding two decades and variantly followed two
competing strands, the isolationist and the internationalist. Pearl Harbor tipped
the balance in favour of internationalism.20 While World War I was perceived as
the war to end all wars, World War II became the first step to a continuous
military presence on the international stage.
This section discusses two cognitive artefacts that Notter published along with
US foreign policy documents. They did not circulate to Stalin and Churchill,
which gives us an opportunity to explore the role that cognitive artefacts have
outside of a negotiation setting. Given the broad parameters of America’s
position, how did Roosevelt and his administration develop a concrete stance on
Poland’s borders?
3.3.1 Poland as room for manoeuvre
Roosevelt’s State Department created the Advisory Committee on Post-War
Foreign Policy, when the US entered the war. The Committee studied global
problems that were of concern to the United States.21 One of the Committee’s
tributaries was the US Subcommittee on Territorial Problems. It was active from
March 1942 to December 1943 and dealt with the global scale of territorial issues.
Beginning with the Near East and Eastern Europe, it eventually produced
20Michael J. Nojeim and David P. Kilroy, Days of Decision: Turning Points in U.S. Foreign
Policy (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2011), pp. 39-55.
21Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 , p. 69.
92
3 Poland’s borders after World War II
materials for all European countries and the rest of the world.22 The Territorial
Subcommittee’s mandate was explicitly not to provide border recommendations,
but to explore issues, to consider eventualities and to develop scenarios. The
underlying rationale, Notter argues, was that the ‘exact nature of postwar
political problems’ could not be known and that recommendations were therefore
simply impossible.23
When the US Territorial Subcommittee started its work, in March 1942,
Roosevelt told the Soviet ambassador that he would not object if the Soviet
Union regained her frontier of September 1941. Roosevelt referred to the
Molotov-von Ribbentrop line that the Soviet and German armies had established
when they attacked Poland in 1939.24 At that time the front line between the
German and the Russian Army was approximately 400 kilometres east of the
Molotov-von Ribbentrop line in the northern section and 800 kilometres or more
in the central and southern sections, see fig. 3.2, p. 94. The Red Army was
engaged in the Battle of Moscow, which would become the first strategically
significant defeat of Nazi Germany.
The front was more or less in the same place in January 1943, after the Red
Army had reversed German gains of summer 1942 in the south-east. In January
1943 the US Territorial Subcommittee produced a paper on the ethnic
composition of the population in Poland, east of the Molotov-von Ribbentrop
line. The paper began with a statistical table that set out overall ethnicity
statistics, see fig. 3.3, p. 95.25 The US Territorial Subcommittee distinguished
three zones of ‘ethnic settlement’, Polish-White Russian in the north, a ‘local’
population in the centre and Polish-Ukrainian in the south. With respect to
ethnic separation, the Subcommittee stated that the Soviet-German line of 28
September 1939 left ‘many Poles to the Soviet Union’, but alternative lines would
leave ‘almost as many Ukrainians in Poland’.26
22Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 , pp. 118, 120.
23Ibid., pp. 121-2.
24Lewkowicz, The German Question and the International Order, 1943-48 , p. 77.
25The paper is reproduced in: Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 , p. 492.
26Ibid., pp. 492-5.
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Figure 3.2: Advances of the Red Army between 1943 and 1945.
Source: Henri Michel, The Second World War (London: Deutsch, 1975), p. 557.
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Figure 3.3: CA 1, US statistics from January 1943 on the ethnic composition in
Poland, east of the Soviet-German partitioning line of 28 September 1939. The table
was based on language data of the Polish Census of 1931.
Source: Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945, General
Foreign Policy Series 15 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 492-5.
In closing, the Subcommittee evaluated its data source. Despite being the ‘best
available data’, the US Territorial Subcommittee argued, the Polish Census of
1931 was of limited use. Census takers had maximised the number of Polish
speakers and minimised the number of non-Polish speakers for political reasons.
This was evident to the Subcommittee in the language category ‘local’. It
captured individuals who were ‘White Russian and Ukrainian in language,
religion and customs’, but who had ‘no degree of White Russian or Ukrainian
national or political consciousness’.27 The US Subcommittee argued as well, that
the ethnic makeup in eastern Poland had undergone ‘drastic changes’ since 1931.
Through the Soviet occupation and the ensuing Soviet-German war the ‘Polish
element has been much reduced’ by voluntary or forced migration; Germany
exterminated ‘a great part of the Jewish population’ and transferred ‘forced
labor’ to other areas under her domination. The US Territorial Subcommittee
thus concluded that the ‘actual situation upon the cessation of hostilities can be
determined only by detailed investigation on the ground’.28
The Polish Census of 1931 used mother tongue as proxy for ethnicity. The census
of 1921 had asked individuals for their nationality. Census takers were instructed
that, if there was no obvious mother tongue, that language should be recorded to
which the person felt closest. Furthermore, Ukrainian, Belorussian etc and
dialects thereof should be treated as different languages, in spite of their close
27Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 , pp. 493.
28Ibid., pp. 493, 495.
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proximity.29 In Rogers Brubaker’s terminology (1996) Poland’s 1931 census was
part of a wider effort at ‘nationalisation’.30 By asking for people’s mother tongue,
rather than their nationality, the Polish element in the statistics should be
strengthened. It was an attempt to include those who spoke Polish, but who did
not see themselves as Poles. This applied above all to the Jewish community.31
Creating the language category ‘local’ was a way of downplaying the non-Polish
element. It made the non-Polish population appear more fragmented and reduced
the absolute number of those who spoke White Russian and Ukrainian.
States are ‘nationalising’, according to Brubaker, if they are ‘conceived by their
dominant elites as nation-states’ that are somehow incomplete, unrealised or
otherwise ‘insufficiently national’. This incompleteness, in turn, requires and
justifies policies aimed at making the nation-state more complete. Brubaker
broadly distinguishes two kinds of strategies at nationalisation. They are either
aimed at strengthening the national element or at downplaying the non-national
element.32 Both were employed in interwar Poland and the outcome was the
detailed enumeration of languages and the opaque category ‘local’. The
circumstances under which nationalisation strategies are successful is an open
question. Celia Heller (1984) argues that the Jewish community in interwar
Poland was on its way to abandon traditional dress and adopt Polish as lingua
franca. In Heller’s opinion it was the emotional backlash to systematic
29Census and census manual were printed in Polish and French, page numbers refer to French
pages: Drugi powszechny spis ludnos´ci z dnia 9.12 1931 roku - Formularze i instrukcje spisowe
: Deuxie`me recensement ge´ne´ral de la population du 9.12 1931 - Formulaires et instructions,
vol. 1, Statystika Polski : Statistique de la Pologne (Warsaw: G lo´wny Urzad Statystyczny
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej : L’office central de statistique de la Re´publique Polonaise, 1932),
pp. 126-8.
30Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism reframed : Nationhood and the national question in the New
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). On the question why nation states
typically build ethnolinguistic, rather than ethnoreligious identities see: Dominique Arel, ‘Lan-
guage categories in censuses: backward- or forward-looking?’, chap. 4 in Census and Identity:
The Politics of Race, Ethnicity and Language in National Censuses, ed. Dominique Arel and
David I. Kerzer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 92–120.
31The notion of a distinctly Jewish national identity, Zionism, existed at the time. Poland’s Jews,
however, did not necessarily identify themselves as such. There was a range of sentiments and
self-identifications that did not necessarily fit the mould of national identities, see Celia S.
Heller, On the Edge of Destruction: Jews of Poland between the Two World Wars, 2nd ed.
(Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1994).
32Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed , p. 79.
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discrimination that triggered 87 percent of Jews to state a different language than
Polish as their mother tongue in the census of 1931.33
The US Territorial Subcommittee remade Polish ethnicity statistics into a
numerical artefact with flexible features. Originally, to the Polish Census takers in
1931, language categories, numbers and locations of people had been rigid. They
were flexible to the US Subcommittee, due to Poland’s nationalisation strategies
during the interwar years and the displacement of people during the war. The
Subcommittee established these flexible features in January 1943, while dealing
with territory that Roosevelt had offered to the Soviet Union in March 1942.
Roosevelt’s decision preceded the cognitive artefacts of the US Subcommittee.
This calls Notter’s position into question. Roosevelt’s political agency was not
evidence-based if the evidence was gathered after the fact. Furthermore, it
appears that ‘uncertainty over postwar problems’ is a euphemistic description of
the real reasons for American abstinence from border recommendations.
Roosevelt’s proposition to the Soviet Union tells us that flexible borders were a
bargaining chip. With its numerical artefact the US Subcommittee reframed
America’s territorial non-commitment as uncertainty. This validated the way in
which Roosevelt fostered the military alliance with the Soviet Union and drew the
Red Army westwards in the fight against Germany.
What does this tell us about the relationship between cognitive artefacts and
political agency? Cognitive artefacts do not necessarily provide an ex ante factual
basis for political agency. Rather, the need for political actors to validate their
agency triggers the production of cognitive artefacts. If this is an important
function of cognitive artefacts, we should be able to observe it more widely. For
example, are there instances in which the circulation or travels of cognitive
artefacts validates agency? Is there a space for cognitive artefacts with false
features to validate agency?
3379 percent of Jews stated Yiddish as mother tongue, 8 percent Hebrew. Heller, On the Edge of
Destruction, pp. 67-8.
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3.3.2 The ethnic geography of Eastern Poland
The US Territorial Subcommittee produced a map of Poland’s eastern
boundaries, too, see fig. 3.4, p. 99.34 It shows the geographic range and structure
of Roosevelt’s scope of agency in eastern Poland. A location map, inset in the
legend, showed Poland and her neighbours in their prewar borders, see fig. 3.5,
p. 100. Poland’s west was coloured in light green. The east, where the main
frame of the map discussed Poland’s ‘alternative boundaries’, was coloured in
dark green. Roosevelt’s room of manoeuvre to agree with Stalin on the Polish-
Soviet frontier was the eastern half of Poland.
The legend indicated alternative Polish-Soviet boundaries, too, see fig. 3.6a,
p. 101. Line A, the first line, was the Molotov-von Ribbentrop line that Germany
and the Soviet Union established through their occupation in 1939. It was the
westernmost line and the least favourable to Poland. The categories of the Polish
1931 census were given in the legend, too, see fig. 3.6b, p. 101. Unlike Bowman in
his map of 1918, the categories and the colour-coding of the US Territorial
Subcommittee did not favour the presence of Poles over other ethnicities, it
rather conveyed a sense of ethnic fragmentation.
The map showed the coastline of the Baltic Sea, political boundaries of states
(black lines), provinces (dashed) and districts (grey), eight cities and the
distribution of language data in pie charts, see fig. 3.7, p. 102.35 The size of a pie
indicated absolute population numbers per district, slices represented the share of
certain language groups. The pie charts made it possible to display a large
number of language categories for many territorial units. They allowed for a
nuanced presentation of the data. Like the legend on mother tongue, the
Subcommittee’s presentation of data in pie charts emphasised the ethnic
fragmentation of the area. Moreover, the pie charts visually hovered over the
territory in the map. This anticipated the approach of ‘population transfers’ that
Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin adopted later in order to reconcile the political
34Reproduced as appendix 19 in: Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 , facing
p. 512.
35The cities are, from west to east: Warsaw, Lublin, Bia lystock, Lwo´w, Vilnius/Wilno, No-
wogro´dek, Pinsk, Lutsk/Luck.
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Figure 3.4: CA2, map of alternative Polish-Soviet boundaries by the US Territorial
Subcommittee from 22 January 1943. The map visualises the language data of the
Polish census of 1931. It proposes ten alternative boundaries that correspond loosely
with ethnic composition.
Source: Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945, General
Foreign Policy Series 15 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), p. 512.
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Figure 3.5: Detail of fig. 3.4. The ‘Location map’ shows that the US regarded the
eastern half of Poland as political room for manoeuvre towards the Soviet Union.
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(a) Alternative frontiers (b) Language categories
Figure 3.6: Details of fig. 3.4. Unlike Bowman in his map of 1918, fig. 2.4, p. 54,
the US Territorial Subcommittee did not favour the cause of the Polish state and
constructed this map accordingly. The Soviet-German line of 1939, Line A, was the
foremost of alternative frontiers. The visualisation of ten language categories gave
the impression of ethnic fragmentation rather than Polish predominance.
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borders they were drawing with the location of ethnicities. Ethnicities that found
themselves outside of the borders of their nation state would be transferred into
those borders. This was a visual, conceptual and practical separation of
ethnicities from territory that was not made during border negotiations after
World War I.
Figure 3.7: Detail of fig. 3.4. Pie charts allowed the detailed presentation of lan-
guage data. This heightened the impression of ethnic fragmentation. The floating
pie charts are a visual, conceptual and political separation of ethnicity and territ-
ory. This anticipated the policy of population transfers on which the Grand Alliance
agreed later.
The two dominant features of Roosevelt’s map of eastern Poland were ethnicity
and the numerous possibilities for the Polish-Soviet border. The fragmentation of
ethnicity, its separation from territory and the treatment of the Polish 1931
Census clearly show that ethnicity was a flexible feature, unlike after World War
I. Ethnicity made none of the political boundaries evidently more stable than any
other. Alternative boundaries might have corresponded broadly with the
language data in the middle and southern zones, where the lines bundled. Line A,
however, swung far into the west through territory that was predominantly
Polish. The US Territorial Subcommittee did not propose a reasoning based on
rigid features in its map. Instead, the Subcommittee translated Roosevelt’s
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concern for political room for manoeuvre with the Soviet Union into a map with
flexible features. Roosevelt’s negotiation space was Central Poland, delimited by
the north-south running provincial borders and the Polish-Soviet interwar
frontier. The space was structured by province and district borders, major cities
and an unknown, mixed and mobile population. When Roosevelt would negotiate
with Stalin he would not have to take into account transportation infrastructure,
resources, industry or Polish territorial integrity. The cognitive artefacts of the
US Territorial Subcommittee gave Roosevelt the broad scope of agency he needed
to pursue America’s war aims, postwar aims and her ‘friendly’ internationalism at
the same time.
By March 1943 Roosevelt was familiar with Stalin’s position on Poland’s frontier.
In the east Stalin would demand the Molotov-von Ribbentrop line (line A in
fig. 3.4, p. 99), but might settle for the slightly easterly Curzon line (line B in
fig. 3.4). Germany should lose Upper Silesia and East Prussia in the west.36 At
that time the Red Army was still about 400 kilometres east of the Molotov-von
Ribbentrop line and had retaken Kiev a few weeks earlier, see fig. 3.2, p. 94.
Stalin’s view on borders allowed the US Territorial Subcommittee to specify
further the American approach in a paper from the end of March 1943, see
table 3.2, p. 104.37 The Subcommittee thought that national strategic
implications and aspects of European security were most important. Ethnicity
came second, economic advantages and disadvantages third, communication and
transportation fourth.
After laying out its general approach, the US Subcommittee discussed the Polish-
Soviet borders it had proposed two months earlier in fig. 3.4, p. 99. The
Subcommittee reasoned that the territory between the Molotov-von Ribbentrop
line, line A, and the ‘former Polish-Soviet frontier provided a cushion for
absorbing the German attack in 1941’, which in turn had been a ‘crucial factor’ in
defending Leningrad and Moscow the same year. Line A was also suitable for
development into a strong defensive frontier. Hence the Subcommittee concluded
36Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, pp. 119-23.
37The paper ‘Polish-Soviet Frontier: Alternative Boundaries’ from 26 March 1943 is reproduced
as appendix 17 in: Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 , pp. 496-509.
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Table 3.2: Stated principles of border considerations by the US Territorial
Subcommittee, 19431
No. 1943
1 ‘Strategic implications for the two states and European security’
2 Ethnic separation
3 Economic (dis-) advantages
4 Communications and transportation
1 Source: US Territorial Subcommittee. ‘Polish-Soviet Frontier: Alternative Bound-
aries’. 26 March 1943, p. 1, reproduced in: Harley A. Notter, Postwar Foreign
Policy Preparation, 1939-1945, General Foreign Policy Series 15 (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 496-512.
that the Soviet Union would prefer Line A over all other lines, if she wanted to
‘play an active role in Central Europe’. The Subcommittee’s assessment for
Poland was bleak. She would be ‘in a difficult military position, no matter where
the boundary is drawn [...] and depend for security upon allies among the Great
Powers or upon a collective security system’.38 Poland would not be able to
protect herself because her military capacity was no match for the powers that
surrounded her.
The US Subcommittee reframed Stalin’s specific territorial demands into a
general approach towards borders. It verbally specified the rather empty and
flexible geography of its January map by including strategic aspects. The
Subcommittee then applied this feature to evaluate and narrow down the border
options it had previously developed. This reduced the options for the Polish-
Soviet frontier that Roosevelt had to consider in negotiations with Stalin. The US
Territorial Subcommittee specified Roosevelt’s scope of agency by including
Stalin’s strategic concerns.
The cognitive artefacts of the US Territorial Subcommittee validated Roosevelt’s
agency on Poland’s borders, both retrospectively and forward-looking. Moreover,
these artefacts specified Roosevelt’s agency without circulating to Stalin and
being rejected by him. Hence the iterative production and modification of
38Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945 , p. 498.
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cognitive artefacts outside of a negotiation setting is a way for a single party to
specify its agency.
3.4 At the conferences of the Grand Alliance
During their joint war against Germany, the US, Britain and the Soviet Union
coordinated on a broad range of issues. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met in
person on three occasions between 1943 and 1945, in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam.
After Tehran and before Yalta a meeting of the three heads of state was
scheduled to take place in Quebec, but Stalin cancelled at short notice. The most
important aspects of interallied cooperation, amongst them Poland’s post-1945
borders, were discussed and settled at these meetings.
3.4.1 Tehran
Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill explicitly discussed Poland’s borders for the first
time in Tehran in winter 1943. Roosevelt had just met Churchill and China’s
Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo. Stalin turned down an invitation to Cairo and a
number of other places on the Mediterranean and in the Middle East. A meeting
of Chiang Kai-shek with Stalin was diplomatically difficult, because China fought
Japan with whom the Soviet Union had a neutrality agreement. Furthermore,
Stalin was suspicious of meeting places that the UK or the US controlled, but he
agreed to a meeting in Tehran.
At Tehran, Stalin made the opening move on Poland’s borders by mentioning
that the ‘Soviet Union favoured the Polish western frontier on the Oder’.
Churchill and his Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden replied that they had ‘no
personal attachment to any specific frontier’. Churchill and Eden encouraged
Stalin to speak out by declaring that Soviet security in the west was a ‘governing
factor’. Churchill said that ‘he would like to see Poland moved westward in the
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same manner as soldiers execute the drill ‘left close’.39 Roosevelt assured Stalin
that he ‘would like to see [Poland’s] Eastern border moved further to the west
and the Western border moved even to the River Oder’. Thus the question of
Poland’s borders was on the agenda. Roosevelt was not present when Churchill
and Eden discussed with Stalin. He spoke to Stalin later and in private,
explaining that ‘he could not publicly take part in any such arrangement at the
present time’; the American presidential election of 1944 were coming up and
there were ‘six to seven million Americans of Polish extraction’ that Roosevelt
did not want to alienate.40
When Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill later returned to the issue, it took only a
few hours until they settled Poland’s eastern border and reached a general
agreement in the west. The three heads of state and their entourages huddled
over an American map and discussed where the Polish-Soviet border should fall
in detail, see fig. 3.8, p. 107. Stalin elaborated his position by drawing on the
map with a red pencil, for details see fig. 3.9, p. 108. At first, he insisted on the
Molotov-von Ribbentrop line (thin black, dash-dotted line), but then added that
he would be willing to accept the more easterly Curzon line (light blue), if ‘parts
of eastern Prussia, including the ports of Ko¨nigsberg and Tilsit’, were given to
the Soviet Union. Thus Stalin took a red pencil, hatched the areas between the
Molotov-von Ribbentrop line and the Curzon line and drew a line through East
Prussia, south of Ko¨nigsberg and Insterburg.41 Indulging the Curzon line in
exchange for the northern part of East Prussia was a favourable deal for Stalin. It
satisfied Soviet strategic aims. The territory around Bia lystok would have given
the Soviet Union a border that was further west but much less defensible than the
Curzon line. Ko¨nigsberg and Tilsit gave the Soviet Union presence on the Baltic
Sea and warm-water ports.
The American map on which Stalin drew, fig. 3.8, p. 107, had a geography that
consisted of political borders, railway lines and rivers. It showed Bia lystok as a
39FRUS, United States Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943 (U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 512, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.
FRUS1943CairoTehran.
40FRUS, ibid., p. 594.
41FRUS, ibid., pp. 599-601.
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Figure 3.8: CA 3, US-Soviet map of Poland’s eastern frontier. At negotiations
in Tehran on 1 December 1943 Stalin drew (red pencil) on this American map.
He detailed where he wanted the Polish-Soviet frontier and proposed the policy of
population transfers.
Source: FRUS, United States Department of State, The Conferences at Cairo and
Tehran 1943 (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961), http://digital.library.wisc.
edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1943CairoTehran, p. 600.
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Figure 3.9: Details of fig. 3.8, showing Stalin’s additions. Left, bottom: Territory
the Soviet Union would cede by agreeing to the Curzon Line. Left, top: Area of
Ukrainian majority that would become Polish and would thus require a population
exchange. Right, centre: Area around Bia lystok, predominantly Polish, that the
Soviet Union would cede by agreeing to the Curzon Line. Right, top: Soviet border
through East Prussia, condition for Soviet agreement to the Curzon Line.
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hub of five railway lines, which was the main argument for the Soviet Union to
claim the area in spite of defensive disadvantages. In order for the Soviet Union
to make use of Ko¨nigsberg and Tilsit, the railways in and out of the cities had to
be under her control as well. Stalin could draw the border through East Prussia
because the map showed railway lines. Conversely, population and ethnicity were
not part of the map’s geography, hence it showed neither Bia lystok as Polish nor
Ko¨nigsberg as German. The ethnicity question, however, was not forgotten or
ignored. Stalin stated during the meeting that the Soviet Union did ‘not wish to
retain any regions primarily occupied by Poles even though they were inside the
1939 line’. This applied above all to the large area around Bia lystok, between the
Molotov-von Ribbentrop line and the Curzon line. In addition, he marked a
predominantly Ukrainian area northeast of Lublin and west of the River Bug that
the Soviet Union would not claim. When Roosevelt asked whether a ‘transfer of
peoples from the mixed areas was possible’, Stalin agreed emphatically.42
Forced displacement of people has occurred throughout history, but the organised
transfer of ethnic shares of the population is a phenomenon of the 20th century. It
is linked to the idea of a nation state that is somehow homogenous, be it with
respect to religion, language or ethnicity. The first such transfer took place
between Greece and Turkey in 1923. The two countries had been at war from
summer 1919 to summer 1922 and both sides used extreme violence against
civilians of the opposing party.43 Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan were the
powers that negotiated a peace. They realised that the minority clauses in the
Paris peace treaties after World War I offered insufficient protection in an
increasingly nationalist climate. Hence they came to think that to ‘unmix the
populations in the Near East’ would secure pacification.44 On 30 January 1923
Turkey and Greece signed the ‘Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and
Turkish Populations’ in Lausanne. From this followed, Pertti Ahonen et al (2008)
argue, a ‘radical and permanent restructuring of the demographic map of the
42FRUS, United States Department of State, Tehran, pp. 599-601.
43Pertti Ahonen et al., People on the Move : Forced Population Movements in Europe in the
Second World War and Its Aftermath, Occupation in Europe : The Impact of National So-
cialism and Fascist Rule (Oxford: Berg, 2008).
44Cited in: ibid., p. 8.
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Aegean region [that] greatly accelerated the process of ethnic homogenisation’ in
both countries and set a ‘precedent for international conflict resolution’ in the
20th century.45 The attitudes of Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill on population
exchanges were positive at the latest since summer 1942. On 7 July Eden
informed Edvard Benesˇ, Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, that ‘he and his
colleagues agree with the principle’.46 The Soviet Union pursued strategies of
homogenising the population with force throughout the war.47
Stalin made his additions to the map while agreeing with Churchill and Roosevelt
on the border and the handling of ethnic minorities. Because the map showed the
coast line, cities and railway lines, but ignored people, Stalin could mark his
preferred border without obstructions and add the population back into the map
afterwards. That way he also established the procedure by which Roosevelt,
Churchill and himself would handle the problem of ethnic minorities. The map
structured Stalin’s agency and his interaction with Roosevelt and Churchill.
The political borders proposed by Roosevelt were flexible features. There were six
options from which Stalin could choose and sample and he could add his own.
The map’s rigid features were railways and cities, including the Ko¨nigsberg port
on the Baltic Sea. These rigid features guided and stabilised the political border
that Stalin drew. Stalin’s pen added swamps and the Polish-Soviet border as
rigid features and populations as a flexible feature. Roosevelt, Stalin and
Churchill fixed the border and established the procedure of transferring ethnic
minorities by modifying the map and referencing its rigid features. They
coordinated their agency by interacting through the map.
3.4.2 Quebec
Before the Polish-German frontier could be agreed, Germany’s postwar shape had
to be determined. That happened at Quebec in September 1944. Stalin
ultimately did not attend the meeting, officially for military responsibilities. He
45Ahonen et al., People on the Move, p. 10.
46Cited in: ibid., p. 65.
47Ibid., pp. 73.
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consistently avoided ground that the US or Britain controlled. His position on
postwar Germany, however, had been trashed out in preparatory meetings.48 This
was sufficient for Roosevelt and Churchill to figure out between the two of them
which map would satisfy Stalin. Two maps were of American origin, one was
drafted by Roosevelt, the other by Henry Morgenthau, the Secretary of the
Treasury. The third map came from the European Advisory Commission (EAC),
an interallied body that the members of the Grand Alliance had set up to
coordinate on postwar issues.
At Tehran our three actors had only agreed that Germany would lose East
Prussia and Upper Silesia. The Anglo-Saxon approach was to reign in Germany
by breaking her up. Prussia and her militarism should be separated from the
industrial capacities in the rest of Germany, particularly the Rhineland.
Roosevelt pursued that approach in the map that he had brought to Quebec, see
fig. 3.10, p. 112. He proposed to assign a strip in the southeast to Austria, the
Alsace to France, the Rhineland and the northwest to an international zone; the
remainder should be divided up into a southern, middle and northern German
state.49 Roosevelt drew no borders in the eastern zone of the map. He left room
to accommodate the westward shift of Poland that he had promised to Stalin in
Tehran.
Henry Morgenthau and the US Treasury put forward a similar proposal, see
fig. 3.11, p. 113.50 Germany should be dismembered into an international zone, a
northern and a southern German state. Austria would not gain territory, but
France would receive the Saarland and some territory would go to Denmark.
Morgenthau’s map was much more explicit on postwar Poland than Roosevelt’s,
possibly because Morgenthau was not familiar with the agreement of Roosevelt
and Stalin to move the Polish-German border all the way to the River Oder. In
Morgenthau’s vision Poland would only receive Upper Silesia and the southern
part of East Prussia.
48FRUS, United States Department of State, The Conference at Quebec 1944 (U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1972), pp. 386-8, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1944.
49Reproduced in: FRUS, ibid., facing p. 476.
50Reproduced in: FRUS, ibid., facing p. 86.
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Figure 3.10: CA 4, map of Roosevelt’s unsuccessful proposal at Quebec to dis-
member Germany, September 1944. Roosevelt market an international zone (green)
in the west, Austria’s accessions in the south (red) and divided up the remaining
territory into a northern, middle and southern German state. In Germany’s east
Roosevelt remained vague. That left room to accommodate the Polish accessions
that he had promised to Stalin. The location of the western Soviet border is not
shown, but was probably thought to fall with Poland and the Baltic states.
Source: FRUS, United States Department of State, The Conference at Quebec 1944
(U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/
FRUS.FRUS1944, p. 476
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Figure 3.11: CA 5, map of Henry Morgenthau’s unsuccessful proposal at Quebec
to dismember Germany, September 1944. An international zone (yellow) was marked
in the west, the Saarland would go to France, Upper Silesia and part of East Prussia
would go to Poland, the remainder of Germany should be divided into a northern and
a southern state. The western Soviet border would be with Poland and the Baltic.
Source: FRUS, United States Department of State, The Conference at Quebec 1944
(U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/
FRUS.FRUS1944, p. 86.
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The US and Britain broadly acknowledged and accepted the Soviet postwar aim
to gain security from Germany. Roosevelt and Morgenthau tried to accommodate
this concern in their maps by breaking up Germany and treating her political
boundaries as flexible. Germany’s boundaries were flexible to Stalin as well, but
his vision of Soviet security from Germany was very different than Roosevelt’s
and Morgenthau’s. Moreover, Stalin wanted to establish the Soviet Union as
guarantor against Germany for all of Central and Eastern Europe. Stalin did not
think that he would achieve that aim through either of the geographic
arrangements proposed by Roosevelt and Morgenthau. Hence he rejected their
maps.
Stalin’s vision was satisfied by the map that the European Advisory Commission
(EAC) proposed, see fig. 3.12, p. 115. The EAC was set up in fall 1943 to develop
and coordinate joint postwar planning of the US, the Soviet Union and Britain.51
It was ineffective in most of its endeavours, unsurprisingly since the common
interest of the Grand Alliance did not extend beyond the defeat of Germany. The
EAC map of Germany’s postwar territory was an exception though. It proposed a
division of Germany into three occupation zones and established tripartite control
over Berlin. Hence Soviet troops would be located west of the Polish-German
border. Already by August 1944 the Grand Alliance agreed that the northeastern
zone would go to the Soviet Union, if the zonal division came into existence. After
the Western Allies submitted to the EAC proposal at Quebec, it took them a few
more months to decide which of the remaining zones would become American and
which British. The French zone was later created from parts of the American and
British zone. It was crucial for Stalin that the EAC proposal showed the
westernmost Soviet position in Germany, west of Poland and the other states that
the Soviet Union wanted to control after the war. Hence Stalin accepted the EAC
proposal, but rejected Roosevelt’s and Morgenthau’s maps.52
Up until the Quebec meeting the members of the Grand Alliance had not exactly
delimited their postwar spheres of influence. They overlapped in an area that
51For the genesis of the EAC, see Bruce Kuklick, ‘The Genesis of the European Advisory Com-
mission’, Journal of Contemporary History 4, no. 4 (1969): 189–201.
52FRUS, United States Department of State, Quebec, pp. 385-92.
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Figure 3.12: CA 6, map of the European Advisory Commission (EAC). The pro-
posal to divide Germany into zones of occupation was adopted by the Allies at the
Quebec Conference in September 1944. The northeastern zone went to the Soviet
Union. The US and Britain agreed in December 1944 who would occupy the western
zones. The French occupation later drew on the American and British zones.
Source: FRUS, United States Department of State, The Conference at Quebec 1944
(U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/
FRUS.FRUS1944, p. 394
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stretched somewhere from the eastern half of prewar Germany to the western half
of prewar Poland. The EAC map specified these spheres of influence and thereby
the actors’ scope of agency. The flexible features of the map, the Polish-German
frontier and the zonal boundaries within Germany, would be stabilised by a rigid
feature, the permanent location of Soviet, British and American occupation forces
after the war.
Roosevelt and Churchill submitted to Stalin’s will by accepting the EAC map.
Let us ponder what might have happened, if they had insisted on Roosevelt’s
map. This will allow us to make a conceptual distinction between cognitive
artefacts and boundary objects. American, British and Canadian troops landed
in Normandy in June 1944, three months before the agreement on the EAC map.
The Western Allies established a second front against Germany in Normandy. At
the same time the advance of the Red Army had gained great momentum and
put the eastern front into Eastern Poland and East Prussia, see fig. 3.2, p. 94.
Roosevelt and Churchill feared throughout the war that the Soviet Union might
make a separate peace with Germany. Had they rejected the EAC map,
Roosevelt and Churchill might have triggered Stalin to do just that. A Soviet-
German peace would have resulted in a concentration of Germany’s military
resources on the western front. This would have extended the war, increased the
material and human cost to the US and Britain and jeopardised their postwar
aim to control Western Europe. Another possible consequence of rejecting the
EAC map was that the Allied armies would start racing towards Germany, the
Red Army from the east and the Western Allies from the west and the south, to
control as much territory as possible. Such a race would have been the end of the
Grand Alliance and, quite possibly, the beginning of hostilities between the
Soviet, American and British armies.
In the previous chapter we have pointed to the competitive aspect of cognitive
artefacts. They are produced and circulated by rivalling actors in an uncertain
political process. Actors do not know to which extent and for which price their
negotiation partners will cooperate. Star and Griesemer, however, presuppose
cooperation and argue that boundary objects ‘emerge [...] as groups from
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different worlds work together’.53 While boundary objects are the product of
cooperating actors, the cognitive artefacts discussed here were produced by actors
trying to identify the conditions for cooperation.
3.4.3 Yalta
The Red Army took Warsaw on 17 January 1945. The eastern front moved
westwards quickly, towards Berlin and beyond, towards the western border of the
Soviet occupation zone. In Europe the end of the war was in sight in February
1945 and Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill met in Yalta. Roosevelt travelled with a
map of the Polish-German border, see fig. 3.13, p. 118.54 The map proposed four
options for territorial changes between Germany and Poland. Option D, the
minimal option, proposed the cession of Upper Silesia and East Prussia, given as
lightly hatched areas. Option C in addition assigned to Poland a wedge of
Pomerania, the dotted area in the map. Option B added the territory east of the
Oder, hatched moderately in the map. Option A included the strongly hatched
territory between the Neisse river and the Oder river into Poland as well.
Roosevelt’s map detailed the territories Germany would lose and Poland would
gain by size, total population and the percentage of Germans. Fig. 3.14, p. 119,
shows East Prussia, Danzig and Pomerania. The transfers of territory and
population for options D to A were quantified in the legend, see fig. 3.15, p. 120,
and fig. 3.16, p. 120. Populations were a fully flexible feature in the map. Or
rather: the mobility of populations was a rigid feature. Wherever Roosevelt,
Churchill and Stalin would ultimately draw the border, it would be stabilised by
the transfer of ethnicities in and out of the areas concerned. Like the map of the
US Territorial Subcommittee, fig. 3.4, p. 99, the State Department map treated
population as separated from territory. It specified this separation more fully by
indicating and quantifying the area and the people that were affected.
53Star and Griesemer, ‘Boundary Objects’, p. 408.
54Reproduced in: FRUS, United States Department of State, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta
1945 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), http://digital.library.wisc.
edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945, facing p. 200.
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Figure 3.13: CA 7, map of the US State Department on territorial changes between
Poland and Germany from 10 January 1945. The map shows four options for the
Polish-German border. Population was a fully flexible feature in the map. Wherever
the border would fall, Poles and Germans would be transferred into their national
boundaries. The map was used at Yalta and again at Potsdam where the Polish
Government was present and the border decision was made public.
Source: FRUS, United States Department of State, The Conferences at Malta and
Yalta 1945 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), http://
digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945, p. 200
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Figure 3.14: Detail of fig. 3.13. Numbers indicate area size, total population and
share of Germans that would be transferred. Population was a flexible feature.
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Figure 3.15: Detail of fig. 3.13. Breakdown of additional territory and German
population that would be affected by the four border options.
Figure 3.16: Detail of fig. 3.13, indicating total territory and German population
that would be affected by the four border options.
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The US State Department proposed four options for the Polish-German boundary
in its map. Hence it would be wrong to call the boundary a fully rigid feature,
nor would it be adequate to say that it was flexible. Lampland’s terminology
allows us to describe the boundary options as provisional both in a ‘temporary’
and a ‘conditional’ sense.55 They were temporary because the map was not a
‘historical document’ that recorded a conclusion, but an anticipation of ‘future
possibilities’.56 The boundary options were conditional because they were the
‘product of [...] political machinations’ between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin
that had not fully played out yet.57 The particularity of the State Department
map was that it showed several provisional borders at the same time.
The State Department’s briefing book for the Yalta Conference advised Roosevelt
to advocate option C. The State Department argued that Pomerania had a strong
Polish ethnicity, that the region’s industry would benefit the Polish economy and
that it would consolidate Polish access to the sea. The Curzon line should be
Poland’s border in the east, except the province of Lwo´w for its Polish
inhabitants and the oil fields. Such a border, argued the State Department, would
‘from a long range point of view contribute materially to the future peace and
tranquility of Europe’.58 It minimised ‘future points of friction, possible
Irredentism [...] and the number of minority groups which would have to be
transferred’.59 To the State Department, the Polish-German border was stabilised
by a mix of ethnic, economic and strategic considerations. The State Department
conceded though, that the territorial question was ‘definitely secondary to the
major problem, the establishment of a viable and truly independent Polish
government’.60 Ahead of the Yalta meeting Churchill argued in a similar way as
the State Department. He supported the Curzon line, but thought that Poland
should not be compensated all the way up to the Oder.61
55Lampland, ‘False numbers as formalizing practices’, pp. 384-7.
56Ibid., p. 384.
57Ibid., p. 385.
58FRUS, United States Department of State, Yalta, p. 232.
59FRUS, ibid.
60FRUS, ibid., pp. 232-3.
61FRUS, ibid., p. 233.
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When Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill met in Yalta, they did not even discuss the
map of the US State Department. Stalin told his allies that the ‘Soviet armies
were moving very successfully onto the line of the Oder’ and that was that.62 The
Polish-German border was not provisional to Stalin. The border that the Red
Army was about to establish on the ground was equivalent to option A in the
State Department map. For Roosevelt and Churchill to insist on one of the other
options would probably have resulted in a military conflict with the Soviet Union.
Hence Roosevelt shifted the focus and replied to Stalin that he was ‘not so
concerned with frontiers’ but with ‘the governmental question’ of Poland.63 The
three actors did not agree on status and location of the Polish-German border in
Yalta. It was clear though that the Oder-Neisse line was rigid to Stalin and that
the US and Britain would not challenge the Soviet Union militarily. This
constellation brought representatives of the Polish state into border
diplomacy.
What was the situation between the Grand Alliance and Poland’s political
leadership in February 1945? During 1943/44 Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill had
shifted around Poland so that it met their own requirements. At the same time
they kept up appearances with the Polish exile government in London, by
conducting sham negotiations about the borders. Stalin calculated that
establishing the Polish-German border far in the west on German territory, on
the Oder and the Western Neisse, would result in the transfer of about 10 million
ethnic Germans. The consequence would be strong German irredentism that
forced Poland to turn to the Soviet Union for protection.64 Yet, since Poland
should be ‘protected and not ‘occupied’ by the Red Army, there had to be a
political process that included the Poles. To that end the Soviet Union propped
up a communist proxy, the so-called Lublin Committee, that rivalled the Polish
government exiled in London.
62FRUS, United States Department of State, Yalta, p. 570.
63FRUS, ibid., pp. 570, 718.
64FRUS, ibid., p. 232; Debra J. Allen, The Oder-Neisse Line: The United States, Poland, and
Germany in the Cold War, Contributions to the Study of World History (Westport, CT: Prae-
ger, 2003); Gotthold Rhode and Wolfgang Wagner, eds., The Genesis of the Oder-Neisse Line
in the Diplomatic Negotiations During World War II : Sources and Documents (Stuttgart:
Brentano-Verlag, 1959).
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At a meeting with the Polish exile government in Moscow on 13 October 1944,
about a year after the Grand Alliance had fixed the Polish-Soviet frontier,
Poland’s Prime Minister Stanis law Miko lajczyk maintained that only the Polish
people could decide about the ‘cession of territory’ and that he could therefore
not accept the Curzon line. Stalin had replied that Miko lajczyk ‘ignored the
existence of the Polish Committee of National Liberation’, the Lublin
Committee.65 Churchill had urged Miko lajczyk to ‘accept the Curzon line as the
de facto line of demarcation’ and wait for a ‘final settlement at the peace table’.
Otherwise the ‘Poles in London and the British government [had] to separate’.
Churchill had furthermore assured Miko lajczyk support for compensation in the
west. Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, eventually had
given away to Miko lajczyk ‘that the Curzon line had the support of the 3 major
allies since [...] Tehran’.66
Miko lajczyk learned about the Grand Alliance’s machinations a few weeks before
the American presidential elections. The news did not travel far and fast enough
though to turn Polish-American voters away from Roosevelt. He was reelected on
7 November 1944. On 17 November Roosevelt informed Miko lajczyk that the US
government was ‘unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Polish state’,
but that he could not ‘give a guarantee for a specific frontier’. If the Polish,
Soviet and British government came to a ‘mutual agreement’, Roosevelt stated,
the US government would not object. Moreover, the US would not object to a
‘transfer [...] of national minorities’, if desired by the ‘Polish government and
people’.67 Thus, in late 1944, the political playing field had tipped in favour of the
Lublin Committee. Thereafter Miko lajczyk unsuccessfully tried to convince his
cabinet to accept the Curzon line. He resigned and was followed by a more
nationalistic and anti-Soviet government under Tomasz Arciszewski, which
counted on the Western Allies to push for democracy in Poland once the war was
over. In late 1944 the Soviet press started to peddle news that the Polish people
demanded the Lublin Committee to assume the role of government. It did so on
31 December and on 5 January 1945 it was officially recognised by the Soviet
65FRUS, United States Department of State, Yalta, p. 202.
66FRUS, ibid., pp. 202-3.
67FRUS, ibid., pp. 209-10.
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Union.68 Unlike the Polish government exiled in London, the Lublin Committee
accepted the Curzon line in the east and demanded territorial compensation from
Germany in the west, up to the Oder-Neisse line.69 The Lublin Committee’s view
of Poland’s borders was identical to Stalin’s. The US and Britain refused to
recognise the Lublin Committee.
While Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin could not overcome their differences on the
location of the Polish-German border, they agreed on the stabilising feature. A
provisional Polish Government, supported by the Grand Alliance, should get
democratic legitimisation as soon as possible.70 Such a government would express
the will of the Polish people and thereby be able to determine and stabilise
Poland’s border. Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill agreed to assist in forming the
provisional government and in holding elections ‘during the temporary period of
instability’ that would follow the ‘liberation’ from Nazi Germany.71
Actors do not necessarily get to agree on rigid features. In other words, a
diplomatic process does not necessarily resolve the disagreements between actors.
We could observe that in adoption of the Polish-German border by the Paris
Peace Conference in 1920. Rather than resolving whether railways or people were
more rigid, actors in Paris made parts of the border provisional. The outcome
that Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill achieved in Yalta calls attention to a similar
way of maintaining agency without resolving differences of opinion. Instead of
figuring out amongst themselves where Poland’s border was rigid, the three actors
passed on the issue to an outside party.
3.4.4 Potsdam
The leaders of the Grand Alliance met for the last time in Potsdam from 17 July
to 2 August 1945. Roosevelt had died on 12 April 1945 and was succeeded by
68Richard C. Lukas, The Strange Allies : The United States and Poland, 1941-45 (Knoxville,
TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1978), pp. 131-4; FRUS, United States Department
of State, Yalta, pp. 210-1.
69FRUS, ibid., p. 232.
70FRUS, ibid., p. 719.
71FRUS, ibid., p. 972.
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Harry Truman. Churchill lost the elections and Clement Attlee followed as Prime
Minister on 26 July, while the Potsdam Conference was in session. In Europe the
war had ended with Germany’s unconditional and total surrender on 8 May 1945.
In the run up to the Potsdam meeting, on 28 June 1945, Poland’s Provisional
Government of National Unity was formed. The US and Britain recognised it on
5 July. On 10 July Zygmunt Modzelewski, the new Polish Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs, wrote from Moscow to Averell Harriman, the US Ambassador to
the Soviet Union. Modzelewski stated that his government, representative of a
‘free and democratic Poland’, wished for Poland’s border with Germany to fall on
the Oder-Neisse line, including Stettin, see fig. 3.17, p. 126. Such accessions
would be an ‘appreciable compensation’ for the losses that his country incurred
through the Curzon line. These compensations would give Poland an ‘adequate
territory’ and make her ‘strong and independent’.72
A delegation of Poland’s Government of National Unity attended the Potsdam
Conference, too. The Polish Delegation appeared in front of the Council of
Foreign Ministers on 24 July and stated again that it accepted the Curzon line as
Polish-Soviet border. Moreover, the Delegation demanded the Oder-Neisse line,
including Stettin, as Polish-German border.73 Truman and Attlee protested
against Polish demands and did not formally agree to the Oder-Neisse line. They
saw no other option, however, than to ‘recognise the fait accompli ’ that the Red
Army had created on the ground.74 The members of the Grand Alliance reached a
compromise by describing the Oder-Neisse line as an intermediary solution and
by demanding ‘free and unfettered elections’ from the provisional Polish
government as soon as possible.75 The Polish-German border should be definitely
fixed in a peace settlement with Germany.
72FRUS, United States Department of State, The Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference)
1945, vol. 1 (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 757-8, http://digital.library.wisc.
edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945Berlinv01.
73FRUS, United States Department of State, The Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference)
1945, vol. 2 (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 332-5, http://digital.library.wisc.
edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1945Berlinv02.
74FRUS, ibid., p. 1152.
75FRUS, ibid., p. 1508.
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Figure 3.17: Detail of fig. 3.13 with the Oder-Neisse line, the Polish-German border
since July 1945. Formally, according to the agreement between the US, Britain and
the Soviet Union in Potsdam 1945, the Oder-Neisse line was provisional. They agreed
that the final border should be settled in a peace treaty with Germany. In fact,
however, the Oder-Neisse line has been rigid since July 1945 as the peace treaty
never came.
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The inconclusive results of the Potsdam Conference and the subsequent Cold War
produced an odd situation. Since the peace settlement with Germany never came,
the Oder-Neisse line remained formally provisional, but was in fact rigid.76 In
1990 the US, Britain, the Soviet Union and France made Germany’s formal
recognition of the Oder-Neisse line a condition for the reunification. Only with
Germany’s acceptance did the Oder-Neisse line became formally rigid.
3.5 Analytical conclusions: Themes from the case
Between early 1943 and mid-1945 political actors from the US, Britain and the
Soviet Union delimited, specified and used their scope of agency in determining
Poland’s borders. Poland’s borders were a function of the actors’ strategic aims,
which were underpinned by military on the ground. The actors iteratively
coordinated and demarcated their strategic aims by producing, circulating,
rejecting and modifying maps and tables. Cognitive artefacts had mostly flexible
features, due to the underlying movement of armies and the assumption that
territory would ultimately be controlled by military means. Political borders
emerged and were gradually stabilised as the contours and practical aspects of the
actors’ territorial control became clearer. The flexibility of Allied armies on the
move turned into the rigidity of well-defined zones of occupation.
The previous case on Poland’s interwar borders has established that cognitive
artefacts are a means of coordinating agency between several actors. This case
shows, by example of table and map of the US Territorial Subcommittee, that
cognitive artefacts are used by single political actors to a similar effect. A single
actor uses cognitive artefacts to coordinate his concrete policies with broader
strategic parameters.
76Compared to fig. 3.17, p. 126, the Soviet Union and Poland agreed in September 1945 to shift
the border a few more kilometres to the west between Stettin and the Baltic Sea. This resulted
in the final Oder-Neisse line. Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Die deutschen Staatsgrenzen: Rechtshis-
torische Grundlagen und offene Rechtsfragen, Jus Publicum (Tu¨bingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004),
p. 324.
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The case allows us to further distinguish cognitive artefacts from boundary
objects. While boundary objects emerge through the cooperation of actors, actors
use cognitive artefacts to find out if and under which conditions cooperation is
possible. This was evident on three occasions. First, in the simultaneous
circulation of several mutually exclusive cognitive artefacts, one of which was
eventually selected. Second, in the circulation of a single map with several
mutually exclusive features that were neither rigid nor flexible. These features
were provisional in Lampland’s sense and coexisted until the actors reached an
agreement. Third, in the modification of a map by one actor that precipitated
agreement between all actors.
Furthermore, the question has been raised again which role cognitive artefacts
play for the legitimisation of agency. Several points have been made in the
previous case. First, an actor claims legitimacy through the rigid and flexible
features of a cognitive artefact. Second, an actor tries to gain legitimacy by
giving different types of cognitive artefacts different rigid and flexible features.
From the current case we learn that actors may produce cognitive artefacts to
legitimise agency retrospectively. The theme will be pursued further in the
following cases.
a
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4.1 Introduction
World War I ended on 11 November 1918, with the armistice between the Allied
Powers and Germany. Germany was the last remaining of the Central Powers
that furthermore included Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria.
The Allied Powers were France, the British Empire, the United States, Belgium,
Italy, Russia and other, smaller countries. Russia had already signed an armistice
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with the Central Powers on 15 December 1917. Once the armed conflict ended,
the conflict over who would pay for the war broke out. The US insisted that her
wartime loans were repaid in full, $9.5bn in total. The bulk had gone to Britain,
$4.9bn, and France, $4bn.1 Britain was herself a net creditor, but her main
debtors were hard-pressed for money. Russia’s debt to Britain was $2.5bn, France
owed $3bn and Italy a similar amount.2
Defaulting on their American loans was neither an option for Britain nor for
France. The two remaining options were domestic taxation and the extraction of
reparations from Germany. Resistance to domestic taxation mounted quickly,
leading to high reparation demands at the Paris Peace Conference. Yet the
reparation question was not resolved and the Treaty of Versailles, signed on 16
June 1919, codified extensive damage categories, a formal procedure to establish a
Reparation Commission and a deadline to settle the matter by 1 May 1921. The
London Schedule of Payments, from 5 May 1921, fixed Germany’s liability at
132bn gold marks. Germany defaulted virtually immediately. The Dawes Plan
thus rescheduled reparations in 1924 and was in turn replaced by the Young Plan
in 1929. Reparations were suspended in 1931 and cancelled altogether in 1932.3
This chapter will examine three cognitive artefacts that were used in 1920/21 to
determine the distribution of reparations between the Allies, see table 4.1, p. 131.
The distribution of reparations was a diplomatic milestone on the way towards a
reparation settlement with Germany.
The principal actors who made the London Schedule were French President
Alexandre Millerand, Britain’s Prime Minister Lloyd George and a small group of
Allied financial experts on the Reparation Commission. The US was initially
meant to take the helm, but Congress never ratified the Versailles Treaty.
1Broadberry and Howlett, ‘The United Kingdom during World War I’, pp. 221-2; Hautcoeur,
Was the Great War a watershed? The economics of World War I in France, p. 191.
2Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939, History of the World Economy
in the Twentieth Century (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 40-1;
Broadberry and Howlett, ‘The United Kingdom during World War I’, pp. 221-2. Absolute
figures for Russian and French debt to Britain are given in Kindleberger, relative figures for
Russian, French and Italian debt are given in Broadberry and Howlett.
3Leonard Gomes, German Reparations, 1919-1932 : A Historical Survey (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010), pp. 65-212.
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Table 4.1: Artefacts of Allied distribution of German reparations post-1918
No. Date Actor1 Description
1 17.7.1920 Allies Spa agreement on Allied distribution of reparations
2 2.7.1920 F/UK Times article on French damages and distribution
3 23.2.1921 RC Statistics on distribution and Allied damage claims
1 Denominates the political fraction or entity from which the artefacts originated: Al-
lies=British Empire, France, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Japan; F=France; UK=United
Kingdom; RC=Interallied Reparation Commission.
Therefore the US was only in the background of reparations diplomacy in 1920
and 1921.
Like Poland’s borders, Germany’s reparation obligation stabilised as the actors
gradually specified their joint scope of agency. This implies, and will be
demonstrated in the following, that reparation numbers did not necessarily
correspond with the material value of war damages. The numerical artefacts on
reparations were not quantifications of war damages, they were triangulations of
the actors’ political concerns. By circulating, modifying and rejecting these
numerical artefacts, the actors figured out their common scope of agency in fixing
Germany’s reparations.
4.2 Literature review
4.2.1 Historical literature
Since the work of Sally Marks (1969, 1972, 1978), it is generally accepted that the
strangulation of Germany by postwar reparations is a myth. The 132bn gold
marks named in the London Schedule were a nominal figure. It had little to do
with the amount that Germany actually paid or was expected to pay.4 132bn
gold marks was the minimum amount, estimated by the Reparation Commission
4Sally Marks, ‘Reparations Reconsidered : A Reminder’, Central European History 2, no. 4
(1969): 356–365; Sally Marks, ‘Reparations Reconsidered : A Rejoinder’, Central European
History 5, no. 4 (1972): 358–361; Sally Marks, ‘The Myths of Reparations’, Central European
History 11, no. 3 (1978): 231–255.
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on 27 April 1921, that public opinion in the Allied countries would accept as
Germany’s liability. The London Schedule was mainly a British creation and
sanctioned by the other Allied governments.5 Nominally, the schedule totalled at
132bn gold marks and divided Germany’s debt into A, B and C bonds,
amounting to 12bn, 38bn and 82bn respectively. Of these, only A and B bonds
would be issued by 1 November 1921. The C bonds would not be issued nor bear
interest until Germany had covered the A and B bonds. Hence Germany’s actual
obligation were 50bn gold marks. This amount is seen as absolutely workable by
Gerald Feldman (1996), Albrecht Ritschl (2012) and others.6 However, after
paying the annuity for 1921, Germany began to miss her payments. Two
attempts in 1924 and 1929 were made to restructure reparations until they were
cancelled altogether in 1932. At that point Germany had paid a total commonly
estimated at 30bn gold marks.7 According to Marks, Germany’s payments
totalled at 20bn gold marks.8
Current historiography on reparations, argues Feldman, is engaged in the same
battle that contemporary witnesses like John Maynard Keynes and E´tienne
Mantoux have fought, except with ‘new evidence, recycled old evidence and
theoretical speculation’.9 Keynes (1919, 1922) was the first who assigned blame.10
He diagnosed Allied politicians and experts, in particular those of France, with a
flawed understanding of the reparations matter. Mantoux (1946) put forward a
counter-diagnosis with his Carthaginian Peace and parcelled out responsibility
5Gerald D. Feldman, The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics and Society in the German In-
flation, 1914-1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 339.
6 Marc Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic Diplomacy,
1916 - 1923 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 210; Bruce Kent, The Spoils of
War : The Politics, Economics and Diplomacy of Reparations, 1918-1932 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989), pp. 132; Feldman, The Great Disorder , pp. 339; Albrecht Ritschl, ‘The German
transfer problem, 1920-33: a sovereign-debt perspective’, European Review of History: Revue
europe´enne d’histoire 19, no. 6 (December 2012): 943–964, pp. 945.
7Ibid., p. 948.
8Marks, ‘The Myths of Reparations’, p. 233.
9Feldman, The Great Disorder , p. 309.
10John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London: Macmillan, 1919);
John Maynard Keynes, A Revision of the Treaty, Being a Sequel to the Economic Consequences
of the Peace (London: Macmillan, 1922).
132
4 European recovery and German reparations after World War I
accordingly.11 Mark Trachtenberg (1980) and others have added a perspective
that is critical of the British role and shows French diplomacy in reasoned
nuances and differentiations.12 Bruce Kent (1989) does not take sides for any
party, but aims for a balanced and all around critical account.13 Feldman’s work
(1996) dispels the idea that Germany’s role was ‘a simple tale of treaty evasion
and bad faith’.14
While there is no consensus on the responsibilities of the various parties and
actors, there is certainly agreement that contemporaries did not approach the
reparations problem with the same technical finesse as today’s economic
historians. Technical sophistication underpins studies that are typically concerned
with the weight of reparations on the German economy and Germany’s failure to
fulfil any of the various payment schemes between 1921 and 1932, see e.g., Ritschl
(2012), Albrecht Ritschl and Tobias Straumann (2010) or Niall Ferguson (2000).15
Zara Steiner (2001) remarks that the statesmen who dealt with reparations had a
much poorer grasp of the issue’s technical complexity than modern
historians.16
4.2.2 Cognitive artefacts on reparation and political agency
The London Schedule’s structure of A, B and C bonds addressed an issue of
political agency. Lloyd George, Millerand and their experts hoped to align their
11E´tienne Mantoux, The Carthaginian Peace: or The Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes
(London: Oxford University Press, 1946).
12Trachtenberg, Reparation in World Politics.
13Kent, The Spoils of War .
14Feldman, The Great Disorder , p. 309.
15Ritschl, ‘The German transfer problem’; Albrecht Ritschl and Tobias Straumann, ‘Business
cycles and economic policy, 1914-1945’, chap. 7 in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe,
1870 to the Present, ed. Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H. O’Rourke, vol. 2 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 157–180; Niall Ferguson, ‘How (Not) to Pay for the War:
Traditional Finance and ‘Total’ War’, chap. 21 in Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobil-
ization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, ed. Roger Chickering and Stig Fo¨rster (Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 409–434.
16Zara Steiner, ‘The Treaty of Versailles Revisited’, chap. 2 in The Paris Peace Conference,
1919 : Peace without Victory?, ed. Michael Dockrill and John Fisher, Studies in Military and
Strategic History (Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p. 20.
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interests in the reparation matter with those of the public. The amount of 132bn
gold marks should satisfy the public’s desire for emotional recompense, 50bn gold
marks was the amount that the designers of the London Schedule thought to be
adequate and feasible. This double function of the schedule indicates that
political actors were more concerned with finding room for manoeuvre than with
the perfect technical solution. The question of political agency in the reparations
matter has been approached from a historical and a rationalist institutionalist
perspective.
Studies in the history of economics evaluate the underlying economic ideas that
featured in reparations diplomacy. What was the policy paradigm, in Hall’s
terminology, within which actors operated? The major battle in the realm of
discourse was over the so-called transfer problem. The transfer problem refers to
the changes of relative prices, expenditure and production as a consequence of the
financial transfer of wealth between two countries.17 Keynes as well as the
German government and its financial experts argued between 1919 and 1921 that
the reparation burden would destroy the German economy.18 They reasoned that
Germany ran a trade deficit, amongst others through the import of vital
foodstuffs, but that reparations had to come out of a trade surplus if they were
not to erode the country’s capacity to pay. If Germany had to pay reparations
beyond its capacity, the German experts argued in 1920, the government was
ultimately forced into ‘a debauch of borrowing [to which] an unlimited increase of
paper issue must follow’.19
The design of the London Schedule of May 1921, the first of three reparation
regimes, did not take account of the transfer problem argument that Keynes and
the German experts advanced. Keynes reiterated his point in numerous
publications throughout the following years. Germany’s hyperinflation from
summer 1921 to 1924 seemed to prove that the transfer of reparations under a
17Philip Brock, Transfer Problem, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2008.
18Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace; Eduard Arnhold et al., ‘Economical effects
of the Paris resolutions.’, chap. 1640 in I. Wahlperiode 1920. Anlagen zu den Stenographischen
Berichten. Nr. 1640 bis 1894. Vol. 366, Verhandlungen des Reichstags (Berlin: Deutscher
Reichstag, 1924).
19LSEA, Auswa¨rtiges Amt (German Foreign Office), 43 (95) : Memorandum on Germany’s
Solvency for the Purpose of Reparation, Berlin, 1920, p. 16.
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trade deficit indeed had the disastrous consequences of which Keynes had
warned.20 Consequently, the Dawes Plan was designed to mitigate the transfer
problem. From 1924 to 1929 Germany’s currency was protected through a
stabilisation loan, she should return to the gold standard, her currency reserves
were protected from reparation payments and commercial debt was given
seniority over reparations.21
The most vocal advocates of the transfer problem, economists like Keynes, Josiah
Stamp or Carl Bergmann, celebrated the Dawes Plan as the long-awaited triumph
of economics over politics. Bergmann, the eminent German expert who had
accompanied negotiations and technical discussions around reparations from the
beginning, dedicated an entire chapter to the transfer problem in his 1926 History
of Reparations.22 His book was published in English in 1927 and widely received.
Bergmann remarked on the transfer problem:
Throughout the world the conviction is gaining ground that, after all,
a country can make payments abroad for which it receives no
counterpart only from the surplus of its production - in other words,
only up to the amount that it can sell to foreign countries in goods
and services, after its internal requirements have been met.23
The technical discussion on the transfer problem peaked in 1929 in the Keynes-
Ohlin debate. At that time a committee lead by American industrialist Owen D.
Young was preparing the third reparation regime under which Germany would
actually have to pay up. Keynes (1929) argued in the March issue of the
Economic Journal that, in addition to the net transfer of wealth, reparations
would also impact Germany’s terms of trade.24 Keynes was the editor of the
Economic Journal. In June and September Bertil Ohlin and Jacques Rueff (1929)
20Keynes, A revision of the treaty ; John Maynard Keynes, Germany’s Capacity to pay Repara-
tions, 1923.
21Ritschl, ‘The German transfer problem’, p. 951.
22The German title was Der Weg der Reparation.
23Carl Bergmann, The History of Reparations (Boston, MA: Houghton Miﬄin, 1927), p. 304.
24John Maynard Keynes, ‘The German Transfer Problem’, The Economic Journal 39, no. 153
(1929): 1–7; Gomes, German Reparations, 1919-1932 , p. 229-32.
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argued against Keynes.25 If all income effects were taken into account, Ohlin and
Rueff maintained, a net transfer did not have to alter the terms of trade, but
could lead exclusively to a change in consumption in all countries.26
Paul Samuelson (1994) described Keynes as Goliath and Ohlin as David in the
transfer problem debate, implying that Ohlin won.27 At the time, however,
Keynes prevailed. He successfully swung the political approach to reparations in
the direction that he advocated. As editor of the Economic Journal he had the
last word over Ohlin and Rueff, too, whose articles were published only with
immediate replies of Keynes. Samuelson’s David is victorious only in hindsight.
Modern transfer theory validates the position of Ohlin and Rueff and maintains
that in a two-country, two-commodity model the terms of trade can change in
favour of either country, or remain stable.28 The history of economics has passed
unflattering judgement on the technical quality of Keynes’ argument of 1929. To
Samuelson, the core of Keynes’ argument was ‘rhetorical bluster and political
resentment against the Treaty of Versailles’.29 Harry Johnson argues that Keynes’
contribution was ‘technically incompetent’ and that his replies to Ohlin were
made in bad faith.30 Robert Mundell calls it ‘one of the great puzzles of the
history of economic thought’ why Keynes took such an ‘absurd position’ in the
matter.31
The victory of Keynes in the transfer problem debate changed the scope of
agency that political actors had in dealing with reparations in 1921 and in 1924.
Evidently, a different set of options was available to the actors that made the
Dawes Plan in 1924 than to those who made the London Schedule in 1921. In
Peter Hall’s classification we are dealing with a ‘second-order change’, that is the
25Bertil Ohlin and John Maynard Keynes, ‘The Reparation Problem: A Discussion’, The Eco-
nomic Journal 39, no. 154 (1929): 172–182; Jacques Rueff, Bertil Ohlin and John Maynard
Keynes, ‘Mr. Keynes’ Views of the Transfer Problem’, The Economic Journal 39, no. 155
(1929): 388–408.
26Gomes, German Reparations, 1919-1932 , p. 229-32.
27Paul Samuelson, ‘Bertil Ohlin (1899-1979)’, in Bertil Ohlin: Critical Assessments, ed. John
Wood Cunningham, vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 109, 112.
28Gomes, German Reparations, 1919-1932 , p. 229-30.
29Cited in: ibid., p. 232.
30Cited in: ibid., p. 232-3.
31Cited in: ibid., p. 233.
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alteration of ‘instruments of macroeconomic policy without radically altering the
hierarchy of goals behind policy’.32 Political actors in 1921 and in 1924 sought to
extract reparations from Germany, but they thought and went about it in
different ways. Yet this second-order change took many years. Keynes started
lobbying for his view in 1918 and six years later it was reflected in the set of
available policy options. In this instance the process of second-order change was
much too slow to resolve the questions around agency that Lloyd George and
Millerand faced in making the London Schedule. Moreover, Keynes’ view of the
transfer problem did not prevail due to its analytical merit, but in spite of it.
Keynes rallied greater support around his idea, but Ohlin was technically right.
This raises the question whether ideas, the category that underpins the notion of
policy paradigms, are in fact an adequate unit of analysis for political
agency.
From a rationalist perspective it is equally difficult to resolve the questions
around agency in the reparations process in 1920/21. The two different
reparation amounts in the London Schedule are evidence that political actors and
the public reasoned in different ways and reached incompatible conclusions. This
dissonance also shaped the distribution of reparations amongst the Allies. While
political actors agreed on a measure for reparation claims, they fixed a
distribution that contradicted that measure. The analysis of the cognitive
artefacts that circulated between political actors and the public will show that
there was no shared rationality.
Ernest L. Bogart (1919, 1920), professor of economics in Illinois, calculated the
direct and indirect costs of World War I for the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.33 Bogart’s numbers are still referenced today and they are a
starting point for scholars to determine the cost of the Great War, e.g., Stephen
Broadberry and Mark Harrison (2005).34 Bogart defined a country’s indirect war
32Hall, ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State’, p. 281-2.
33Ernest L. Bogart, Direct and Indirect Costs of the Great World War, 2nd ed., Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace: Preliminary Economic Studies of the War (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 1920).
34Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, ‘The economics of World War I : an overview’, chap. 1
in The Economics of World War I, ed. Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3–40.
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costs as the sum of the capitalised value of war deaths, property losses on land
and shipping and cargo losses at sea. This definition corresponds very closely
with the reparation categories that the Paris Peace Conference fixed in 1919. The
Treaty of Versailles defined a country’s entitlement to reparation the sum of
military pensions, separation allowances, damages to property and losses at sea.
Presumably, from a rationalist perspective, the distribution of reparations would
correspond with a country’s share of total indirect war costs, but that was not the
case. Table 4.2, p. 138, compares the indirect war costs calculated by Bogart, the
percentages of total indirect costs according to Bogart and the actual distribution
of reparations that actors agreed on, the so-called Spa percentages.
Table 4.2: Comparison of Bogart’s indirect costs of World War I with the distribution
of German reparations amongst the Allies, the so-called Spa percentages.
Indirect costs1($m) Share of total2(%) Spa percentages (%)
British Empire 9,157 20 22
France 15,271 34 52
Italy 5,526 12 10
Other Allies3 15,240 34 16
Total 45,194 100 100
1 Bogart calculated indirect costs of the war as the sum of capitalised value of war deaths,
property lost on land and shipping losses.
2 Calculated as a country’s indirect costs as share of total indirect costs.
Source: Bogart’s figures are taken from Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, ‘The
economics of World War I : an overview’, chap. 1 in The Economics of World War I, ed.
Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
3–40, p. 23.
3 Belgium, Portugal, Japan, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, South-Slavia/Serbia.
The distribution of reparations between the British Empire, France, Italy and
countries summarised under ‘other Allies’ was fixed on 16 July 1920 in Spa,
Belgium. This distribution became known as the Spa percentages and assigned
22% to Britain, 52% to France, 10% to Italy and 16% to other countries. The
indirect costs of the British Empire and Italy approximately matched their Spa
percentages. The indirect costs of France and the other Allies, however, diverged
greatly from their Spa percentages. France’s share (52%) was much greater than
her share in indirect war costs (34%). The other Allies received a much smaller
percentage (16%) than their share in costs (34%). If we accept that Bogart’s
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figures are reasonably correct and that they correspond with reparation
categories, then the distribution of reparations cannot be explained by war
damages alone.
4.3 The Spa percentages
4.3.1 Actors and interests
The Spa percentages were a diplomatic compromise that was not primarily
related to war damages. The percentages were neither the outcome of a rational
calculation nor of a policy paradigm. Nonetheless, the Allies agreed on a
distribution of reparations on 16 July 1920. The agreement was publicised in the
press the day after, see fig. 4.1, p. 140.
Why was it so important for our actors to fix a distribution of reparations?
Millerand, Lloyd George and the Allied representatives on the Reparation
Commission believed that the amount of reparations they would obtain from
Germany was far less than the war damage and far less than the domestic publics
in France or England demanded. Hence the actors had to negotiate a reparation
settlement with the German government. And that was only possible once the
actors agreed on the distribution of reparation amongst themselves. Whether or
not that distribution was proportionate to war damages was secondary. From
that perspective we can begin to make sense of France’s excessive Spa percentage
and the raw deal that the smaller Allied countries received. France had much
more bargaining power than countries like Greece, Romania or Portugal. The
latter had no other possibility than to accept the Spa percentages and thereby
the reparations they would receive as part of an Allied deal with Germany.
Millerand arrived at the insight that there would be a negotiated reparation
settlement after a drawn-out process. He gradually accepted the limits of
Germany’s capacity to pay and the limited ability of the Allies to make Germany
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1
Figure 4.1: CA 1, the Allied agreement on the distribution of reparations that
was reached in Spa, Belgium, and published in the Daily Mail of 17 July 1920. For
the broad public, reparation shares had to reflect absolute war damages. For Lloyd
George, Millerand and their financial experts, agreed shares were an expedient for
negotiations with Germany that did not have to correspond with war damages.
Source: Daily Mail, ‘Reparation Share-Out Pact’, Daily Mail Historical Archive
(London), no. 7574 (July 1920), http : / / find . galegroup . com / dmha / infomark .
do?&source=gale&prodId=DMHA&userGroupName=lse ttda&tabID=T003&
docPage=article&searchType=BasicSearchForm&docId=EE1862833958&type=
multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0.
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pay.35 Lloyd George and other members of his government consistently wanted
low reparations for a host of reasons since the war had ended.
The relevant parties in mid-1920 can be divided into an active and a passive side.
The active side consisted of Millerand, Lloyd George, their financial experts on
the Reparation Commission and a few other Allied politicians and technocrats,
mainly from Belgium. John Bradbury was the British representative on the
Commission. Since 1905 he was at the Treasury as the government’s chief
financial adviser. He was appointed to the Committee on Currency and Foreign
Exchanges in January 1918.36 Louis Dubois was the French representative on the
Commission since 19 May 1920. Dubois was member of the Assemble´e Nationale
since 1910. From 27 November 1919 to 20 January 1920 he was in charge of
maritime transport and the merchant marine as France’s Minister of Commerce.37
The initiative of producing and circulating cognitive artefacts lay with these
actors. The passive side consisted of the broad public in France and Britain as
well as of politicians and experts of smaller Allies like Japan, Portugal or
Romania. Italy’s government and her experts moved from the active to the
passive side half way through the process. Actors on the passive side rejected
cognitive artefacts or responded to them, but they could not seize the initiative
and make their own modified cognitive artefacts circulate.
4.3.2 ‘Searching hun pockets’
British views on reparations started to diverge with the end of the war in 1918.
Technically, Britain came out of the war as a net creditor. She was owed a total
of $11.1bn by other states, but a large part would not be forthcoming.38 The
Russian Bolsheviks refused to honour the debt of $2.5bn that the Czarist regime
had accumulated.39 The French debt was $3bn, but repayment depended on the
35Kent, The Spoils of War , pp. 103, 110.
36Susan Howson, Bradbury, John Swanwick, first Baron Bradbury (1872-1950), Oxford Diction-
ary of National Biography, 2004.
37Assemble´e Nationale, Dubois, Louis Joseph Marie (1859-1946), Base des donne´es des de´pute´s
franc¸ais depuis 1789, 2014, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/sycomore/index.asp.
38Gomes, German Reparations, 1919-1932 , pp. 5-6.
39Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939 , pp. 40-1.
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amount of reparations France would receive from Germany. The British position
towards reparations derived from her aspirations in the postwar world. The idea
was, according to Alan Dobson (1995), to regain the previous position as global
power in finance and commerce, which had been challenged by the US throughout
the war. To resume that position, Britain did not want to default on her
American loans so that she preserved her reputation as good creditor and
maintained an intact relationship with the US. Hence the defaults of her own
debtors had to be absorbed and balanced through other receipts.40 These had to
come either from taxation or reparation.
Britain’s public and government had very moderate reparation demands up until
early 1917.41 Trade and the return to prewar trade patterns were most important.
To not disturb these trade patterns, Germany should not be burdened heavily.
Further factors for moderation were domestic left-wing groups and the possibility
of Allied defeat. There were few in the British Empire that thought differently.
An early and lonely voice to demand a large indemnity was Joseph Ward,
Finance Minister of New Zealand. In January 1918 Lloyd George spoke of
compensation for losses incurred at sea and in the invaded territories, i.e., for
physical damage. Still in September 1918, although in martial rhetoric, this
position was corroborated by Alfred Harmsworth, Britain’s Director of
Propaganda and newspaper magnate. He demanded compensation for everything
that Germany had ‘gorged and stolen, sacked and burnt’.42
The tide turned as the end of the war approached and the US insisted on the
repayment of her loans. The Canadian and Australian governments, just like
Britain’s, were indebted to the US. In anticipation of increasing taxation, British
men of property and their media outlets joined British conservative and
nationalist politicians. They claimed that Germany should not just compensate
the physical damage she had done, but also pay indemnities, i.e., military
pensions. Responding to the public pressure, Lloyd George’s government created
a committee to investigate Germany’s financial capacities. The committee was
40Alan P. Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge,
1995), p. 47.
41For the detailed development of the British position, see: Kent, The Spoils of War , pp. 28-40.
42Cited in: ibid., p. 32.
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headed by Australia’s Prime Minister William Hughes and took the liberty to
estimate the total of war damages as well. It concluded that Germany should and
could pay a total of £24bn, or £1.2bn annually.43 Lloyd George and others
thought in private that the figure of the Hughes Committee was a ‘wild and
fantastic chimera’.44 Closing in on the general elections of 14 December 1918,
however, Lloyd George publicly adopted the same stance as the Hughes
Committee. On 11 December, at a speech in Bristol, Lloyd George coined one of
the battle cries for high reparation demands: ‘Those who started [the war] must
pay to the uttermost farthing, and we shall search their pockets for it’, see
fig. 4.2, p. 143.45
1
Figure 4.2: When reporting on the reparations issue, the popular press frequently
reiterated Lloyd George’s statement from the election campaign in 1918, how he
would ‘search the pockets’ of the Germans.
Source: Daily Mail, ‘“Search their Pockets”’, Daily Mail Historical Archive (London),
no. 7551 (May 1920), http://find.galegroup.com/dmha/infomark.do?&source=
gale&prodId=DMHA&userGroupName=lse ttda&tabID=T003&docPage=article&
searchType=BasicSearchForm&docId=EE1862762224&type=multipage&contentSe
t=LTO&version=1.0.
Lloyd George was reelected on his promise to search German pockets. In March
1919 at the Peace Conference he attempted two routes to secure a sum that
43Kent, The Spoils of War , pp. 37-8.
44Cited in: ibid., p. 40.
45Daily Mail, ‘“Search their Pockets”’, Daily Mail Historical Archive (London), no. 7551 (May
1920), http://find.galegroup.com/dmha/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=DMHA&
userGroupName=lse ttda&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchType=BasicSearchForm&
docId=EE1862762224&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0. Farthing was a
quarter of a penny, the smallest coin in circulation. It was abolished in 1960.
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would satisfy the public. The first route was to demand 30% of the total that
Germany would pay; France should receive 50% and the remaining countries 20%.
Louis Loucheur, principal economic adviser of French President Clemenceau,
refuted the proposal as he was not willing to fix France’s share below 55%,
leaving a maximum of 25% to Britain. Lloyd George’s second route was to press
for the inclusion of allowances for widows and orphans into military pensions.
There he succeeded and overcame opposition by admitting categories of civilian
damages that were suitable to France. American resistance to the French-British
dealings faltered, according to Kent, once Wilson realised that he could argue
that detailed reparation categories made the peace agreement more transparent
and thereby more just.46 Thus the Versailles Treaty codified a damage accounting
that would yield a high figure.
By mid-1920 the gap between what the British public expected and what the
government would deliver had begun to decrease. Financial revisionism was
gathering momentum, Keynes had published his Economic Consequences of the
Peace in late 1919 and what was formerly ‘piecemeal criticism’ had been given
‘force and cohesion’ by April 1920.47 Nonetheless, there was still a significant
shortfall. Public expectations in France were as high as ever. Financial
revisionism played no role and the reception of Keynes varied ‘from indifferent to
vitriolic’.48
The broad public in Britain in mid-1920 held Lloyd George to his election
promise of 1918, fig. 4.2, p. 143. The popular press reiterated the sentence over
and over in the years after 1918 and reminded its readership of the Prime
Minister’s statement. It became a dictum in the call for high reparations and still
in 1921 it gave rise to puns like ‘unsearched hun pockets’.49 That is, the election
46Kent, The Spoils of War , p. 74.
47Ibid., pp. 92-3.
48Gomes, German Reparations, 1919-1932 , pp. 47-50; Kent, The Spoils of War , pp. 93-4.
49Daily Mail, ‘Unsearched Hun Pockets : Taxes Lower than before the War’, Daily Mail Historical
Archive (London), no. 7745 (February 1921), http://find.galegroup.com/dmha/infomark.
do?&source=gale&prodId=DMHA&userGroupName=lse ttda&tabID=T003&docPage=
article&searchType=BasicSearchForm&docId=EE1864198283&type=multipage&content
Set=LTO&version=1.0. Other examples are Daily Mail, ‘Every Hun Penny we Can Get
Quickly’, Daily Mail Historical Archive (London), no. 7136 (February 1919), http://find.
galegroup.com/dmha/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=DMHA&userGroupName=lse tt
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promise determined one of the rigid features of the cognitive artefacts on
reparations.
We have argued in the first case that verbal statements are usually much more
ambiguous than cognitive artefacts. How can we reconcile that with the
unambiguous force of the catch phrase coined by Lloyd George? When he
promised his electorate in Bristol to ‘search [German] pockets’, he made several
qualifying statements, too. The West Australian, a newspaper in Perth, reported
Lloyd George at Bristol stating that ‘as far as Germany’s capacity admitted she
must pay the cost of the war to the last penny’.50 This qualification indicates that
Lloyd George actually meant to make a nuanced statement when he promised to
‘search pockets’. These nuances, however, were lost to the British popular press
and the broad public. Against Lloyd George’s intentions, his Bristol statement
became an unambiguous battle cry for high reparations. Even Lloyd George’s
sentence in isolation could mean several things, e.g., that Germany had to ‘pay to
the uttermost farthing’ of her capacity, of war damages or of some other measure.
The point is that Lloyd George’s statement in itself was ambiguous, but it came
to be understood in an unambiguous manner to mean high reparations. Because
of that dominant interpretation, high reparations were a rigid feature to the
public.
4.3.3 Political expedience
Lloyd George, Millerand and their experts saw reparations differently from the
broad public. By June 1920 they abandoned the formal procedure of settling
reparations through war damage accounting. John Bradbury, the British delegate
da&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchType=BasicSearchForm&docId=EE1866490650&
type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0; Daily Mail, ‘We Pay Germany’, Daily Mail
Historical Archive (London), no. 7588 (August 1920), http://find.galegroup.com/dmha/
infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=DMHA&userGroupName=lse ttda&tabID=T003&
docPage=article&searchType=BasicSearchForm&docId=EE1863072535&type=multipage&
contentSet=LTO&version=1.0.
50National Library of Australia, The West Australian, ‘British Elections: Mr. Lloyd George at
Bristol’, National Library of Australia, December 1918, http://nla.gov.au/nla.news-article
27498958.
145
4 European recovery and German reparations after World War I
on the Reparation Commission, wrote to Austen Chamberlain, Chancellor of the
Exchequer, on 2 June:
[Chairman Dubois, the French Delegate,] was as emphatic as any of us
[members of the Commission] as to the impossibility of carrying out
the assessment provisions of the Treaty as it stands by 1st May, 1921,
and, while he naturally abstained from giving us any precise indication
of what his own views or the views of his Government are in regard to
a “lump sum settlement”, he accepted without demur the principle
that the only question of serious importance was to fix the largest
amount which Germany could afford to pay and the best method of
making the payment available at the earliest practicable date, and
that the total amount of damages (which was necessarily vastly in
excess of such a sum) had little more than academic importance.51
Germany’s limited ability to pay was a rigid feature to Lloyd George, Millerand
and their financial experts. Hence the relevant question to our actors was no
longer the total damage of the war, but how to fix the largest amount that
Germany could be made to pay as soon as possible. Reparations were not a
matter of justice or accounting, but of expedience. Lloyd George had pushed for
this approach at the latest since March 1920.52 Millerand accepted it under
reservations as the French government ran out of other options in the first half of
1920.53 The French general elections of November 1919 had brought a nationalist
government to power. At first, this ‘strengthened the rhetoric of French
reparation policy’ and the willingness to coerce Germany into payment.54 During
the occupation of the Ruhr on 6 April 1920, however, the French government
conclusively realised that Britain did not back up its approach.55 Quite the
opposite, Britain replied to the French occupation by suspending coal deliveries
to France and Lloyd George countered Millerand’s call for a joint occupation with
51The National Archives of the UK (hereafter NAUK), Reparation Commission, T194/273 :
Germany’s Liability under the Treaty : Views expressed : 1920-1921., 28.
52Kent, The Spoils of War , p. 92.
53Ibid., p. 95.
54Ibid., p. 89-90.
55Gomes, German Reparations, 1919-1932 , pp. 49.
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the ‘hitherto unthinkable suggestion’ that the German government should be
included into the process of determining reparations.56
Once Millerand and Lloyd George agreed that Germany should pay the largest
amount she could afford, the next step was to agree on a distribution of
reparations. The Allies would have to negotiate reparations with Germany,
something they could not do if they did not agree amongst themselves who would
receive which share. Again Bradbury:
[Dubois] also concurred very definitely [...] that the most useful first
step would be to secure a completion of the arrangement for
percentage distribution already arrived at between Great Britain,
France, and Serbia by bringing in the other powers entitled to
reparation.57
To secure reparations from Germany the Allies had to take a joint position. That
meant that there could be no quarrelling about who had suffered more damages.
Chamberlain thus replied to Bradbury that he was ‘in full agreement that the
first step is to get the Allies’ percentages settled’.58
4.4 Stabilising the Spa percentages
To the broad public in Britain, France and other Allied countries, Germany’s
compensation for total war damages was a rigid feature. To these publics, the
distribution of reparations was stabilised by the relative war damages that
countries had suffered. To Lloyd George, Millerand and their financial experts,
Germany’s capacity to pay was a rigid feature and her actual payments were
flexible. To them, the distribution was stabilised by the necessity to have a
distribution, so that any payments at all could be extracted from Germany. The
British and French publics considered other features as rigid, flexible and
stabilising than our political actors. How did Lloyd George, Millerand and the
56Kent, The Spoils of War , p. 92.
57NAUK, Reparation Commission, T194/273 .
58NAUK, ibid.
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experts resolve this contradiction? How did they succeed in stabilising the Spa
percentages nonetheless? They did so by producing and circulating different
cognitive artefacts for the public and the diplomatic spheres.
4.4.1 In the public sphere
Lloyd George, Millerand and other Allied politicians formally agreed on the Spa
percentages on 16 July 1920 and a day later the numbers were in the press, see
fig. 4.1, p. 140. Prior to their agreement, on 2 July 1920, the Times published an
article on ‘France’s Account For Reparation’.59 It reported French-British
negotiations over a reparations split of 55% to 25%, see fig. 4.3a, p. 149. This was
followed by a detailed description of the items on the French reparation account,
see fig. 4.3b, p. 149. The Times reported that France had suffered industrial
damages of 7,260,269,456 francs and non-industrial damages of 54,774,000,000
francs. Damages for the Department du Nord, the region most affected by the
war, were at 3,700,000,000. The damage in agriculture was given as
16,249,000,000; hunting and fishing 88,000,000; agricultural water-power
46,000,000; woods and forests 1,400,000,000; railways of general importance
468,000,000; canals 276,000,000; maritime ports 78,000,000; roads and bridges
1,218,000,000; posts, telegraphs and telephones 295,000,000; taxes and war
contributions 2,500,000,000. French war damages totalled at 248bn francs.60
The French damage estimate published in the Times amounted to £5.2bn. It was
compiled and distributed to the press by Louis Dubois, France’s delegate on the
Reparation Commission. Dubois agreed with Millerand, Lloyd George and the
Reparation Commission that an accounting of damages was practically impossible
and that it had no consequence for the amount Germany would actually pay. To
the English and French publics, however, the actors presented the distribution of
59The Times, ‘France’s Account For Reparation’, The Times Digital Archive (London), no. 42452
(July 1920), http://find.galegroup.com/ttda/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=TTDA&
userGroupName=lse ttda&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchType=BasicSearchForm&
docId=CS184880866&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0. Conversion rate is
48 francs in one pound, as used in the article.
60Ibid.
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1
(a)
1
(b)
Figure 4.3: CA 2, Times article on ‘France’s Account For Reparation’, 2 July
1920. The article begins with the French-British agreement to split reparations 55%
to 25%, (a). These percentages were presented in conjunction with a detailed French
damage account that totals at 248bn francs, (b). The distributional agreement was
necessary for Allied politicians to take a joint position towards Germany and ex-
tract reparations. The damage figures were produced by Louis Dubois, the Principal
French Member on the Reparation Commission, to frame the distributional agree-
ment as if it satisfied the publics desire for high reparations. In private, Dubois knew
that a complete damage accounting was practically impossible, that it would yield
an infeasible total and that reparations from Germany would be much less.
Source: The Times, ‘France’s Account For Reparation’, The Times Digital Archive
(London), no. 42452 (July 1920), http : / / find . galegroup . com / ttda / infomark .
do ? &source = gale & prodId = TTDA & userGroupName = lse ttda & tabID = T003 &
docPage = article & searchType = BasicSearchForm & docId = CS184880866 & type =
multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0, p. 11.
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reparations along with an extensive and detailed discussion of French war
damages.61 That is, they presented the distribution as if it was derived from war
damages.
For the English and French publics our actors produced a numerical artefact in
which war damages stabilised the distribution of reparations between the Allies.
After summer 1920 newspapers often used the Spa percentages to calculate
national shares from various reparation totals that cropped up in the discussion.62
All numbers of the cognitive artefact were provisional in the sense that neither
percentages nor damages were fixed on 2 July, at the time of publication in the
Times. Moreover, the damage figure of Dubois was a false number. Dubois
intentionally inflated the figure to preserve the public’s illusion that reparations
would match war damages. Only a week earlier our actors had publicised a
reparations proposal in which Germany should pay a total of £5.25bn, to which
the Daily Mail had responded that the Allies were ‘letting off the huns’.63 French
officials produced another damage account a few months later that was not made
public. It amounted only to half the amount that Dubois circulated in the
Times.64
Lampland identifies false numbers as place holders in situations in which
mastering ‘the logic of formal procedures’ is more important than the ‘accuracy of
the numerical sign’.65 False numbers allow ‘learning to rationalise’.66 The false
damage number of Dubois enabled rationalisation in a different way. It aligned
the British and French publics to the position of Lloyd George, Millerand and
61In France, the estimate of Dubois was published on 1 July in La Liberte´.
62An example is Daily Mail, ‘If Germany Pays £11,300,000,000.’, Daily Mail Historical Archive
(London), no. 7741 (January 1921), http://find.galegroup.com/dmha/infomark.do?&source=
gale&prodId=DMHA&userGroupName=lse ttda&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchTy
pe=BasicSearchForm&docId=EE1863470802&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=
1.0.
63The total of £5.25bn consisted of 35 annuities of £150m. Daily Mail, ‘Letting off the Huns’,
Daily Mail Historical Archive (London), no. 7553 (June 1920), http://find.galegroup.com/
dmha/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=DMHA&userGroupName=lse ttda&tabID=
T003 & docPage = article & searchType = BasicSearchForm & docId = EE1863677259 & type =
multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0.
64NAUK, Reparation Commission, T194/007 : Bradbury papers, 1921.
65Lampland, ‘False numbers as formalizing practices’, p. 378.
66Ibid., p. 395.
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their experts. By being false, the damage number stabilised the distribution of
reparations in the public.
4.4.2 In the diplomatic sphere
The Reparation Commission had two main tasks in the negotiations with
Germany. It should determine Germany’s capacity to pay and compile a sound,
minimal Allied damage figure that could not easily be challenged.67 Hence on 7
October 1920 the Reparation Commission sent a request to all governments that
intended to claim reparations. They were asked to submit minimal estimates of
their total damage by 1 November. The Commission specified that estimates
should be based on quantities and 1914 unit prices and be compiled under four
headings: military pensions, separation allowances, damages to property and
losses at sea. Once thorough investigations were completed, the Commission
promised, estimates could be revised upwards. The Commission sent an
additional request to the governments of France, Italy, Belgium and the British
Empire. They were asked to submit an estimate as exact ‘as possible [with] a
complete statement of the methods employed’ for certain damage categories.
France and Belgium should provide an exact estimate for pensions and damages
to property, Italy for separation allowances and the British Empire for losses at
sea. The Commission assured that it would ‘examine the methods employed [...]
and consider the possibility of adopting’ them for the estimation of damages of
‘other Powers’ under the same category.68 By late February 1921 the Commission
received damage estimates that amounted to 213.09bn gold marks.69 The
Commission compiled and processed the claims so that they could be used in
negotiations with the German government, see fig. 4.4, p. 152. In doing so, the
Commission produced a cognitive artefact that stabilised the Spa percentages in
the diplomatic sphere towards all Allied governments.
67NAUK, Reparation Commission, T194/072, 1920.
68NAUK, Reparation Commission, T194/071 : Estimation of Damages, 1920.
69NAUK, Reparation Commission, T194/7 .
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Figure 4.4: CA 3, compilation of Allied damage claims by the Reparation Commis-
sion, 23 February 1921. The Commission recalculated national claims and shares to
reconcile them with the agreed Spa percentages and to extend the percentage agree-
ment for all claimant countries. Source: Author’s additions to: NAUK, Reparation
Commission, T194/007 : Bradbury papers, 1921.
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At first, outlined in red on fig. 4.4, p. 152, the Commission rejected all estimates
except those of France, the British Empire and Belgium. It argued that the
estimates of Italy, Japan, Portugal, Serbia, Greece, Romania and ‘miscellaneous’
countries were not based on sound methods. The Italian claim on separation
allowances was flawed, the Commission argued, because it made no distinction
between losses before and after the beginning of belligerency with Germany. The
Commission found, however, that an adjustment of the timing based on the date
of the declaration of war would reduce the Italian claim from 28.9bn to 18.6bn
gold marks. Romania’s claim of 22bn was regarded as ‘wholly fantastic’.70
In the second step (green), the Commission calculated a ‘proper’ total from the
damage claims that it considered to be valid, i.e., the claims of France, the British
Empire and Belgium. The Commission equated the sum of these claims with the
sum of French, British and Belgian Spa percentages, i.e., 144.3bn gold marks
equalled 82%. The proper total of claims were consequently 100% or 176bn gold
marks.71. These claims were notably restrained in comparison to the numbers
that had been circulated in public before. France submitted a claim of 88bn gold
marks to the Reparation Commission, approximately 133bn francs, which was
about half of the 248bn francs Dubois estimated in summer 1920.72
The third step (blue) of the Commission was to suggest percentages for those
countries that had not signed the Spa agreement and whose damage estimates it
rejected, i.e., Serbia, Greece, Romania and miscellaneous other countries. Fourth
and last (orange), the Commission derived new damage estimates for all countries
from the Spa percentages and the proper total. Hence France’s proper claim were
52% of 176bn gold marks, i.e., 91.5bn, Italy’s were 10% of 176bn, i.e., 18bn
etc.73
70NAUK, Reparation Commission, T194/7 , Bradbury to Chamberlain, 23/2/1921.
71NAUK, ibid.
72The conversion rates used here are the same that John Bradbury used at the Reparation
Commission in late February 1921. 2 francs were 1 gold mark for pensions, 1.3 francs for
separation allowances and 3 francs for remaining items. NAUK, ibid.
73The Commission rounded new claims for France, the British Empire, Belgium, Italy and Serbia
to 0.5.
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What were the politics behind the submitted claims and the recalculation of the
Reparation Commission? Regarding the first aspect we can observe that those
countries that had signed the Spa agreement submitted very restrained claims
compared to those that had not signed the Spa agreement. Presumably, the Spa
signatories had accepted the premise of Lloyd George, Millerand and their
experts: the total of reparations would not depend on the amount the Allies
claimed, but on the amount they would be able to extract jointly from Germany.
Hence the Spa signatories had an incentive to stabilise the agreed percentages by
submitting conservative and sound estimates. The non-signatories, in comparison,
had realised by the end of 1920 that they would only receive reparations as part
of the joint Allied deal with Germany. That is, their reparations would come out
of the 6.5% of the total that had been reserved for them in Spa on 16 July 1920.
Hence Serbia, Greece and Romania had an incentive to submit large claims.
The delegates of France, Britain and Belgium at the Reparation Commission
formed an alliance to stabilise the Spa percentages for all claimant countries. The
Commission rejected Italy’s claim, based on the starting date that Italian experts
used to calculate damages. That date had been a controversial issue before. Italy
wanted to claim reparations from the time before she had officially entered the
war. The others thought that Italy could only claim reparations from her official
war entry date onwards. Fittingly, when the Reparation Commission calculated
the actual Italian claim with the Italian date of war entry, it yielded 18.6bn gold
marks.74 That made it almost equal to the Italian claim of 18bn gold marks that
the Commission calculated via Italy’s Spa percentages and the proper total. Thus
the Commission could argue that four methodologically sound estimates and 92%
of reparations (the sum of France, Britain, Belgium and Italy) stabilised the Spa
percentages.
In February 1921 the Reparation Commission produced and circulated a
numerical artefact to stabilise the Spa percentages amongst politicians and
experts of all countries that claimed reparations, fig. 4.4, p. 152. That artefact
had rigid, flexible and provisional features. Spa percentages were rigid to the
Commission. The damage estimates were generally treated as flexible, but some
74NAUK, Reparation Commission, T194/7 , p. 43.
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claims were more flexible to the Commission than others. It completely rejected
the Romanian or Greek claim, while it used the French, British and Belgian
claims to calculate the proper total of 176bn gold marks. The proper total and
the amount that countries would receive were treated as provisional. At the time
when the Commission produced the numerical artefact, in February 1921,
countries could still update their claims. So an updated French, Belgian or
British claim would yield a new proper total. Furthermore, the question of
Germany’s capacity to pay was unresolved, making the absolute amount a
country would receive provisional, too.
Which features stabilised the numerical artefact that the Reparation Commission
produced for the diplomatic sphere? Fig. 4.5, p. 156, shows the relations between
stabilising and stabilised numbers. Overall, the Spa percentages of July 1920 did
most of the work. The percentages of France, Britain, Belgium and Italy
(outlined in dark orange in fig. 4.5, p. 156) stabilised the proper total. The
Commission calculated the proper total of 176bn gold marks by equating the sum
of the French, British and Belgian claims (144.3bn gold marks) with the sum of
their Spa percentages (82%). The Commission furthermore argued that the
adjusted Italian claim yielded the same amount as Italy’s Spa percentage (10%)
of the proper total. The proper total was stabilised as well by the claims of
France, Britain and Belgium (green). Furthermore, the sum of the Spa
percentages stabilised the percentages of non-signatories (blue). The Spa
agreement settled the distribution of 93.5% of reparations, accordingly the
Commission proposed shares for Serbia, Greece, Romania and ‘miscellaneous’
countries that amounted to 6.5%. Finally, a country’s percentage stabilised the
amount of reparations it would receive (red).
The calculations of the Reparation Commission aligned actual Allied reparation
claims with the Spa percentages. French, British and Belgian delegates on the
Commission completed and stabilised the Spa percentages as a distributional
agreement for all claimant countries. Consequently, the Allies could negotiate
with the German government on the basis of a consistent claim and a minimal
damage estimate. That strengthened the Allied position.
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Figure 4.5: Several numbers stabilised each other in this numerical artefact of the
Reparation Commission.
Source: Author’s additions to: NAUK, Reparation Commission, T194/007 : Brad-
bury papers, 1921.
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In the previous cases I have discussed cognitive artefacts as a means for actors to
scope out and specify their agency. In this case I have argued that two different
numerical artefacts were produced for two different spheres to stabilise one set of
numbers: the Spa percentages. This gives us further insight into a complex to
which we have pointed before, the legitimisation of agency via cognitive artefacts.
We have seen that producing and circulating different cognitive artefacts to
different audiences is a strategy for actors to gain legitimacy. One possible
outcome of this strategy is that we end up with cognitive artefacts that
contradict each other, despite being produced by one and the same actor or group
of actors. The numerical artefact for the public sphere had a different damage
total than the numerical artefact for the diplomatic sphere. Lloyd George,
Millerand and their experts tried to manage that inconsistency by limiting the
circulation of the diplomatic numerical artefact.
It could be argued that the Spa percentages eventually allowed the various
fractions to collaborate in spite of their diverging views. Once the Spa
percentages were stabilised in all spheres, Lloyd George, Millerand and their
experts could negotiate with the German government with the approval of the
British and French publics and without disruption from the minor Allies. Does
that mean that the Spa percentages, once they were stabilised, were a boundary
object? I have two reasons to argue that that they were not. The first reason is
historical. When the Allies began direct negotiations with Germany, in July 1920,
there were still countries entitled to reparations that had not signed the Spa
agreement, e.g., Greece or Romania. Moreover, the Italian government wanted to
unbundle the Spa percentages again and the French government negotiated
directly with Germany throughout 1920, speculating to supersede a joint Allied
agreement with a better bilateral deal. Hence the Spa percentages might have
been stable, and in retrospect we know that they were long-lived, too, but they
were probably never uncontested.75 The second reason is systematic. Star and
Griesemer maintain that boundary objects are ‘not engineered [...] by any one
individual or group’, but that they emerge as ‘groups from different worlds work’
75The Spa percentages were valid from July 1920 to June 1929, longer than any of the reparation
schemes. In June 1929 the Young Plan reduced the British share by 2.4%, see Gomes, German
Reparations, 1919-1932 , p. 172.
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together.76 The Spa percentages, however, clearly were engineered by Lloyd
George, Millerand and their experts. Moreover, the Spa percentages did not
emerge from cooperation, but made greater cooperation possible.
The historical events that followed the stabilisation of the Spa percentages in
1920/21 indicate where the boundaries of the strategy lie, with which our actors
legitimised their agency. In 1920/21 the reparation total in the public artefact,
were approximately 260bn gold marks, about 1.5 times greater than in the
diplomatic artefact (176bn gold marks).77 In May 1921 in the London Schedule of
Payments, the public reparation figure (132bn gold marks) was about 2.5 times
greater than the diplomatic figure (50bn gold marks). Producing and circulating
numerical artefacts to dedicated audiences was not enough for Lloyd George and
Millerand to legitimise their reparation settlement. They could not create one
reparation total that was valid in the public and the diplomatic sphere. The same
problem is evident in from the reaction of the German government to the London
Schedule. The cabinet under Constantin Fehrenbach refused to sign the London
Schedule and stepped down instead. Fehrenbach and his government and the
German public rejected the Schedule because they responded to the excessive
public reparations figure, not to the moderate diplomatic figure.
4.5 Analytical conclusions: Themes from the case
Between mid-1920 and early 1921 a group of political actors around Lloyd George
and Millerand used numerical artefacts to stabilise the distribution of German
reparations between the Allies. That distribution, the so-called Spa percentages,
was a political expedient that followed neither from a rational calculation of
reparation entitlements nor from a policy paradigm. In stabilising the Spa
percentages, these actors tried to legitimise their agency in the reparations
process.
76Star and Griesemer, ‘Boundary Objects’, p. 408.
77The total of 260bn gold marks is calculated via France’s share of 52% and the French claim of
133bn gold marks from July 1920.
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To legitimise their actions, the group of actors produced and circulated numerical
artefacts to dedicated audiences before and after formally agreeing on the Spa
percentages. The cognitive artefacts that circulated in different spheres
contradicted each other. This constellation gives us further insight into the
production and circulation of cognitive artefacts. To legitimise their agency in
front of the English and French public, actors produced a numerical artefact with
a false reparations number. Unlike in Lampland’s systematic, that false number
was not a place holder in a process of ‘learning to rationalise’.78 The number
necessarily had to be a false, so that it stabilised the Spa percentages in the
public sphere. Consequently, the circulation of the cognitive artefact produced for
the other Allies had to be limited to the diplomatic sphere. Going forward, we
may pursue that issue more generally and in the analytical terminology of
Howlett and Morgan. How are actors managing the ‘travels’ of cognitive artefacts
to legitimise agency?79
The Spa percentages, once they were stabilised in the public and the diplomatic
spheres, were a cognitive artefact that enabled Allied political actors to negotiate
with the German government over reparations. That is, the Spa percentages were
a cognitive artefact that to some extent enabled cooperation. Unlike a boundary
object, however, the Spa percentages did not emerge from cooperation.80 They
were engineered to enable cooperation. Hence cognitive artefacts might have a
function similar to boundary objects without being boundary objects.
78Lampland, ‘False numbers as formalizing practices’, p. 395.
79Howlett and Morgan, How Well do Facts Travel?
80Star and Griesemer, ‘Boundary Objects’, p. 408.
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5.1 Introduction
The relationship between Germany’s and Europe’s economic recovery after World
War II is a staple fact in Economic History. To name only a few, Barry
Eichengreen and Andrea Boltho (2010) find a ‘key precondition for European
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economic growth’ in the unrestrained production of Germany’s capital goods
industry.1 Helge Berger and Albrecht Ritschl (1995) argue that a major element
of postwar recovery was the successful reinstatement of ‘intra-European division
of labor with West Germany as its locational and industrial centre’.2 According
to Alan Milward (1992), Germany was at the heart of the postwar intra-European
trade boom.3
The American position on Germany was crucial to the course of her postwar
economy and therefore to Europe. At the end of the war, however, two competing
views co-existed in the American administration and in the American public. One
side wanted to significantly reduce Germany’s industry. Their catchphrase was
the Morgenthau Plan, the conversion of Germany into an agrarian economy. The
other side wanted to preserve industry and the German economy to resume its
central role in Europe. In hindsight it is evident that the pro-industry fraction
prevailed.
This chapter investigates how actors in the American military administration of
Germany used and managed cognitive artefacts to shape Washington’s political
space of agency. The main focus is not on the internal structure of cognitive
artefacts, but on the production of cognitive artefacts and their circulation or
‘travels’.4 The two opposing views on the postwar role of Germany’s economy
were also present in the military administration. The individuals at the centre of
the pro-industry fraction were Lucius D. Clay, the Deputy Military Governor, and
William H. Draper, Director of the Economics Division. Administrative units in
the pro-industry fraction were the Industry Division, the Food & Agriculture
Division and others. The key actors of the anti-industry camp were Bernard
Bernstein and the Finance Division.
1Barry Eichengreen and Andrea Boltho, ‘The economic impact of European integration’, chap. 11
in The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe: 1870 to the Present, ed. Stephen
Broadberry and Kevin H. O’Rourke, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
p. 280.
2Helge Berger and Albrecht Ritschl, ‘Germany and the Political Economy of the Marshall Plan,
1947-52: A Re-Revisionist View’, chap. 8 in Europe’s Post-War Recovery, ed. Barry Eichen-
green (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 200.
3Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (London: Routledge, 1992),
p. 275.
4Howlett and Morgan, How Well do Facts Travel?
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I argue that the pro-industry fraction prevailed because it gained significant
advantages at producing cognitive artefacts and at making them ‘travel well’.5
First, I reconstruct the changing general conditions for the production and travels
of cognitive artefacts between mid-1945 and early 1946. I then gauge the impact
these changing conditions had on three key aspects in the reactivation of
Germany’s industry. The first aspect is the contemporary controversy over
German industry as a threat to peace. The second aspect is the discussion over
the population’s food supply. The third aspect is the reasoning that legitimised
reactivating Germany’s industry in 1947. This became an explicit goal of US
occupation policy once the view prevailed that Germany’s industrial activity did
not threaten international security and that it should be used to pay for vital
food imports. I investigate a range of objects that relate to these three aspects.
Not all objects qualify as cognitive artefacts though. These objects are periodical
and non-recurring reports as well as images that contain or ‘package’ cognitive
artefacts, see table 5.1, p. 162.6
Table 5.1: Objects and cognitive artefacts on Germany’s postwar economy
No. Date Actor1 Description
1a 8/9 1945 AI/PI OMGUS reports to Washington on IG Farben
1b 12.11.1945 PI Showcased blasting of IG Farben plant
1c 6.12.1945 PI Universal Newsreel of IG Farben blasting
2a 8/9 1945 AI/PI OMGUS reports to Washington on food situation
2b 12/1 1945/46 PI Statistics on production of agricultural machinery
2c Mar. 1946 PI Graph on production of agricultural implements
3 Mar. 1947 HH Report: German exports for recovery of Europe
1 Denominates the political fraction or entity from which the artefacts originated: AI=Anti-
industry camp within OMGUS, the American military administration of Germany; PI=Pro-
industry camp of OMGUS; HH=Herbert Hoover.
5Howlett and Morgan, How Well do Facts Travel?
6Morgan, ‘Travelling Facts’, pp. 28-9.
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5.2 Literature review
5.2.1 Historical literature
The formulation of American occupation policy in 1945 was dominated by
security concerns that implied a negative stance towards German industry. At its
centre were the US Treasury and its Secretary Henry Morgenthau. He argued
that safeguarding peace required the physical reduction of Germany’s economic
capacity, in particular her heavy and armaments industry.7 Accordingly, JCS
1067, the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that governed the American
occupation from April 1945 to July 1947, took a hard line. It provided that the
military government should take no action to revive the German economy.
The restrictive language of JCS 1067 was not consistently interpreted by the
American occupation administration on the ground. Some elements of OMGUS,
the Office of the Military Government for Germany, United States, flagrantly
violated the policy. Some adapted it to the pragmatic requirements of governing
a war-torn territory. Others interpreted JCS 1067 as an opportunity to drive
home moral lessons to the Nazi population.8
John Gimbel (1968) recognises that stated policy and the military
administration’s objectives and actions diverged, in particular during the first
months of the occupation. He accounts for this in two ways. First, he invokes the
compassion of Americans when they witnessed destroyed Germany. According to
Gimbel, journalists thought that Berlin was ‘more like the face of the moon than
any city’; Truman was depressed when seeing its inhabitants ‘wandering
aimlessly’ amongst the ruins; Germany’s towns ‘smelled of death and destruction’
7Wilfried Mausbach, ‘Restructuring and Support: Beginnings of American Economic Policy
in Occupied Germany’, in The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War,
1945-1990, ed. Detlef Junker, vol. 1 (Cambridge: German Historical Institute and Cambridge
University Press, 2004), pp. 278-9.
8Karl-Heinz Roth (1986) tells the story of an OMGUS officer who was a manager of General
Motors in his civilian life. He lost his position in OMGUS when he tried to salvage the
capital assets of GM’s German subsidiary Opel; OMGUS and Karl Heinz Roth, OMGUS
- Ermittlungen gegen die I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, September 1945, Die Andere Bibliothek
(No¨rdlingen: Franz Greno, 1986).
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etc.9 Second, Gimbel refers to the logistical challenges of setting up a new
government and the degrees of freedom that were necessary to do so. To Gimbel,
Lucius D. Clay was a ‘brilliant’ Deputy Military Governor who started out in a
‘chaotic administrative situation’, which required ‘fundamental changes in
organisation, command structure and administration’.10
Harold Zink (1957) explains the inconsistent application of JCS 1067 by pointing
to the weight that different elements had within OMGUS. He remarks that the
Economics Division was in a strong position and that it adopted a pragmatic
view of the directive. Moreover, Zink explains that it was common for a
functionary like Clay to enjoy considerable leeway in interpreting his directives
from Washington.11
Other historians, usually associated with the political left, see JCS 1067 as a
smoke screen. Scholars like Ju¨rgen Kuczynski (1948) argue that industrial
ownership structures of the Third Reich were instantaneously restored in the
American zone. The ‘monopolists and trust lords’ of the German economy had
disappeared between May and July 1945, according to Kuczynski, but were back
in the western zones by the end of the summer.12 Karl-Heinz Roth (1986) argues
in this tradition in his analysis of OMGUS and Germany’s chemicals giant IG
Farben. More broadly, there is a consensus that American efforts at
denazification generally failed.13
9John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany : Politics and Military, 1945-1949 (Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 6.
10Ibid., pp. 46-7.
11Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton, NJ: van Nostrand, 1957),
pp. 26, 31-3.
12Ju¨rgen Kuczynski, Die Bewegung der deutschen Wirtschaft von 1800 bis 1946: 16 Vorlesun-
gen (Meisenheim am Glan: Westkulturverlag Anton Hain, 1948), p. 191. See also: Ernst-
Ulrich Huster, Determinanten der westdeutschen Restauration: 1945-1949 (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1972).
13Ralf Ahrens, ‘Von der Sa¨uberung zum Generalpardon: Die Entnazifizierung der westdeutschen
Wirtschaft’, Jahrbuch fu¨r Wirtschaftsgeschichte / Economic History Yearbook 51, no. 2 (2010):
p. 25.
164
5 European recovery and German industry after World War II
5.2.2 Literature on artefacts
While Economic History has paid much attention to Germany’s and Europe’s
reconstruction after World War II, it has largely ignored the question where the
numbers come from on which its narratives of reconstruction build. Alan Milward
(1992) draws attention to the matter and remarks that there is an ‘abundance of
dubiously accurate statistics produced by governments and international
organisations’ on which historians overly rely, without knowing the exact source
or origin.14
It is generally agreed that there was no zero hour for Germany in 1945. There
were a great deal of individual and social continuities as well as administrative
and political lines of development that ran from the Nazi era into the West
German Federal Republic and the East German Democratic Republic.15 That is
true for the numerical artefacts on Germany’s economy, too. Adam Tooze (2001,
2006, 2008) covers the issue of Germany’s economic statistics for the late
Kaiserreich, the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, but stops sharp with the
end of the Nazi regime in mid-1945.16 He does point out, however, that there are
colourful biographies and careers, such as that of Ernst Wagemann, that
straddled the historical ruptures of the German state.17
Earl Ziemke (1975) discusses activities of the US Army in mid-1945 that were
related to the administrative body of the dying Reich and the occupation forces
that would take its place. He comments on a facility called the Ministerial
Collecting Center (MCC). It was located near Kassel and gathered ‘fragments’ of
Germany’s government as they were discovered in the field. Ziemke does not
investigate possible connections between the MCC, its holdings and what
14Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 , p. xiii.
15Wolfgang Benz, ‘Deutschland unter alliierter Besatzung, 1945-1949’, chap. 1 in Gebhardt: Hand-
buch der deutschen Geschichte, 10th ed., ed. Wolfgang Reinhard, Ju¨rgen Kocka and Wolfgang
Benz, vol. 22 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2009), p. 39.
16Adam Tooze, Statistics and the German State 1900-1945: The Making of Modern Economic
Knowledge, Cambridge Studies in Modern Economic History (New York, NY: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2001); Tooze, The Wages of Destruction; Adam Tooze, ‘Trouble with Numbers:
Statistics, Politics, and History in the Construction of Weimar’s Trade Balance, 1918-1924’,
The American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (2008): 678–700.
17Tooze, Statistics and the German State 1900-1945 , p. 283ff.
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OMGUS made of them. Instead, he offers somewhat blanket judgements on the
general difficulty of controlling a large, foreign country and coordinating different
actors.18
Werner Abelshauser (1975) comments on the origins of postwar Germany’s
economic statistics.19 Abelshauser points to the links and spillovers between the
administration of the Third Reich and those of the occupying powers. He argues
that their preconditions for recording economic data were ‘quite favourable’,
despite zonal boundaries, the dispersal of the Reich’s Statistical Office all over
Germany and the resultant loss of data and structures. The American and British
administrators of the MCC formed a Statistics Section from the fragments of the
Reich’s Statistical Office. OMGUS furthermore created a Statistical Office of
German Industries in Bad Nauheim, building on the Reich’s Industrial Reporting
Division.20
For a while, Bad Nauheim was the workplace of several would-be important
economists of the 20th century: John K. Galbraith, Burton H. Klein, Nicholas
Kaldor, E.F. Schumacher, Paul A. Baran, Edward Denison and Ju¨rgen
Kuczynski. They were expected to document the contribution of the US Air
Force to Allied victory. These economists had access to the records of the Reich’s
Statistical Office and studied the effect of the bombing campaigns, but also the
economics of the German war effort more generally.21 Galbraith’s memories
(1981) on his time as Head of the Statistical Office in Bad Nauheim provide some
insight into the process of unlocking German statistics, in which German
personnel were apparently quite helpful; they give no indication though of the
ways in which these resources were used going forward.22 Roth (1986) takes an
18Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946, Matloff, Maurice
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1975), p. 315.
19Werner Abelshauser, Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945 - 1948: Rekonstruktion und Wach-
stumsbedingungen in der amerikanischen und britischen Zone, Schriftenreihe der Vier-
teljahreshefte fu¨r Zeitgeschichte (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1975).
20ibid., pp. 32-3, incl. footnotes.
21Werner Abelshauser, ‘Germany: guns, butter, and economic miracles’, chap. 4 in The Economics
of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison, ed. Mark Harrison, Studies
in Macroeconomic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 122–176, p. 122.
22John Kenneth Galbraith, Leben in entscheidender Zeit: Memoiren (Mu¨nchen: Bertelsmann,
1981), pp. 198-228.
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extreme stance on the importance and functionality of these institutions and
maintains that OMGUS ‘held the Nazi economy’s entire unaltered administrative
apparatus in its hand’.23
It is consensus that there were broad continuities in personnel and resources
between the administrations of the Third Reich and the American occupation.
On economic data specifically there are strong indicators for spillovers and
linkages. For some reason though this knowledge has remained disconnected from
the administrative history of OMGUS by Christoph Weisz (ed., 1994).24 Werner
Henke and Klaus Oldenhage (1994) chart the evolution of OMGUS in great
detail. They also touch upon political ramifications such as the reorganisations of
OMGUS in late 1945 and early 1946. Similar to Gimbel, however, Henke and
Oldenhage report these structural changes as quasi neutral organisational
developments. They explain appointments of key personnel through personal
friendship, predilections and factual considerations. They thereby miss out on the
consequences the evolution of OMGUS had for the production and the travels of
cognitive artefacts on Germany’s postwar economy.25
5.3 The American military administration and cognitive
artefacts
5.3.1 Actors and audiences
The notion that Europe’s recovery had to go hand in hand with Germany’s was
fairly common in the US administration during the war. The fraction that was in
favour of protecting Germany’s industry was strongest in the War Department
and the US Army. Their focus was on the economics of Germany’s role as
Europe’s capital goods supplier. She had played that role before the war and
23OMGUS and Roth, OMGUS - Ermittlungen gegen I.G. Farben, p. xxvii.
24Christoph Weisz, ed., OMGUS-Handbuch: Die amerikanische Milita¨rregierung in Deutschland
1945-1949, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte (Mu¨nchen: R. Oldenbourg, 1994).
25Josef Henke and Klaus Oldenhage, ‘Office of Military Government for Germany (US)’, chap. 1 in
OMGUS-Handbuch: Die amerikanische Milita¨rregierung in Deutschland 1945-1949, ed. Chris-
toph Weisz (Mu¨nchen: Oldenbourg, 1994), pp. 15-23, 28, 30.
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should do so also in postwar reconstruction. Accordingly, Germany’s reparations
should not be punitive and economic disarmament should not affect ‘machinery,
but mechanisms’, i.e., the threat of German militarism should not be contained
by removing her industrial potential, but by creating an international security
architecture.26 From spring 1944, however, Henry J. Morgenthau, Secretary of the
Treasury, and Eleanor Roosevelt, President Roosevelt’s wife, led a pro-security,
anti-industry campaign that advocated a harsh peace with Germany. This
changed the dominant attitude in the public and in the administration and
resulted in the formulation of JCS 1067 in April 1945.27
Key figures in the Washington administration’s pro-industry fraction were John
J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, and John H. Hilldring, Chief of the
Army’s Civil Affairs Division and delegate at the Potsdam Conference. For them
JCS 1067 was a policy ‘assembled by economic idiots’ who wanted to ‘forbid the
most skilled workers in Europe from producing as much as they can for a
continent which is desperately short of everything’.28 McCloy and Hilldring
unsuccessfully tried to change JCS 1067 in its inception phase. Once it was in
effect they adopted a different strategy. They accepted the directive for the time
being and over time policy change should ‘bubble out of the facts’ that the
military administration would ‘uncover’ in Germany.29 Moreover, the Potsdam
Agreement between the four occupying powers gave actors within OMGUS scope
to apply JCS 1067 not too literally. It stipulated that ‘during the period of
occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit’.30 This provided
zonal administrations with leeway to allow the production of goods in their zone
that were needed in another, for trade between zones, the reconstruction of
transportation links and coordination between zonal administrations.
26Mausbach, ‘Restructuring and Support’, pp. 278-9.
27Steven Casey, ‘The Campaign to Sell a Harsh Peace for Germany to the American Public, 1944-
1948’, History 90, no. 297 (2005): 62–92. On the different factions in the US administration,
see also: Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the Line : The American Decision to Divide
Germany, 1944-49 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 14-70.
28Cited in: Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany , p. 1.
29Cited in: ibid., p. 8.
30FRUS, United States Department of State, Potsdam II , p. 1504.
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In OMGUS, both the pro- and the anti-industry view were represented. Bernard
Bernstein and his men held the flag of the anti-industry fraction. Bernstein was
Head of the Finance Division of OMGUS and his men were dubbed the
Morgenthau boys. The pro-industry fraction was led by Lucius D. Clay, Deputy
Military Governor of the US Zone and William H. Draper, Director of the
Economics Division of OMGUS. While the anti-industry fraction was stronger in
the American public and in the Washington administration in mid-1945, the pro-
industry fraction was stronger in OMGUS. Actors from both camps in OMGUS
produced cognitive artefacts on Germany’s economy and made them travel to the
US. In doing so, they tried to give legitimacy to their respective agendas.
5.3.2 Producing cognitive artefacts
Both camps drew on the same type of resources in producing cognitive artefacts.
These resources were records that the Third Reich had produced, German
ministerial personnel who knew how to handle these records and data from the
current military administration. Both sides tried to control as many of these
resources as possible, to strengthen their own production of cognitive artefacts
and to weaken the production of the other side.
By the end of 1945 the pro-industry camp gained virtually full control over these
resources, see table 5.2, p. 170. While a quantification is not easily possible, the
rivalry of the two sides is evidence that the resources were of great value. The
Ministerial Collecting Center (MCC), the repository of the pro-industry camp,
inventoried the German ministerial personnel and the tons of the documents it
held. The Finance Division kept its resources elsewhere, in 44 field offices that
were spread throughout the American zone. The Finance Division did not report
any quantities, but in December 1945, when its field offices were dissolved, the
military administration reported that 24,000 feet of documents were
centralised.
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Table 5.2: Distribution of resources between the competing camps
in OMGUS for the production of artefacts
Pro-industry camp1 Anti-Industry camp2
Records Personnel Records Personnel3
May 1945 90t4 254 15K ft.4 ?
September 1945 130t 130 21K ft.4 ?
January 1946 150t 250 - -
1 Resources were housed at the Ministerial Collecting Center (MCC), the
official repository for resources of the Third Reich, which was operated
by SHAEF.
2 Resources were housed in 44 field offices, spread throughout the Amer-
ican zone. Bernstein established this separate infrastructure for the
Finance Division. The field offices were dissolved in December 1945
and 24,000 feet of records centralised.
3 Numbers are not known.
4 Proportionate estimates.
Sources: Lester K. Born, ‘The Ministerial Collecting Center Near Kas-
sel, Germany’, The American Archivist 13, no. 3 (1950): 237–258.
BAK, OMGUS: Ministerial Collecting Center, USGCC 3/125-1/10:
Semi-Monthly Report, 1 to 15 December 1945, December 1945.
The MCC in total, according to Ziemke, held 750 tons of documents of the
Reich’s ministries and close to 100 German officials by the end of May 1945.31
The MCC was formally established on 13 June 1945 by the Supreme
Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), the joint American-
British headquarters. The facility was secret, codenamed Goldcup, and its stated
purpose was to ‘safeguard [...] records and archives of the German Ministries, [...]
provide a collecting center for such German Ministerial officers and officials as
may be required for interrogation [and] provide an information and interrogation
center relative to the German Ministries for the use of the Supreme Headquarters
[...] and other agencies as may be jointly authorised by the U.S. and British Zone
Commanders’.32 The site of the MCC comprised three villages, five camps and a
munitions factory about 12 miles southeast of Kassel, more than 300 buildings in
total; on some days, more than a hundred trucks arrived to unload materials and
31Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946 , p. 315.
32SHAEF, USGCC 44-45/10/3, fiche 1 : Ministerial Collecting Center, June 1945.
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people.33 On 1 November, according to the MCC archivist Lester K. Born (1950),
Goldcup housed about 1,250 tons of documents, more than 1,200 German
ministerial personnel and about 70 tons of film and scientific apparatus.34 On 10
December, according to MCC’s semi-monthly report, it held close to 1,400 tons of
documents and more than 1,100 officials.35
With respect to the competing camps within OMGUS, the composition of
documents and officials at the MCC is much more telling than its absolute
holdings. The resources of the pro-industry fraction far outstripped those of the
security camp. On 1 November Draper’s Economics Division held 264 individuals
and 145 tons of documents.36 Draper’s division was second, with regard to
individuals, only to the Armed Forces and third, regarding documents, to the
Armed Forces and the Foreign Office. On 10 December 1945 there were 257
former German officials and 150 tons of documents on the roster of the
Economics Division.37 In comparison, the resources of Bernstein’s Finance
Division at the MCC were negligible. On 1 November there were seven officials
and 1/2 ton of documents.38 On 10 December there were three individuals and 1/4
ton of files.39
The MCC was a prize for the administration, particularly for the pro-industry
camp. By 1 November it had had more than 600 visitors, Galbraith was one of
them. They came for the files, the German personnel or both.40 The MCC had a
considerable output as well, although figures vary by source. Born speaks of
‘about 200 reports’ that the German experts had produced by the end of
October.41 A memo of the MCC from December speaks of 110 reports and 25
radio talks, most of them on the agricultural industry, the food situation, but also
33Lester K. Born, ‘The Ministerial Collecting Center Near Kassel, Germany’, The American
Archivist 13, no. 3 (1950): pp. 239, 250-1.
34Ibid., pp. 247-8.
35Bundesarchiv Koblenz, (hereafter BAK), OMGUS: Ministerial Collecting Center, USGCC
3/125-1/10: Semi-Monthly Report, 1 to 15 December 1945, December 1945.
36Born, ‘The MCC’, pp. 247-8.
37OMGUS: Ministerial Collecting Center, OMGUS-MCC: Semi-Monthly Report .
38Born, ‘The MCC’, p. 248.
39BAK, OMGUS: Ministerial Collecting Center, OMGUS-MCC: Semi-Monthly Report .
40Born, ‘The MCC’, pp. 247-8.
41Ibid., p. 247.
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on price formation, a so-called plant protection service or the supply with
machinery.42
The Statistical Office of the Industry Division of OMGUS was one of the entities
that used the MCC. The Statistical Office consisted itself partly of German
human resources. It was located in Bad Nauheim, was established in June and
had recruited personnel from the Abteilung fu¨r Maschinelles Berichtswesen
(Division for Automated Reporting) of the Reichsgruppe Industrie. Reichsgruppe
Industrie was one of the branches of the Reichswirtschaftskammer, the industrial
organisation of the Third Reich, which was subordinated to the Reich’s Ministry
of Economics. Reichsgruppe Industrie had fled Berlin in March 1945 and was
contacted in Bayreuth and Gera in May by the OMGUS Industry
Division.43
OMGUS evaluated the usefulness of the MCC in autumn 1945, with a view of
discontinuing it. Bernstein was the only division head who argued that the MCC
was of ‘no value’ and that it should be closed.44 Considering the Finance
Division’s meek holdings at the MCC, Bernstein’s proposition is not surprising.
He kept his resources away from the MCC and shutting down the facility would
have given him a significant advantage. Bernstein had set up 44 field offices
throughout the American zone. There the Finance Division kept its own
resources, away from the MCC and beyond the reach of the pro-industry camp.45
Bernstein’s decentralised parallel organisation controlled at least 24,000 feet of
documents and it survived as long as Bernstein himself managed to hang on to a
post as Division Head in OMGUS. His tenure ended in December 1945 though.
He returned to the US, the field offices were dissolved and its records moved to
Griesheim am Main, close to the seat of OMGUS in Frankfurt am Main.46
42OMGUS: Ministerial Collecting Center, MCC FA-61/13: List of studies produced by German
experts, December 1945.
43Abelshauser, Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945-1948 , pp. 32-3; OMGUS and Roth, OMGUS
- Ermittlungen gegen I.G. Farben, pp. xxvi-xxvii.
44USGCC, USGCC 44-45/10/3 : Evaluation of the Ministerial Collecting Center, 1945.
45OMGUS and Roth, OMGUS - Ermittlungen gegen I.G. Farben, pp. xxiv-xxvi.
46LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R481) : Finance - Monthly Report 6, January
1946, pp. 18-20.
172
5 European recovery and German industry after World War II
5.3.3 Making cognitive artefacts travel well
Cognitive artefacts and the resources for their production had to travel, from the
MCC to the Industry Division, from one field office of the Finance Division to
another and between different OMGUS divisions. Ultimately, cognitive artefacts
had to travel from the American zone of occupation in Germany to Washington.
To legitimise political agency, however, it was not sufficient that resources and
cognitive artefacts moved between various actors, entities and audiences. In the
terminology of Peter Howlett and Mary S. Morgan (2011), artefacts and resources
had to ‘travel well’.47 The content of cognitive artefacts and the resources for
their production had to be ‘intact’ when reaching their destinations.48 Recipients
had to use resources and artefacts in ‘new ways’.49 That is, in the terms of Mary
S. Morgan (2011), resources and cognitive artefacts had to travel with ‘integrity’
and ‘fruitfully’.50
The concept of ‘travelling well’ initially refers to facts, used as an umbrella term
for ‘shared pieces of knowledge’ that are ‘autonomous, short, specific and
reliable’.51 I apply the concept of ‘travelling well’ to cognitive artefacts and the
resources for their production, because I think that they are facts in such a broad
sense, too. Morgan argues that facts have ‘many guises and sizes’, that they are
hard to delimit and while some call them ‘data’, others might call them
‘phenomena’.52
By which means did cognitive artefacts and resources for their production travel
within OMGUS and between OMGUS and the Washington administration?
Which impact could these means have on the integrity and fruitfulness of
travelling resources and artefacts? OMGUS disposed of a so-called reports
procedure that regulated the flow of official information. Between mid-1945 and
47Howlett and Morgan, How Well do Facts Travel?
48Morgan, ‘Travelling Facts’, p. 12.
49Ibid.
50Ibid., pp. 12, 13, 18.
51Ibid., p. 8.
52Ibid.
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early 1946, the pro-industry camp overhauled the reports procedure along with
the administrative structure of OMGUS.
The precursor of OMGUS was USGCC, the US Group Control Council, Germany,
which formally existed from 8 May until 1 October 1945. The pro-industry camp
was dominant in the USGCC structure, see fig. 5.1, p. 175.53 Clay stood at the
top of the organisation as Deputy Military Governor and Draper was a member of
the executive office as Assistant Deputy for Resources. Several functional
divisions also belonged to the pro-industry camp, above all Industry, Food &
Agriculture and Trade. The power of the anti-industry camp was concentrated on
a lower, functional level. Bernstein was Head of the Finance Division. In USGCC
resources and artefacts could travel freely between functional divisions, e.g.,
between Finance and Public Health or Industry and Food & Agriculture (F&A),
and directly to Washington.
The Control Office was created by Clay on 13 September 1945. The new unit,
headed by William Whipple, was wedged in between the Military Governor and
the directorates and functional divisions, see fig. 5.2, p. 177. Henke and
Oldenhage describe the Control Office’s duties in general terms. Its
responsibilities were to liaise with Washington, to oversee the work of the
functional divisions, to allocate personnel and coordinate the military
government’s administrative and reports system.54 The War Department defined
a report as ‘an oral, narrative, tabular, or graphic presentation of information
transmitted from one agency to another’ and stipulated that ‘no agency of a
command will initiate a report’ without a control symbol by the Control Office.55
That is, the Control Office controlled the flow of official information in OMGUS
and from OMGUS to Washington. The OMGUS reports procedure could be
tweaked to open certain channels and close others. It could create very specific
audiences. Some reports could not travel at all, others were public, some moved
only between specific OMGUS subdivisions, others could travel to the top of the
53Author’s design, following Henke and Oldenhage, ‘OMGUS’, pp. 16-7.
54Ibid., pp. 27, 29.
55National Archives and Records Administration, US (hereafter NARA), OMGUS: Economics
Division, RG-260.319.1 (R&S): Memo to Branch Chiefs on Reports Control, February 1946.
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Figure 5.1: Structure of USGCC and exemplary channels of reports system in May
1945. Dashed lines exemplify the movements of reports that the administration pro-
duced. These could move freely, e.g., between functional divisions like Finance and
Public Health, and travel to Washington directly.
Source: Author’s own design, based on Josef Henke and Klaus Oldenhage, ‘Office of
Military Government for Germany (US)’, chap. 1 in OMGUS-Handbuch: Die amerik-
anische Milita¨rregierung in Deutschland 1945-1949, ed. Christoph Weisz (Mu¨nchen:
Oldenbourg, 1994), 1–143, pp. 16-7.
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organisation but not sideways, and some travelled in the entire administration,
including Washington.
USGCC was transformed into OMGUS on 1 October, see fig. 5.2, p. 177.56
Elements that belonged to the pro-industry camp were brought closer together,
the anti-industry camp was split up. The Economics Division was created at the
functional level. It absorbed Draper’s office of the Assistant Deputy for
Resources, the Divisions for Industry, Trade & Commerce and Food &
Agriculture as branches and furthermore parts of the Reparations & Restitution
Division. In addition, the Economics Division received a Policy & Control
Branch. Draper, formerly Assistant Deputy of Resources, became Director of the
Economics Division in personal union with Economic Advisor to the Deputy
Military Governor. Bernstein and his Morgenthau boys were corralled into the
Division for the Investigation of Cartels & External Assets, a dedicated
IG Farben Control Office was created at the Finance Division.57
One of the things that make cognitive artefacts and resources travel well are
‘vehicles’.58 For actors in OMGUS the most immediate and important vehicle was
the military administration’s reports procedure. We can observe indirectly which
consequences the creation of the Control Office had for the anti-industry camp
around Bernard Bernstein. On 1 October 1945 he was made Director of the
Cartels & External Assets Division and on 15 December the division was broken
up again. Typically, functional divisions produced monthly reports that travelled
within OMGUS and to Washington. Bernstein’s division, however, produced no
reports during its short existence. Legitimising agency via cognitive artefacts
means that some of them have to be made to travel well, while others have to be
made to travel poorly.
Bernstein returned to the US in winter 1945. External assets became the Finance
Division’s responsibility, the investigation of cartels became part of the
Economics Division, see fig. 5.3, p. 179.59 Chief of the Decartelisation Branch of
56Henke and Oldenhage, ‘OMGUS’, p. 28.
57Ibid., p. 30.
58Morgan, ‘Travelling Facts’, pp. 26-9.
59Henke and Oldenhage, ‘OMGUS’, p. 32.
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Figure 5.2: Structure of OMGUS and exemplary channels of the reports system in
September 1945. A dedicated Economics Division (green) was created from several
USGCC elements. William Draper became Director of the Economics Division and
Economic Adviser to the Deputy Military Governor. Bernstein became Head of the
Division for the Investigation of Cartels & External Assets (red).
The new Control Office and changes to the reports control procedure meant that it
could cut off Bernstein from the flow of information and prevent him from submitting
reports to Washington.
Source: Author’s own design, based on Josef Henke and Klaus Oldenhage, ‘Office of
Military Government for Germany (US)’, chap. 1 in OMGUS-Handbuch: Die amerik-
anische Milita¨rregierung in Deutschland 1945-1949, ed. Christoph Weisz (Mu¨nchen:
Oldenbourg, 1994), 1–143, pp. 32-4.
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the Economics Division became James Stewart Martin. In February 1946 Draper
established a reports control procedure for the Economics Division, following the
model of the Control Office for the entire administration. Draper charged the
Economics Division’s Reports & Statistics Branch (R&S) to assign control
symbols, change report forms and handle the entire communication with ‘outside
agencies’; Draper ordered furthermore that R&S review all existing reports, edit
them where necessary ‘to avoid misinterpretation’ and ensure ‘clarity and
completeness’.60 Draper assigned control symbols to the Industry Branch, to Food
& Agriculture, to Trade & Commerce, but none to the Decartelisation
Branch.61
Draper denied Martin and the Decartelisation Branch access to the OMGUS
reports procedure. That was the vehicle whose purpose it was to make cognitive
artefacts and the resources for their production travel well within OMGUS and
from OMGUS to Washington. It was not the only vehicle though. There is no
evidence that Martin was silenced or prevented completely from sharing
information with other Morgenthau boys inside OMGUS and the anti-industry
camp more generally. Quite the opposite, there are several well-informed
contemporary accounts on the struggle between the two camps in OMGUS.
Howard Watson Ambruster (1947) published an account in which he decried the
US occupation of Germany as ‘treason’ and duping of the American people.62
After leaving OMGUS Martin made a similar argument in his 1950 book,
sarcastically referring to his former superiors as Honorable Men.63 The historical
record indicates that the published accounts of Ambruster and Martin did not
have the force to delegitimise America’s pro-industry policy towards Germany.
They highlight, however, that we should expect actors to employ a range of
strategies to make cognitive artefacts travel well. An official government report
and a book are different types of vehicles and they travel to different audiences.
Hence they will carry different specifications of a cognitive artefact. Morgan
60NARA, OMGUS: Economics Division, Memo ED 319.1 (R&S).
61NARA, ibid.
62Howard Watson Ambruster, Treason’s Peace: German Dyes & American Dupes (New York,
NY: Beechhurst Press, 1947).
63James Stewart Martin, All Honorable Men (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1950).
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Figure 5.3: Structure of the Economics Division and channels of OMGUS report
system, March 1946. The Division for Decartelisation (red) was the last element
that belonged to Bernstein’s camp. In December 1945 it was made a branch of the
Economics Division, the stronghold of the pro-industry camp. In February 1946 the
reports control procedure within the Economics Division replicated the pattern the
Control Office had already established for OMGUS as a whole. It was adjusted so
that the Decartelisation Branch was cut off from the flow of current information and
could not send official communication to Washington or to other entities in OMGUS.
Source: Author’s own design, based on: LSEA, Office of Military Government: Eco-
nomics Division, HC286.5 G37: A Year of Potsdam : The German Economy since
the Surrender, ed. William Draper, Arthur Settel and Henry Koerner (1946), p. 5.
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argues that ‘labels, packaging or chaperones’ can make for good travels, too.64
Moreover, ‘terrain and boundaries’ matter, as does the ‘character’ of an artefact
itself.65 We might not identify all of these aspects in the travels of the cognitive
artefacts of OMGUS, but we should look out for them.
5.4 US occupation policy and cognitive artefacts
Between mid-1945 and early 1946 the pro-industry camp strengthened its control
over resources for the production of cognitive artefacts. Moreover, it gained
control over the most important vehicle on which cognitive artefacts travelled, the
OMGUS reports procedure. Which impact did these developments have on the
cognitive artefacts that were produced and that travelled well? How did they
shape the scope of agency in Washington and what kind of occupation policy did
they legitimise? I investigate these questions by tracking cognitive artefacts on
three key issues in the debate over postwar Germany’s economy: first, the
potential for warfare of Germany’s industry; second, the food supply of the
population; third, the reasoning that lead to a US occupation policy that
promoted industry from 1947.
5.4.1 IG Farben and Germany’s potential for warfare
The German company IG Farben was the world’s largest chemicals corporation in
mid-1945. During the war it had closely collaborated with the Nazi regime and
was one of the most important suppliers of the Wehrmacht. IG Farben had
provided virtually all of the Wehrmacht’s synthetic rubber, methanol, synthetic
lubricating oil and explosives.66 Farben had produced most of the poisonous gas
that was used in the gas chambers of the Holocaust.67 It had operated a factory
64Morgan, ‘Travelling Facts’, pp. 26-30.
65Ibid., pp. 31-3, 33-5.
66LSEA, Office of Military Government: Economics Division, HC286.5 G37: A Year of Potsdam
: The German Economy since the Surrender, ed. William Draper, Arthur Settel and Henry
Koerner (1946), p. 192.
67LSEA, ibid.
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in the Auschwitz concentration camp to make use of prisoners’ forced labour.68
Farben was covertly active in the US as well, where it maintained close
relationships with Standard Oil and other companies throughout the war.69 The
stance that the Washington administration would take on IG Farben was a
centrepiece in determining American occupation policy. If Washington saw
IG Farben as a case in point for Germany’s industrial war potential, an anti-
industry policy was virtually inevitable. If Washington saw IG Farben as a
problem of the past that was effectively handled and contained by the American
military administration, a major obstacle to a pro-industry policy was
removed.
Starting in July 1945 various units of the American military administration in
Germany produced monthly bulletins, typically consisting of a mix of text and
numerical artefacts. The vehicle on which these bulletins travelled within
OMGUS and to Washington was the OMGUS reports procedure. In July and
August Clay’s Report of the Military Governor mentioned neither IG Farben nor
any other German cartel, see fig. 5.4a, p. 183.70 For Bernstein and the
Morgenthau boys, however, IG Farben was one of the key topics. Bernstein and
the Finance Division reported Farben’s global connections with subsidiaries in
Spain, Latin-America and the US. Bernstein told Washington, too, that American
IG had been ‘engaged to an extent of more than 60% with government orders for
direct armaments purposes’ during the war, see fig. 5.4b, p. 183.71 In August the
68Vernon Herbert and Attilio Bisio, Synthetic Rubber: A Project that had to Succeed, Contribu-
tions in economics and economic history (London: Greenwood Press, 1985).
69Charles Higham, Trading with the enemy: An expose´ of the Nazi-American money plot 1933-
1949 (London: Robert Hale, 1983). Further literature on IG Farben: Gerald Aalders and Gerd
Wiebes (1996) analyse the techniques used by neutral countries like Sweden to cloak owner-
ship of Farben assets, see Gerard Aalders and Cees Wiebes, The Art of Cloaking Ownership:
The Case of Sweden: The Secret Collaboration and Protection of the German War Industry
by the Neutrals (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996). Volker Koop (2005) in-
vestigates the links between IG Farben and Swiss banks and companies, see Volker Koop,
Das schmutzige Vermo¨gen (Mu¨nchen: Siedler Verlag, 2005). Stephan H. Lindner (2005) deals
with the relationship of Hoechst, a successor of Farben, and the Third Reich, see Stephan H.
Lindner, Hoechst: Ein I.G. Farben Werk im Dritten Reich (Mu¨nchen: C.H. Beck, 2005).
70LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R512) : Monthly Report of the Military Gov-
ernor - 2, September 1945.
71LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R481) : Finance - Monthly Report 1, OMGUS,
August 1945, pp. 1, 11-3.
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Finance Division reported the blocking of IG Farben’s financial assets.72 On 12
September the Finance Division submitted a dedicated report on IG Farben to
Clay, consisting of several hundred pages.73
Bernstein’s cognitive artefacts travelled well to Washington during the first
months of the occupation. The vehicle for the bulletins of the Finance Division
was the OMGUS reports procedure. Bernstein showed IG Farben to Washington
as an ongoing threat to peace. In comparison, no cognitive artefacts on
IG Farben by the pro-industry camp travelled to Washington during those
months. Clay even applauded Bernstein’s investigation into IG Farben when Clay
appeared in front of a Senate Subcommittee, led by Harley M. Kilgore. Kilgore
was a US senator who had travelled the American zone of occupation in May and
June 1945. Upon returning to the US, Kilgore opened a Senate Subcommittee on
the elimination of Germany’s war potential and thereby became an important
ally of Bernstein.74 Clay, however, as Deputy Military Governor of OMGUS,
classified the IG Farben report of Bernstein as restricted. Hence Bernstein’s
report could no longer travel on the OMGUS reports procedure.75 On 13
September, the day after Bernstein submitted his IG Farben report, Clay created
the Control Office that systematically regulated access to the OMGUS vehicle.
Moreover, Clay promoted Bernstein and his men to form the newly created
Division for the Investigation of Cartels & External Assets.76 Bernstein’s new
division was dissolved again three months later, on 15 December, and it never
produced a report that travelled on the OMGUS vehicle.77
After creating the Control Office and closing down Bernstein’s access to the
OMGUS vehicle, the pro-industry camp moved to control Bernstein’s production
of cognitive artefacts on IG Farben. As of 30 October Clay made cartels and
72LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R481) : Finance - Monthly Report 2, September
1945, p. 1.
73The report is published in:OMGUS and Roth, OMGUS - Ermittlungen gegen I.G. Farben.
74ibid., p. xxviii; United States Senate, Elimination of German resources for war: Hearings
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs. (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1945).
75OMGUS and Roth, OMGUS - Ermittlungen gegen I.G. Farben, pp. xxviii - xxxiv.
76Henke and Oldenhage, ‘OMGUS’, p. 27.
77LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R481) : Finance - Monthly Report 3, October
1945.
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(a) Clay’s report (b) Bernstein’s report
Figure 5.4: Objects 1a, cover pages of military government reports by Lucius
D. Clay, Military Governor, and Bernard Bernstein, Head of the Finance Division,
from September and August 1945. Clay did not mention IG Farben. Bernstein
investigated the global dimension of the IG Farben conglomerate and relayed its US
connections to the Washington administration.
Sources: LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R481) : Finance - Monthly
Report 1, OMGUS, August 1945; Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R512) :
Monthly Report of the Military Governor - 2, September 1945.
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external assets a matter of quadripartite control.78 Consequently, Bernstein’s duty
was to deal only with those aspects of IG Farben that fell within the American
occupation zone, i.e., regional assets and facilities. Bernstein could no longer show
IG Farben as a global conglomerate that threatened world peace.79 In December,
Clay made all of IG Farben a quadripartite matter.80 That made Bernstein’s
division entirely superfluous and it was dissolved the same month. The resources
on which the Morgenthau boys had drawn in their field offices were centralised in
Griesheim am Main. There, according to the pro-industry camp, they facilitated
‘the continued investigation by American and Allied investigators’.81
What were the politics behind Clay’s handling of IG Farben? In autumn 1945 it
was apparent that the four occupying powers, the US, Britain, France and the
Soviet Union, had very different ideas for the future of Germany. Clay was
acutely aware that the Allied Control Council (ACC), the body that was
supposed to develop joint policies and handle quadripartite matters, was
ineffective.82 Clay impeded the kind of thorough investigation on which Bernstein
had embarked in the summer of 1945 by making IG Farben a quadripartite
matter. Thereafter, all that was left for OMGUS to deal with were the physical
plants of IG Farben that were located in the American zone. These plants were
assigned to a pool of industrial facilities that the Allies thought to dismantle at
some point, either for security reasons, like armaments plants, or to extract
reparations. Hence, as of January 1946, IG Farben was the responsibility of the
Restitutions & Reparations Branch, a unit that belonged to the Economics
Division of OMGUS, see fig. 5.3, p. 179.83
The Restitutions & Reparations Branch (R&R) of the Economics Division was
firmly in the pro-industry camp. During 1945 R&R reported to Washington in
78LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R512) : Monthly Report of the Military Gov-
ernor - 4, November 1945, pp. 17-8.
79LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R481) : Finance - Monthly Report 4, November
1945, pp. 1, 13-4; Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R481) : Finance - Monthly Report
5, December 1945, pp. 1, 11-3.
80LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, Finance Report 6 , p. 18.
81LSEA, ibid., pp. 19-20.
82Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, pp. 149, 264.
83LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, Finance Report 6 , p. 18.
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general terms and aggregate quantities about the progress that OMGUS made in
gauging Germany’s industrial potential and identifying potential reparation
plants.84 R&R did not focus on any company in particular and the term
IG Farben appeared in its reports only once, when a dyes factory in the French
zone was added to the roster of available plants.85 Several armaments plants had
been operated by IG Farben during the war, but were actually owned by the
Reich. During 1945 R&R itemised these factories consistently as assets of the
Reich. The pro-industry camp as a whole, however, started in November 1945 to
make its cognitive artefacts on IG Farben travel well to Washington. On 12
November the Industry Branch of the Economics Division blasted two of the
armaments plants that were owned by the Reich and had been operated by
IG Farben. The Army’s Signal Corps documented the blasting with its camera
and film teams. The handle of the detonator was pressed down by General Lucian
K. Truscott and he did so several several times until his expression and the
camera angle were suitably tough for the occasion, see fig. 5.5, p. 186.
In December 1945 Truscott could be seen in action in the press and on United’s
Newsreel, where he followed Go¨ring and other Nazis standing trial in Nuremberg,
see fig. 5.6, p. 188. In news reports the blasted plants were described as
IG Farben plants, neglecting the distinction between operator and owner. After
the American public and the Washington administration had a chance to see the
blasting of the IG Farben plants, R&R changed its reporting on IG Farben and
the cognitive artefacts it sent to Washington. In R&R’s report of January 1946
IG Farben showed up in the table of contents and in the synopsis.86 Moreover,
R&R itemised plants that were owned by the Reich and operated by IG Farben
as assets of IG Farben; R&R reported the destruction of the two plants and
calculated that 21 of 42 sites, or about 52% of Farben’s production capacity in
84Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R525) : Reparations and Restitution - Monthly Report
3, October 1945; Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R525) : Reparations and Restitu-
tion - Monthly Report 4, November 1945; Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R525) :
Reparations and Restitution - Monthly Report 5, December 1945.
85LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, Reparations Report 4 , p. 3.
86LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R525) : Reparations and Restitution - Monthly
Report 6, January 1946, p. 1.
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Figure 5.5: Object 1b, showcased blasting of an IG Farben plant. Three different
takes of General Lucian K. Truscott show him blasting the IG Farben armaments
plant at Kraiburg on 12 November 1945. Industry Branch choreographed the occa-
sion, the Army’s Signal Corps filmed and photographed it.
Source: NARA, OMGUS: Army’s Signal Corps, 111 ADC 9928, RG-60.3603: Blast-
ing IG Farben Plant, November 1945.
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the US Zone, were either destroyed or available for reparation.87 R&R did not
point out that the destroyed factories were owned by the Reich, not by Farben.
IG Farben received similar prominence in R&R’s report of February 1946.88
How did the images of General Truscott on the detonator handle make the
cognitive artefacts of the pro-industry camp travel well? Obviously, the artefacts
did not travel with the images, i.e., the images were not a vehicle. The Travelling
Facts project offers the analytical term ‘chaperones’ that is helpful here.89
Chaperones are individuals who ‘act as knowing or unknowing companions’ of a
cognitive artefact.90 By blasting the plants and by producing images of it, the
Industry Branch of OMGUS and the US Army’s Signal Corps produced large
numbers and different groups of chaperones. Above all, there is Truscott. As
high-ranking general, member of OMGUS and blaster, Truscott became
‘authority’, ‘expert’ and ‘witness’ at the same time.91 Furthermore, the
journalists, camera men, photographers and OMGUS members who were on site
became eye witnesses. Finally, those who saw the images of the blasting became
indirect witnesses. The numerical artefacts on IG Farben’s containment that
R&R produced from January 1946 had many chaperones.
The chaperones resided in different social spheres and had hugely varying degrees
of expertise on IG Farben. Moreover, the vast majority of chaperones never saw
the cognitive artefacts that the pro-industry camp produced and circulated. That
asymmetry brings us back to the problem that we have encountered in the
previous case. Actors need to align parties with potentially diverging objectives
in order to legitimise political agency. How can they do that? In other words,
how could a camera man or the audience of Universal’s newsreel be made into
chaperones of the pro-industry camp’s artefacts? Here the notion of ‘packaging’ is
helpful.92 Cognitive artefacts were packaged into images and a narrative of the
destruction of IG Farben plants. The pro-industry camp demonstrated that it
87LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, Reparations Report 6 , pp. 3-5.
88LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R525) : Reparations and Restitution - Monthly
Report 7, February 1946.
89Morgan, ‘Travelling Facts’, p. 30.
90Ibid.
91Ibid.
92Ibid., pp. 28-9.
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Figure 5.6: Object 1c, Universal Newsreel of the blasting of the IG Farben arma-
ments plant at Kraiburg in November 1945. The materials of the Army’s Signal
Corps featured in Universal’s Newsreel from 6 December 1945. It showed the broad
public how OMGUS contained the threat that Germany’s industry posed to peace.
Source: Still images of newsreel taken from: LSEA, Office of Military Government:
Economics Division, HC286.5 G37: A Year of Potsdam : The German Economy since
the Surrender, ed. William Draper, Arthur Settel and Henry Koerner (1946), pp. 22,
24.
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contained IG Farben’s threat to security by telling a simple, spectacular and
catchy story, similar to Lloyd George’s reparations promise after World War I to
search German ‘pockets for the last farthing’. That story packaged cognitive
artefacts that were much less straightforward. Hence the packaging transformed
the cognitive artefacts, too.93
The decline of the anti-industry camp began when President Roosevelt died on 12
April 1945 and was succeeded by Harry Truman.94 Morgenthau resigned from the
Treasury on 22 July 1945. The Morgenthau boys left their posts in the military
administration in Germany or were squeezed out in the course of autumn and
winter. Thereafter, the anti-industry camp continued to pursue a harsh peace
with Germany by appealing to the American public.95 Steven Casey (2005)
argues that the campaign lost momentum in the course of 1946 and was truly lost
in 1948.96 From 1946 onwards Germany’s industry in general and IG Farben in
particular were increasingly less perceived as a threat to world peace. IG Farben
was in the centre of attention again on 5 June 1947, when 24 executives were
charged in the Nuremberg trials. Records on Farben that had been brought to
Griesheim in late 1945 were destroyed before the process. Prosecutor Josiah E.
DuBois was discredited as Jewish, i.e., partial, and a ‘follower of the Communist
creed’.97 The trial ended very favourably for the defendants and for IG Farben.
They were found to have no collective responsibility for the war or war crimes
and only some individuals were sentenced for crimes like participation in looting.
The maximum sentence was eight years and some managers continued their
career at IG Farben after their time in prison.98
US policy also changed in favour of IG Farben and Germany’s cartels between
mid-1945 and early 1947. According to Regina Ursula Gramer (2004), policy took
93Morgan, ‘Travelling Facts’, p. 29.
94Eisenberg, Drawing the Line, pp. 14-70.
95Henry Morgenthau, Germany is our Problem (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1945).
96Casey, ‘The Campaign for a Harsh Peace’.
97OMGUS and Roth, OMGUS - Ermittlungen gegen I.G. Farben, pp. lv-lvi; Josiah E. DuBois and
Edward Johnson, The Devil’s Chemists: 24 Conspirators of the International Farben Cartel
who Manufacture Wars (The Beacon Press, 1952).
98OMGUS and Roth, OMGUS - Ermittlungen gegen I.G. Farben, pp. lviii - lix.
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a U-turn from ‘decartelisation to reconcentration’.99 When the chemicals giant
was finally dismantled from February 1947 onwards, the outcome were not the
dozens of small companies once envisioned, but three large corporations and a few
smaller ones. The most well-known successor companies of IG Farben are BASF,
Bayer, Hoechst and Agfa. That outcome was ‘much more favourable to West
German industry preferences’ than the decartelisation ideas from
mid-1945.100
5.4.2 Food supply of the German population
We have outlined how the pro-industry camp gained the upper hand in the course
of 1945. It increasingly controlled the resources for the production of cognitive
artefacts and was in a better position to make its own artefacts travel well.
Which impact did this development have on the cognitive artefacts concerning
food supply in Germany? From the start of the occupation, the pro-industry
camp argued that the food supply of the population could only be secured
through imports, which should be paid for by exports. In autumn 1945 Clay
emphatically warned Washington of an impending humanitarian catastrophe. Via
his monthly report, he relayed that the American zone could only produce rations
of 930 calories throughout October 1946 and that the Germans would ‘not subsist
in good health’.101
A few months before Clay’s warning, SHAEF had compiled a handbook for the
military government of the occupation. For 1944/45 American experts estimated
that native food production would amount to a daily ration of 1,745 calories. In
addition, 400 calories per person and day would be carried over from reserves.
Occupation policy for Germany provided for a ration of 2,000 calories, in keeping
99Regina Ursula Gramer, ‘From Decartelization to Reconcentration: The Mixed Legacy of
American-Led Corporate Reconstruction in Germany’, in The United States and Germany
in the Era of the Cold War, 1945-1990, ed. Detlef Junker, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: German
Historical Institute / Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 289-90.
100Ibid.
101LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, Military Governor’s Report 4 ; Military Governor
of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R512) : Monthly Report of the Military Governor - 5, December 1945,
p. 14-5.
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with provisions across Europe and matching the League of Nation’s
recommendation for a working adult.102 Hence the initial expectation was that
rations in Germany would have to be actively reduced.103 Looking back, Werner
Abelshauser (1998) maintains that rations for a member of a worker’s family were
1,671 calories in 1944/45 and 1,471 in 1945/46.104 Hence the 930 calories that
Clay reported to Washington in November 1945 understated caloric supply by
approximately a third. Clay’s number fell far short of the supply SHAEF
anticipated and of actual rations as they are known in hindsight.
Clay and the military administration might have chosen to err on the side of
caution rather than dealing with an actual famine. If we consider which
numerical artefacts Clay and the pro-industry camp made travel well and which
they made travel poorly, we come to a different conclusion. It was not clear what
was happening on the ground and all sorts of claims could legitimately be made.
In that situation Clay and the pro-industry camp adduced such evidence that
suited their political agenda of promoting German industry. In contrast to the
pro-industry fraction, the Public Health and Welfare Division (PH&W) of
OMGUS painted a very different and much more optimistic picture in its reports
to Washington.105 In early September 1945 the authors of PH&W’s monthly
report found no evidence of a poor humanitarian situation. PH&W worried about
the structures of relief agencies and their coordination. In passing they mentioned
that about 20% of the population depended on ‘public assistance’, but the
relationship between relief administration and unemployment insurance was a
102Atina Grossmann, ‘Grams, Calories, and Food: Languages of Victimization, Entitlement, and
Human Rights in Occupied Germany, 1945-1949’, Central European History 44, no. 1 (2011):
p. 122.
103SHAEF and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Handbook for Military Government in Germany prior to
Defeat or Surrender (US Army, 1944), §§ 887-94.
104Abelshauser draws on Hans-Joachim Riecke, Undersecretary at the Reich’s Ministry of Food
and Agriculture; Abelshauser, ‘Germany: guns, butter, and economic miracles’, p. 155.
105Jessica Reinisch (2013) has produced a comparative study of public health policies in the four
occupation zones between 1945 and 1949. She remarks that services in the American zone were
best, due to superior American resources and absence of internal conflict in the administration,
and that the attitude towards the German population was soon remarkably positive. Reinisch
does not comment on the early developments in OMGUS though. Jessica Reinisch, The Perils
of Peace: The Public Health Crisis in Occupied Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2013), pp. 188 - 220.
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more pressing problem than food supply, see fig. 5.7a, p. 193.106 Meanwhile, in
Clay’s report, Germany’s population was heading straight for ‘wide spread
malnutrition’; food, transportation and fuel were the ‘most immediate economic
problems’.107 The Food & Agriculture (F&A) Division made the same point
already a month earlier. Its ‘German technical experts’ had calculated that 11m
tons of supplies, consisting of fertilisers, pesticides, machinery and combustibles,
had to be imported to achieve the necessary calorific output in 1945/46, see
fig. 5.7b, p. 193.108 The calculations on Germany’s food supply that Clay and
F&A quoted came from the MCC. They were produced by some of the roughly
250 former German officials that the Economics Division held there.
Similar to the IG Farben issue, the pattern of cognitive artefacts that travelled
well from the American military administration to Washington changed with the
creation of the Control Office and the restructuring of OMGUS in September/
October 1945. PH&W had to submit to the reports control procedure of the
Control Office and lost its independence in the restructuring of USGCC into
OMGUS. In USGCC, PH&W was an independent functional division that could
make its own cognitive artefacts travel. In OMGUS, PH&W became a section of
the Internal Affairs and Communications Division, see fig. 5.1, p. 175, and
fig. 5.2, p. 177. Once the authors of the Public Welfare report belonged to
Internal Affairs and Communications, they produced cognitive artefacts on food
supply that aligned well with the warnings of Clay and F&A of a looming
catastrophe. To PH&W, food, clothing, fuel and shelter were pressing problems
in their October 1945 report. After stating that they had ‘very little statistical
data’ on current and future public assistance, the authors of the PH&W report
went on to imagine the mass feeding centres of the coming winter in great
technical detail. The ‘most acute problem’ was that of obtaining food. The
authors rounded off their report, citing a survey of living conditions, that riots in
the coming winter would be due to ‘demands for the basic necessities for
106LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R523) : Public Welfare - Monthly Report 2,
September 1945, pp. 1, 6.
107LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, Military Governor’s Report 2 , pp. 5-7.
108LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R482) : Food and Agriculture - Monthly Report
1, August 1945, p. 2.
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(a) Public Health & Welfare (b) Food & Agriculture
Figure 5.7: Objects 2a; cover pages of OMGUS reports to Washington by the Public
Health & Welfare Division (PH&W) and the Food & Agriculture Division (F&A)
from September and August 1945. PH&W was not worried about food supply, F&A
warned of starvation in the upcoming winter of 1945/46 and calculated imports that
would be necessary to close the subsistence gap. F&A’s predictions were based on
calculations by German experts and proved to be overly pessimistic by December
1945.
Sources: LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R523) : Public Welfare -
Monthly Report 2, September 1945; Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R482)
: Food and Agriculture - Monthly Report 1, August 1945.
193
5 European recovery and German industry after World War II
continued existence’.109 The F&A report chimed in in October 1945 as well and
remarked that Allied wheat was being distributed to ‘prevent disease, disorder
and hazard to occupational forces’.110
Between November 1945 and February 1946, PH&W produced no monthly
reports and did not submit current relief statistics to Washington.111 F&A and its
scribes, however, now part of the Economics Division, made other numerical
artefacts travel to Washington and warned that ‘facts and figures do not paint a
cheerful picture’.112 Clay doubled up on the grim outlook and relayed that it was
now certain, according to the ‘third and most complete crop estimate’, that the
‘Germans will not subsist in good health through 1946 nor revive their depleted
agriculture’. To supplement the 930 calorie rations, Clay went on, organised mass
feedings were necessary, such as the program of November 1945 that fed 37,000
people in Berlin.113
In January 1946 it was evident that the warnings of Clay and F&A were too
pessimistic. Nobody was starving or rioting in the American zone of occupation.
When the Public Welfare report was produced again in March 1946, it contained
relief statistics that would have deflated the pessimism of Clay and F&A much
earlier. Continuous relief data for the past months showed that the opposite had
happened of what the German experts had predicted. Public assistance had
consistently declined since the start of the occupation and was lowest in January
1946, with total expenditure a third lower than in July 1945.114
The absence of misery in the population in early 1946 was a setback for the pro-
industry camp’s objectives. If the population was well-fed, if it was peaceful, if it
109LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R523) : Public Welfare - Monthly Report 3,
October 1945, pp. 1-3, 6.
110LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R482) : Food and Agriculture - Monthly Report
3, October 1945, p. 1.
111LSEA, OMGUS, Public Welfare, 1945-1948, 1949, flyleaf.
112LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R483) : Food and Agriculture - Monthly Report
4, November 1945, p. 1; Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R483) : Food and Agriculture
- Monthly Report 5, December 1945, p. 1.
113LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, Military Governor’s Report 4 ; Military Governor
of the U.S. Zone, Military Governor’s Report 5 , p. 14-5.
114LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R523) : Public Welfare - Monthly Report 8,
March 1946, pp. 1, 17.
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did not press the American military administration for relief, there was no case to
reactivate, let alone promote Germany’s industry. This episode offers insight into
the limits of managing the travels of cognitive artefacts. It only goes so far in
legitimising agency. The predictions by the German experts about food supply
travelled well. They were transmitted on the OMGUS reports procedure, they
were not subverted by actual relief statistics or challenged by rivalling
calculations. Yet, they did nothing to legitimise a pro-industry policy, because
they evidently did not represent the things that were actually happening. That
brings us to the question what actors do if their cognitive artefacts fail to
legitimise their agency or even subvert it?
F&A conceded in January 1946 that ‘sufficient food supplies were available’ after
all and that calorific intake in the most recent rationing period was in fact at
1,550 calories, highest ever since the beginning of the occupation.115 The authors
explained their excessively bleak expectations from previous autumn with
inaccurate data, an overestimation of the population and an underestimation of
‘indigenous food supplies’.116 That is, in retrospect F&A declared its own
estimates as provisional. Eventually, Clay and F&A retargeted their warnings
and predicted a human catastrophe for the winter of 1946/47.
Other units in the pro-industry camp were confronted with the same problem.
Their cognitive artefacts made a claim to legitimacy, but discrepancies between
artefact and the things actually going on threatened to subvert that claim. The
Industry Division of OMGUS, later Industry Branch of the Economics Division,
produced a range of cognitive artefacts with the purpose of legitimising a
reactivation of German industry.117 One of the artefacts that Industry Division
provided was the counterpart to F&A’s starvation prognosis. Industry Division
115LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R512) : Monthly Report of the Military Gov-
ernor - 6, January 1946, p. 6; Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R483) : Food and
Agriculture - Monthly Report 6, January 1946, p. 1.
116LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R483) : Food and Agriculture - Monthly Report
7, February 1946, p. 1.
117For example, at the time when F&A calculated requirements for fertiliser, Industry Division
relabelled its inventory in a suitable manner. Plants for chemical base products were re-listed
as fertiliser plants, e.g., the soda ash plant in Heilbronn or the ammonia plant in Trostberg.
See LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone. Industry - Monthly Reports 1-6. Aug. 1945
to Jan. 1946.
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produced a numerical artefact that compared actual output of agricultural
equipment to required output, the latter being estimated by Germans at the
MCC. Throughout autumn and winter 1945 actual output fell far short of
requirements.118 An example is the production of tractors, see fig. 5.8a, p. 197.
The German experts estimated that the US Zone needed 1,062 tractors in the
first quarter of 1946. Actual production, however, only amounted to 22 tractors
in October 1945 and 25 in November. That suggested a significant shortfall for
the coming quarter, allowing the pro-industry camp to argue for a more far-
reaching activation of Germany’s industry to increase production and pay for
necessary imports.
Similar to what happened to F&A, the Industry Branch was forced to readjust
the relationship between its numerical artefacts and actual events in January
1946. A surprisingly high output figure for ploughs threatened to debunk the
argument that the level of current industrial production in the US zone would
lead to starvation, see fig. 5.8b, p. 197. The output of ploughs was 225 units in
October 1945 and 260 in November, while requirements for the first quarter of
1946 were estimated at 1,000 units, see fig. 5.8a, p. 197. Surprisingly, 1,756
ploughs were produced in December 1945, more than fulfilling requirements, see
fig. 5.8b, p. 197. Industry Branch reacted by revising its estimate of required
ploughs. Instead of 1,000 units, as of December 1945, Industry Branch estimated
in January 1946 that 10,749 units were needed. While both requirement
estimates were provisional numbers, Industry Branch replaced a number that
threatened their political agenda with a number that was suitable.
Moreover, from March 1946 onwards, Industry Branch used a different type of
cognitive artefact to compare actual and required production of agricultural
implements. A line graph was used instead of a table, see fig. 5.9, p. 198. While
the table reported disaggregated figures for different types of machines, the graph
was based on aggregate figures for all machines. One line of the graph showed
prewar production, too. The graphic artefact had several advantages over the
118LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R495) : Industry - Monthly Report 1, August
1945, p. 2; Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R495) : Industry - Monthly Report 2,
September 1945, pp. 1-2; Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R495) : Industry - Monthly
Report 3, October 1945, p. 20.
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(a) December 1945
(b) January 1946
Figure 5.8: Object 2b; production statistics of agricultural implements in the US
zone from December 1945 and January 1946. Industry Branch reported actual out-
put and estimated requirements to Washington. When production of ploughs, third
line from the bottom, in December 1945 increased to more than 1,700 units and
thereby exceeded the estimated requirement of 1,000 units, the estimate was drastic-
ally revised upwards to more than 10,000 units.
Source: LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R495) : Industry - Monthly
Report 5, December 1945, p. 9; Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R495) :
Industry - Monthly Report 6, January 1946, p. 2.
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table. First, events like the surprisingly high production of ploughs in December
1945 and any adjustments that Industry Branch might make to requirement
estimates would be much less obvious. The graph was more adaptable to actual
events than the table. Second, in the graph actual output (bars) was visibly
dwarfed by requirements (dotted line) and prewar production (solid line). Hence
the graph made a stronger and visually more impressive case than the table for
the reactivation of Germany’s industry.
Figure 5.9: Object 2c; graph of the production of agricultural implements in the
US zone in 1945-46, relative to estimated requirements (dotted line) and prewar
production (solid line). Industry Division switched to the graphic presentation in
March 1946. Compared with the numerical presentation it had several advantages.
Surprises like the production miracle in ploughs from January 1946 were less visible.
Furthermore the gap between actual and required production was visually more
impressive.
Source: LSEA, Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R495) : Industry - Monthly
Report 8, March 1946, p. 21.
The pro-industry camp of OMGUS iteratively produced, modified and circulated
cognitive artefacts to legitimise political agency. In the first two cases the driver
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of that iteration was the rejection of cognitive artefacts by negotiation partners.
For the actors of OMGUS, the iteration was driven by the need for cognitive
artefacts to represent what was actually happening. To that end, actors
retrospectively declared numbers as provisional that were rigid initially, they
adapted provisional numbers as necessary and they chose more suitable types of
cognitive artefacts over less suitable ones.
More generally, producing cognitive artefacts that represent what is happening
requires actors to engage in two types of activities. On the one hand, they have
to produce new artefacts, e.g., calculate a new forecast of caloric supply. On the
other, they have to modify old artefacts, e.g., declare features as provisional that
were initially treated as rigid. That suggests two additions to our analytical
toolkit. Lampland argues that numbers ‘decay’ if they are provisional in a
temporary sense, because they serve to ‘anticipate future possibilities’.119 Here,
however, we have a case in which actors purposely retire provisional numbers
when they no longer fit to actual events. As actors retire old provisional numbers,
they replace them with suitable new ones. Moreover, we have provisional
numbers that are activated as actors retrospectively flip rigid numbers to
provisional ones.
5.4.3 Industrial exports for food imports
Herbert Hoover, former President of the United States, visited Austria and the
American and British zones in Germany in winter 1946/47. Hoover was the envoy
of President Truman’s so-called Economic Mission to Europe. In the American
zone, Hoover was shown around by OMGUS. He inquired into the food supply of
the population with the help of the Food & Agriculture Branch of the Economics
Division.120 After returning to the US, Hoover assembled his findings in a report
in March 1947, titled The necessary steps for the promotion of German exports,
so as to relieve the American taxpayers of the burdens of relief and for economic
119Lampland, ‘False numbers as formalizing practices’, p. 384.
120Timely, F&A also wrote a cumulative review of the past year in February 1947, see LSEA,
Military Governor of the U.S. Zone, 43 (R483) : Food and Agriculture - Monthly Report 20,
February 1947.
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recovery of Europe, see fig. 5.10, p. 201.121 He based his report on a ‘mass of
information and statistical material secured on [his] journey’ and on witnessing
the extreme scarcity of food during the winter months of 1946/47 himself.122
Hoover built on the cognitive artefacts of the pro-industry camp and on his
experiences to argue that the population would starve if it was not for American
and British aid.123
American occupation policy changed in July 1947. JCS 1067 was the directive
from April 1945 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the American military
administration. JCS 1067 had provided that the military government should
undertake no steps to reactivate Germany’s industry. In July 1947, JCS 1067 was
replaced by JCS 1779, which had the objective to stabilise the American zone of
occupation and make it economically productive. Michael Hogan (1987) and
others argue that the cost of Germany’s food supply to the American taxpayer
provided a great deal of the political momentum to shift US occupation policy.124
Under JCS 1779, instead of closing the subsistence gap with Allied relief,
Germany should export industrial goods and pay for food imports herself. The
economic reasoning of JCS 1779 is encapsulated in the title of the report by
Herbert Hoover. Moreover, Hogan argues that the Hoover Report was the
template for a policy initiative by the War Department that provided the
economic reasoning of the Marshall Plan, which followed a few months
later.125
We have previously identified several criteria under which cognitive artefacts
travel well and legitimise political agency. Many of these criteria apply to the
Hoover Report. Above all, the German and Austrian population really was
121Herbert Hoover, Truman Library : Official File, Truman Papers, 18 March 1947 : Report No. 3
- The Necessary Steps for Promotion of German Exports, so as to Relieve American Taxpayers
of the Burdens of Relief and for Economic Recovery of Europe, March 1947.
122Ibid., p. 2.
123Ibid.
124Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan : America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western
Europe, 1947-52, Economic History and Policy: The United States in the Twentieth Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 22-5; Berger and Ritschl, ‘Germany and
the Political Economy of the Marshall’, pp. 210; more broadly: Milward, The Reconstruction
of Western Europe, 1945-51 , pp. 3-6.
125Hogan, The Marshall Plan.
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Figure 5.10: Object 3; cover page of Herbert Hoover’s report no. 3 on his visit to
Germany and Austria during the winter 1946/47. Based on statistics and information
by OMGUS, Hoover recommended the ‘promotion of German exports, so as to relieve
the American taxpayer of the burden of European relief and recovery’. His report
provided a great deal of the political momentum for occupation policy JCS 1779 and
the Marshall Plan that promoted Germany’s industrial production.
Source: Herbert Hoover, Truman Library : Official File, Truman Papers, 18 March
1947 : Report No. 3 - The Necessary Steps for Promotion of German Exports, so as
to Relieve American Taxpayers of the Burdens of Relief and for Economic Recovery
of Europe, March 1947.
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starving during the winter 1946/47, giving Hoover’s report and the cognitive
artefacts it contained a close correspondence with actual events. Herbert Hoover
was a very effective chaperone, too. He was a witness because he had seen the
misery of the people himself. He was an expert because he was equipped with
data about food requirements, the cost of relief etc. He was an authority, amongst
other reasons, for his famed achievements in organising Allied food supply during
World War I at the US Food Administration. It could even be argued that, as
former President of the United States, Hoover was a celebrity. Moreover, Hoover
included cognitive artefacts into his report that had ‘character’ and were therefore
likely to travel well.126 For example, Hoover included the rather chilling numerical
artefact into his report that making Germany into ‘pastoral state’ required the
US to ‘exterminate or move 25,000,000 people out of it’, to give her the same
population density as France.127 Finally, the Hoover Report travelled on several
vehicles and reached different audiences: on the one hand, the Hoover Report was
an administrative document that had been commissioned by President Truman.
On the other, the report was published through news agencies to the media.
5.5 Analytical conclusions: Themes from the case
Between mid-1945 and early 1946 the pro-industry camp of OMGUS consolidated
its control over the production and circulation of cognitive artefacts. In the
terminology of the Travelling Facts project, actors in the pro-industry camp
produced and managed their own cognitive artefacts so that they ‘travelled well’,
with integrity and fruitfully.128 In addition, the pro-industry camp made its own
cognitive artefacts travel well by preventing others from travelling at all. That
allows us to make an addition to the Facts project, which does not discuss
‘travelling well’ as absence of travelling competition. Using both measures, the
pro-industry camp succeeded to spread its story about Germany’s economy,
legitimising the policy shift to which it aspired. In April 1947 US occupation
126Morgan, ‘Travelling Facts’, p. 33.
127ibid., p. 33; Hoover, Report No. 3 , p. 12.
128Morgan, ‘Travelling Facts’, pp. 12, 13, 18.
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policy changed from restricting to promoting Germany’s industrial
production.
Actors in the pro-industry camp managed the initial production and circulation
of their cognitive artefacts in a number of ways. First, by controlling as many
resources for the production of artefacts as possible; second, by controlling access
to the prime vehicle on which artefacts travelled; third, by packaging complicated
and ambiguous artefacts into a simple and straightforward narrative that
travelled well on newsreel film and in the press; fourth, by enlisting a broad range
and a large numbers of chaperones. The Hoover Report from March 1947, crucial
in providing the momentum for the policy shift, had many of these features and
we might say that it travelled extremely well.
The limitations of legitimising agency by managing the production and
circulation of cognitive artefacts became evident, too. Actual events did not line
up with what cognitive artefacts predicted. Actors managed the resulting
discrepancies by iteratively producing and circulating artefacts. In these
iterations, actors produced cognitive artefacts in which they adapted the value of
provisional numbers or chose to produce entirely different types of artefacts.
Actors retroactively changed features of old artefacts from rigid to provisional as
well. Hence we argued that Lampland’s provisional numbers do not only ‘decay’
as time passes. Actors purposely retire and activate provisional numbers, too.
More generally, the case gave us additional insight into the forces that drive the
evolution of cognitive artefacts. In the first two cases we have seen that actors
develop their artefacts after negotiation partners reject them. The current case
shows us that actors modify their artefacts so that they represent what is actually
happening.
Moreover, the case has highlighted that legitimising agency through cognitive
artefacts is not a one-off problem. We have seen that refining the production of
cognitive artefacts and making them travel well required actors to pay continuous
attention and show a great deal of endurance. That aspect is not a general
feature in the Travelling Facts project. It appears occasionally though, e.g., in the
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study of Naomi Oreskes (2011).129 She investigates the difficulties of making facts
about climate change travel to the general public in the face of competing
interests. More generally, I want to suggest that legitimising political agency
through cognitive artefacts is a prolonged process with a high, possibly endless
number of iterations.
129Naomi Oreskes, ‘My Facts Are Better Than Your Facts: Spreading Good News about Global
Warming’, chap. 5 in How Well Do Facts Travel? : The Dissemination of Reliable Knowledge,
ed. Peter Howlett and Mary S. Morgan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 136–
66.
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6.1 Analytical conclusions
Political actors remade Europe’s economic landscape between 1917 and 1947
through cognitive artefacts. Cognitive artefacts were maps, data maps, statistical
tables and graphs relating to aspects that actors were dealing with. Cognitive
artefacts give us additional insight into the diplomatic process because they
complement the textual and verbal record we have. When it comes to concrete,
tangible outcomes, actors remain vague in their statements, but they are explicit
in their cognitive artefacts. By analysing the cognitive artefacts of actors, we
could see that the diplomatic results they achieved were neither the outcome of a
rational calculation nor of a policy discourse. Instead, actors jointly developed ad
hoc ways of reasoning that were synthetic, open-ended and contained both
rational and ideational elements. These joint ways of reasoning were specific
enough to yield diplomatic results and general enough for actors to maintain their
own views.
In coming to an agreement, diplomatic actors go through a process in which they
are aligning their agency. In the cases, we could observe four aspects of this
process in which actors are using cognitive artefacts. First, actors identify scope
and structure of their individual agency; second, actors identify scope and
structure of their joint agency; third, actors coordinate concrete political
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decisions with broader strategic aims; fourth, actors grind out or even create
shared interests. Actors that are aligning their agency are cooperating. That has
raised the question how cognitive artefacts relate to Star and Griesemer’s
boundary objects, which allow actors from different social spheres to cooperate
without having a consensus.1 We have identified a number of differences that lead
us to conclude that cognitive artefacts are not boundary objects, despite
occasionally displaying similarities. Boundary objects mediate between the
positions of actors while actors use cognitive artefacts to sharpen their individual
positions.2 Boundary objects provide multi-way translations of an issue while
cognitive artefacts are singular, at best partly compatible accounts.3 Boundary
objects emerge when actors cooperate, but cognitive artefacts serve actors to
identify conditions and scope of their cooperation.4 Lastly, boundary objects
‘maintain the integrity’ of diverging interests whereas actors use cognitive
artefacts to legitimise their agency, possibly against other interests.5
The different functions of boundary objects and cognitive artefacts point to a
difference in the respective social processes in which they are used. Cooperation
is a given for actors that are using boundary objects. In contrast, cooperation is
uncertain for the political actors that are using cognitive artefacts. Political
actors manage and gradually reduce that uncertainty by iteratively producing,
circulating, rejecting and modifying cognitive artefacts. The key element in that
iterative process is the internal structure of cognitive artefacts. Cognitive
artefacts are ‘internally heterogeneous’, like Star and Griesemer argue for
boundary objects.6 Initially, I have specified the internal structure of cognitive
artefacts as consisting of features that actors take to be rigid, flexible or
stabilised. The features an actor takes as rigid define the outer limits of his
agency. Features an actor considers as flexible structure his agency internally. A
diplomatic outcome is a stabilised feature, neither rigid nor flexible by itself, but
dependent on other features.
1Star and Griesemer, ‘Boundary Objects’, p. 388.
2Ibid., p. 389.
3Ibid., pp. 389-91.
4Ibid., p. 408.
5Ibid., pp. 389, 413-4.
6Ibid., p. 408.
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The cases have shown that the internal structure of cognitive artefacts develops
as actors go through a diplomatic process. At the beginning, different actors
consider different features as rigid, flexible and stabilised. At the end, if the
diplomatic process has not broken down, they have worked out a shared set of
rigid, flexible and stabilised features. The internal heterogeneity of cognitive
artefacts gives actors space to reason, but it does not necessarily provide them
with reasoning resources. To exemplify, the map of one actor considers people to
be rigid, another actor’s map considers them to be flexible. Yet, the question how
actors ultimately agree to treat people, or if they get to agree at all, might be
resolved outside their maps. As actors go through iterations of cognitive artefacts,
their cooperation as well as their noncooperation take shape. Through their
iterations actors might produce cognitive artefacts that share some characteristics
with boundary objects, but lack many others. In the cases, examples of such
cognitive artefacts were the map of the Polish border in the Treaty of Versailles
or the Spa percentages. Like boundary objects, these cognitive artefacts allowed
actors with diverging views to cooperate. Unlike boundary objects, however,
these cognitive artefacts did not emerge from existing cooperation, but were
forged with persuasion, coercion and deceit to enable cooperation.
The results of the cases suggest that we revise our specification of the internal
structure of cognitive artefacts. First, actors do not take features to be rigid or
flexible in an absolute sense, but relative to other features. Second, in one and
the same cognitive artefact an actor can consider a feature rigid in one place and
flexible in another. Third, cognitive artefacts have false features, too. In each
case, drawing on Lampland’s notion of ‘false numbers’, we have identified
cognitive artefacts with features that actors regarded as neither rigid nor flexible
nor stabilised, but as false.7 As in Lampland’s systematic, there are three types of
false features. They can be literally false, provisional in a temporary sense and
provisional in a conditional sense.8 Moreover, false features are not necessarily left
to decay, actors may purposely retire and activate them. Like Lampland’s false
7Lampland, ‘False numbers as formalizing practices’.
8Ibid., pp. 387-94, 384, 384-7.
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numbers, false features make ‘stability and fixity of representation’ possible,
rather than subverting it.9
For actors that are using cognitive artefacts, aligning their agency is bound up
with legitimising their agency. That shapes both cognitive artefacts and the
iterative process in which they are used. The cases have shown that an actor
produces a cognitive artefact so that its internal structure legitimises his desired
outcome. That is, an actor considers those features as rigid, flexible and false
that yield his preferred stabilised feature. We have seen, too, that actors
legitimise their agency after the fact by producing cognitive artefacts with an
appropriate internal structure. Furthermore, actors produce cognitive artefacts
with features that have to be false so that a desired outcome is stabilised; actors
seek to control which cognitive artefacts are produced at all; actors retroactively
modify cognitive artefacts, e.g., by retiring and activating provisional features. In
the analytical terminology of the Travelling Facts project we have traced the
efforts of actors to legitimise their agency by managing the circulation of
cognitive artefacts.10 Actors seek to control access to the ‘vehicles’ on which
cognitive artefacts circulate, with the intention of making some ‘travel well’ and
making others travel poorly.11 Actors ‘package’ cognitive artefacts so that they
travel well on certain vehicles, e.g., complex and ambiguous cognitive artefacts
are packaged into catchy and straightforward ‘narratives’ that travel well on film
and in the press.12 Actors enlist ‘chaperones’ so that their cognitive artefacts
travel well, too.13 Lastly, as an addition to the Facts project, we have identified
actors making their own cognitive artefacts travel well by preventing others from
travelling at all, i.e., by shutting down travelling competition.
One of the protagonists of our cases, the American geographer Isaiah Bowman,
has put forward the term ‘map language’ in describing high-level diplomacy in
Paris after World War I. We have considered extending Bowman’s term to a
language of cognitive artefacts because cognitive artefacts form a network of
9Lampland, ‘False numbers as formalizing practices’, p. 380.
10Howlett and Morgan, How Well do Facts Travel?
11Morgan, ‘Travelling Facts’, pp. 25, 27.
12Ibid., pp. 27-8.
13Ibid., p. 30.
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reasoning, communicating and arguing. The language label does not fit very well
though because cognitive artefacts have different qualities, serve different
purposes and achieve different things than verbal and written statements. So
thinking and speaking of a technique of cognitive artefacts would be better, to not
obliterate their specifically numerical, visual, spatial and hybrid qualities.
6.2 Historical conclusions
What are we gaining as historians from cognitive artefacts and the role they play
in political processes? A rough bibliometric estimate on the four cases of this
study indicates that diplomacy after World War I has drawn a disproportionately
large share of critical scholarship. It seems that there is a strong motivation to
explain the negative experience of the interwar years and World War II through
mistakes made after 1918. Whatever the reasons, as a consequence we might have
a skewed picture. Possibly we are misjudging the impact that political actors had
on the course of the 20th century.
Diplomacy after World War I is often characterised as a failure. Regarding
borders, Sharp points out that politicians could not ‘reconcile the irreconcilable’
and Steiner argues that ‘no one understood [their] full complexity’.14 Regarding
reparations, a great deal of the literature starts with the observation that they
were a shambles to then work back and trace individual and collective
shortcomings.15 Through the analysis of cognitive artefacts we get a different
perspective. Rather than diagnosing failure we recognise achievement. Politicians
after World War I developed a remarkable synthesis of interests and
considerations despite not understanding the full complexity of the border
problem. Considering the obstacles that had to be overcome, reparations
diplomacy produced a pretty good result, maybe the best possible. In short, this
study alerts us to evaluate historical figures and their actions with due
consideration of the constraints and opportunities they had in situ. Cognitive
14Sharp, The Versailles Settlement , pp. 161-8; Steiner, The Lights that Failed , p. 82.
15Keynes, A revision of the treaty ; Mantoux, The Carthaginian Peace; Trachtenberg, Reparation
in World Politics; Kent, The Spoils of War .
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artefacts enable us to do a better job at that than the linguistic record
alone.
A point closely related is the explanatory power we ascribe to diplomacy for
macro developments that chronologically followed. Poland’s borders after World
War II have been rigid for more than 70 years now. But nobody would say that
that is because those who made them in the first place understood their
complexity. Indeed, probably no one would argue that Roosevelt, Stalin and
Churchill fully understood what they were doing in the 1940s. So why are we
inclined to think that a poor performance of Lloyd George, Millerand or Wilson
was responsible for borders and reparations that remained contentious beyond
1919 and 1921, respectively?
The 2011 study of Wolf, Schulze and Heinemeyer on trade and borders after the
Paris Peace Conference exemplifies the systematic problem.16 The ‘failure of
border diplomacy’ on the one hand and its ‘detrimental economic consequences’
on the other have formed a neat pair of cause and effect for almost an entire
century. However, Wolf et al show that the economic effects of the new borders
‘were quite limited’.17 So Lloyd George and his colleagues were either lucky or,
more likely, they got something right. As historians, considering cognitive
artefacts improves our historical judgement of diplomatic processes and actors.
Consequently, we are better placed to evaluate the impact they had or did not
have on subsequent developments.
16Wolf, Schulze and Heinemeyer, ‘Economic Consequences of the Peace’.
17Ibid., 915.
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